Heterogeneity in Stock Market Expectations and Portfolio Choice of American Households. by Kézdi, Gábor
Heterogeneity in Stock Market Expectations and
Portfolio Choice of American Households
MTA DOKTORI ÉRTEKEZÉS
Kézdi Gábor
February 13, 2013
               dc_564_12
Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Structure of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Preview of the results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Heterogeneity in expectations about future stock returns, learning incen-
tives and portfolio choice 21
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Characterizing stock market beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Heterogeneity in beliefs and learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Descriptive analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Structural analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Financial knowledge, personality and expectations about future stock re-
turns 46
3.1 Introduction and theoretical motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Results on nancial knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Results on Big Five personality traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Results on optimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 Stock market crash and expectations of American households 83
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Descriptive analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Structural estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5 Results of the structural model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Concluding remarks 110
1
               dc_564_12
A Appendix to Chapter 2 112
A.1 Details of the theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A.2 Data, descriptive statistics and detailed evidence on noise and information in
the probability answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2.1 Sample and stockholding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2.2 The proxy variable for lifetime earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.2.3 Noise in the probability answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2.4 Relevant heterogeneity in the probability answers . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.3 Details of the structural econometric model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.3.1 The likelihood function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.3.2 Expected ~ and  conditional on the probability answers . . . . . . . 143
A.3.3 Estimating the variance and correlation of survey noise . . . . . . . . 144
A.4 Detailed estimation results from the structural econometric model . . . . . . 149
A.4.1 Detailed estimates from the benchmark model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.4.2 Results for nancial respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.4.3 Results with freely estimated 2-point distributions for ~ . . . . . . . . 153
A.4.4 Results with including all the belief-specic right hand-side variables
(z) in all models with the other covariates (x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B Appendix to Chapter 3 158
B.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.2 Detailed estimates of the structural models with 2 probability answers . . . . 163
B.3 Detailed estimates of the structural models using all three probability answers 168
C Appendix to Chapter 4 176
C.1 Detailed estimates from the models with interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
C.2 Estimates based on alternative functional form assumptions . . . . . . . . . 179
2
               dc_564_12
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Decisions under uncertainty are shaped by the decision makerspreferences, the constraints
they face, and their beliefs about the future. The conceptual separation of beliefs from
preferences is perhaps one of the most important assumptions behind the economic theories
of decision under uncertainty. The separation of beliefs from preferences is complete in
expected utility theory with subjective probabilities. However, most nonexpected and non-
Bayesian utility theories also separate the two, at least at a conceptual level (see, for example,
Machina, 2002, for a review of nonexpected utility theory and Gilboa, 2010, for a critical
review of decision theory).
Economic analyses typically focus on the e¤ects of constraints on decisions. Constraints
are considered more likely to be a¤ected by policy decisions, while individual preferences are
thought to be una¤ected by policy decisions. Whether and how beliefs can be a¤ected by
policy decisions is typically not addressed in economics. An important exception is the role
of ination expectations in the Lucas critique of policies exploiting the Phillips curve (Lucas,
1976). One interpretation of the critique is that policies cannot fool people, and except for
some descriptive research on ination expectations and their relationship to central banks
credibility, most economists continued to assume away the impact of policies on beliefs.
However, beliefs may be inuenced by policy decisions, either directly or indirectly, more
so than preferences. In any case, assumptions about the stability of, or e¤ects of policies
on, beliefs or preferences are empirical questions and are di¢ cult to assess without adequate
measurement.
However, measuring preferences and beliefs at the same time is di¢ cult by observing
actions only. Revealed preference theory (see, for example, Richter, 2008, for a review) is
applicable to decisions under uncertainty only if one fully species the individual beliefs
about the future. For example, in rational expectations equilibrium, people are assumed
to make decisions based on beliefs about the probability distribution of future states of the
world that will prove to be correct in the sense that peoples subjective beliefs will in turn
characterize the actual probability distribution of future states. Unfortunately, assumptions
about peoples beliefs are di¢ cult to test by observing actions only, unless one is willing to
assign fully specied preferences to the decision makers.
Therefore, it appears obvious that these questions prescribe and agenda for empirical
research. We should learn about peoples preferences and beliefs in many decision situations
that are important for economic theory or policy.
There is a growing literature on uncovering preferences and on establishing relevant het-
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erogeneity in these preferences Typically, this type of research examines peoples decisions in
experimental situations. The most important general preferences regarding decisions under
uncertainty are related to risk and time. (Experiments in non-expected utility frameworks
often aim at measuring other preferences such as ambiguity aversion or loss aversion.) In
typical experiments that measure risk preferences, decision makers are presented with lotter-
ies with fully specied probability distributions and are asked to choose from the available
options. In e¤ect, in risk preference experiments, the experimenter induces variation in the
probability distribution while keeping preferences constant (because the probabilities vary
for the same people). Assuming that people fully understand and internalize those proba-
bilities, their choices can then be used to recover their risk preferences. A similar variation
can be induced in terms of the time horizon of outcomes to measure time preferences.
Many such experiments were criticized for analyzing specic populations (often under-
graduate students) and studying small samples. However, it is of course possible to conduct
similar experiments in large representative samples, although such experiments are rather
costly. Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man and Sunde (2010) is an excellent example: they investigate
correlations between intelligence ("IQ") on the on hand and risk preference and time prefer-
ence the other hand in a sample that is representative of the adult population in Germany.
This research nds that there is substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion, and that, on
average, risk aversion is moderate.
Typical experiments involve outcomes with real money at stake. Therefore, these exper-
iments are "incentivized," which means that peoples decisions have consequences for them
in terms of real money. For obvious reasons, however, the amount of money at stake in these
experiments is usually small compared to the money at stake in the most important real-life
decisions that concern economists.
An alternative method for eliciting preferences presents respondents with hypothetical
gambles, again with fully specied probability distributions - and then asks respondents to
make hypothetical decisions. The seminal paper measures risk preferences: Barsky, Juster,
Kimball and Shapiro (1997) ask people to choose between hypothetical jobs that would
result in di¤erent risks in terms of lifetime earnings and then recover the parameter of
risk tolerance assuming constant relative risk aversion utility. Importantly, these types of
hypothetical gamble questions allow for recovering "cardinal" (numerical) measures of risk
preferences with some additional assumptions, while the more widely used simpler survey
questions (how would you rate your risk tolerance?) allow for ordinal measures (ranking)
only. A series of follow-up papers examined the stability of measured preferences, the e¤ect
of question wording and the role of measurement error (Sahm, 2007; Kimball, Sahm and
Shapiro, 2008). They nd substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion and that risk preferences
4
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are stable over time. As an important methodological contribution, they also nd that there
is substantial error in the survey measures, and they develop a method to address that error
appropriately. They also nd that most people are likely signicantly more risk averse in
these hypothetical situations than has been previously expected and observed in incentivized
experiments, which is an important puzzle.
A widely aired criticism of the hypothetical gambles approach is that people may not
make thoughtful decisions if they do not have the right incentives to do so. Consequently,
the preference measures from this approach, and the heterogeneity therein, may have little
to do with "real" preferences that are relevant in real-life situations. The evidence in this
respect is mixed. On the more a¢ rmative side, Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man and Sunde (2010)
nd that an ordinal measure of risk preference from simple survey questions is strongly
correlated with risk preference measures derived from decisions in an incentivized experiment.
At the same time, Anderson and Mellor (2009) nd that risk preference measures derived
from hypothetical gambles of this type are often very weakly, if at all, correlated with
risk preference measures derived from decisions in incentivized experiments. The authors
also nd that the situation described in hypothetical gambles matters with regard to the
hypothetical decisions people make, and the strength of the correlation of the risk measures
derived from those answers to the experimental measures vary with the described situation.
Unfortunately, investigations of this type fall short of truly informative validations precisely
because the large stakes involved in the most informative hypothetical gambles are impossible
to implement in incentivized experiments.
Another concern with the hypothetical gamble approach is the cognitive di¢ culty of un-
derstanding hypothetical situations. It usually takes many complicated sentences to describe
these situations, with many important details. Respondents are also asked to make quick
decisions in situations that they most likely have never experienced. If the respondents were
to experience such situations, their decisions would most likely take a lot of time, and they
may consult other people, none of which is available in a survey situation. Note, however,
that the cognitive di¢ culty also appears to be a problem in incentivized experiments: Dave,
Eckel, Johnson and Rojas (2010) show that di¤erent wording can lead to di¤erent decisions
among people with lower numerical skills, even in an incentivized experiment.
Therefore, it appears that the approach to measure preferences has made substantial
progress but still has its problems.
A complementary approach aims at measuring beliefs. Here the experimental approach
is not feasible: while it is possible, at least in principle, to place decision makers in situations
with fully specied probabilities and then vary those probabilities to observe how decisions
change, giving people preferences and varying those preferences is obviously impossible. This
5
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problem leaves researchers with one possibility if they want to measure beliefs: to ask decision
makers directly about their beliefs.
A direct measurement of beliefs has potential problems that are similar to the hypo-
thetical gambles approach to elicit preferences. In a typical survey situation, there is little
time to answer the questions, and, beyond a spirit of cooperation, there are no incentives
to get the answers right. Furthermore, there is an additional issue: asking about beliefs
requires questions that people understand but that provide answers that are also useful in
characterizing peoples beliefs in a theoretically satisfactory way.
Manski (2004) argues that researchers should ask probabilities from decision makers if
they are interested recovering decision makersbeliefs. If people have well-dened probabil-
ities in their minds, asking for those probabilities is certainly the right approach. If people
think about uncertainty in other ways, asking for probabilities may be more problematic.
However, answers to probability questions may be informative even in that latter case.
We know little about how people actually think about uncertainty when they make
economically relevant decisions. Furthermore, even if we knew more about this phenomenon,
whether people can represent that uncertainty in probabilities when asked about it would be a
di¤erent question. It is possible that, if necessary, not fully conscious accounts of uncertainty
can be translated into probabilities even if decision makers do not make that transformation
explicit in their thought processes when making decisions. In fact, the possibility of this
transformation is the assumption of subjective probability theory. Of course, it is also
possible that uncertainty is represented in ways that are impossible to translate into well-
dened probabilities.
We know that people often make statements about uncertainty that do not conform
with the laws of probability. Moreover, people often or make choices that do not satisfy the
assumptions of subjective probability theory (see, for example, Ellsberg, 1961 or Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). This nding may imply that the expected utility theory and the subjective
probability theory completely misrepresent the way people make decisions. Undoubtedly,
failures in specic situations undermine the general nature of the theory. However, such
failures do not necessarily undermine the theorys usefulness in certain situations: those
theories may be su¢ cient descriptions of the way decisions are made in some situations but
not all situations. For example, the fundamental thought processes may be signicantly
di¤erent from what expected utility theory would suggest in the sense that people do not
calculate probabilities of future states of the world, attach utilities to each state, and/or
multiply those probabilities with characteristics of states of the world and then add up those
products. Instead, people may rely on heuristics and fast-and-frugal decision algorithms (see,
for example, Gigerenzer, 2008). The expected utility theory with subjective probabilities may
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still be a good approximation to those decision rules in situations but not necessarily in all
situations.
Whether probabilities are the way people actually think about uncertainty and the extent
to which peoples decision-making process can be appropriately approximated by expected
utility theory, are very relevant questions that need further investigation. Unless the answer
to those questions is very negative, asking probabilities from people about appears to be a
sensible approach to making them characterize the uncertainty they face. There is a small
but growing literature that makes use of peoples answers to questions on probabilities of
future events.
Research on expectations measured in probabilistic forms is made possible by the fact
that some major surveys have begun to include questions on probabilities of future events.
A pioneer in this approach is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a large
biannual panel household survey, representative of the American population 51 years of age
or older and their households (see Juster and Suzman, 1995 and NIA, 2007, for reviews).
The HRS has included several probability questions since its start in 1992. The inclusion of
probability questions was initiated by the late Thomas Juster, the rst principle investigator
of the HRS - and a long-time advocate of eliciting beliefs by probability questions (see, for
example, Juster, 1966).
The HRS includes questions on the probability of events such as living to certain age;
working past a certain age; losing a job (if working) or nding a job (if unemployed); receiving
an inheritance; and leaving an inheritance. Since 2002, the HRS has included one or more
questions on the probability that the stock market would go up (or down) by some threshold
values.
The example of the HRS itself led to similar surveys ("sister studies") around the world,
including in Great Britain, Mexico and Japan. The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE), a harmonized survey elded in 19 European countries (and Israel), also
closely follows the example of the HRS.1 The success of the HRS and the spread of HRS-
type surveys are in part due to the fact that population aging is one of the most important
structural challenges of the developed world, and studying aging requires panel data with
information in many domains. Another component of the HRS success is its organizational
structure, which was closely followed by its sister studies. The HRS is governed by re-
searchers as opposed to professional data collection agencies. Consequently, the content of
the questionnaire is closely related to important research questions. Similarly to the HRS,
its sister surveys also include questions on expectations, typically in the form of probabil-
ity questions (although stock market expectations are typically not included in those other
1Hungary joined SHARE in 2011 in its 4th wave.
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surveys).
Hurd (2009) provides an overview of the rst years of empirical research on expectations as
measured by survey questions on probabilities. The conclusions of his overview are cautiously
optimistic. It appears that there is substantial heterogeneity in peoples expectations. It
also appears that probabilistic measures of expectations elded on surveys can capture a
substantial part of that heterogeneity. Moreover, it appears that peoples answers to these
probability questions, on average, can be rationalized relatively easily in many important
domains.2
However, these measures have their own problems. Quite naturally, the lack of incentives
may be problematic because respondents may not put in the required e¤ort and thus may
not give well-grounded answers to these types of survey questions, a problem similar to
questions on hypothetical gambles. Note that whether and how one could incentivize the
elicitation of beliefs is a very di¢ cult question that has not been addressed in the literature.
Peoples ability to think in terms of probabilities may make these questions even more
di¢ cult to understand. One concern is the overall validity of expectation measures from
such questions; another concern is the potential relationship between answer quality and
respondentscognitive capacity. This second concern is especially severe because an apparent
correlation of expectation measures with real-life decisions may simply stem from, on the
one hand, a correlation of those decisions with cognitive capacity, and on the other hand,
the correlation of cognitive capacities with the quality of the probability answers, instead of
from a genuine correlation between decisions and expectations.
Expectations, or beliefs about the future, are the subject of this dissertation.3 I inves-
tigate ordinary individualsexpectations about returns attainable on the stock market. I
focus on American Households because of data availability. The research I report on in this
dissertation takes the measurement issues seriously. In fact, some of my research is in the
forefront at addressing those concerns.
Stock market expectations are important for many reasons. These expectations should
be relevant for the prices of stocks and other assets, the volume of transactions and other
aggregate measures of asset markets. Di¤erences between people regarding their stock market
2Important exceptions are massive overstatement of probabilities of rare negatve events such as natural
disasters or terrorist attacks (Christelis and Georgarakos, 2010), or teen-agers almost absurd overestimation
of the risks of major accidents or a premature death (Fischo¤, 2008). Whether and how stock market
expectations can be rationalized is a more complex question and a subject of this dissertation.
3I use "expectations" in a broad sense to denote beliefs about the future (as opposed to a more nar-
row use for "expected value"). Throughout the dissertation, I use the words "beliefs" and "expectations"
interchangably.
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expectations may be relevant for di¤erences in portfolio choice behavior and, in turn, wealth
accumulation. Furthermore, the existence of di¤erences in stock market expectations is an
important question in itself, from a theoretical perspective. Stock market expectations are
expectations about market prices, with little room for private information. It is not obvious
that individuals should exhibit substantial di¤erences in stock market expectations; if they
do exhibit substantial di¤erences, we should understand the origins of such di¤erences.
The primary focus of my dissertation is on the last question: why do people have di¤erent
expectations about future stock market returns? I also address the important follow-up
question: if people di¤er in their expectations, does that lead to di¤erences in their portfolio
decisions? The answers to these questions are also important for understanding asset prices
and wealth di¤erences.
Householdsportfolio decisions determine the structure of assets that households chose
to hold for their savings. In the United States, as in many other countries, fewer households
hold stocks than standard theory would imply, at least if risk preferences are "sensible" (i.e.,
if the risk aversion is not extremely high) and beliefs are close to what historical evidence
would suggest. This observation is the so-called "stockholding puzzle" (Mankiw and Zeldes,
1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Campbell, 2006; Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise, 2006).
The stockholding puzzle is related to the equity premium puzzle, which states that returns
on stocks observed in the past 100 years are di¢ cult to reconcile with their historical risks
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Kocherlakota, 1996; it appears that the recent nancial crisis
did not undo the equity premium puzzle, Damodaran, 2012).
There are three potential theoretical resolutions of the puzzle as well as an empirical
resolution. The empirical resolution aims at showing that, for most people, stocks are sig-
nicantly more risky than what the aggregate exercise by Mehra and Prescott suggests (the
paper by Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2008, is perhaps the most convincing of
those attempts). The three theoretical directions are the following: many people may face
very strong constraints that prevent them from investing in stock-market based assets; many
people may be much more risk averse than what has formerly been judged as "sensible"; and
many people may have beliefs about future stock returns that are characterized by substan-
tially lower expected value and/or substantially higher perceived risks than what historical
evidence would suggest.
There is an empirical literature on stock market participation that has focused on reduced-
form e¤ects of demography, education and wealth (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2000; Guiso, Halias-
sos, and Jappelli, 2002), cognitive capacity (Christelis, Jappelli and Padula, 2006), health
(Rosen and Wu, 2003), or social interactions (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Hong,
Kubik and Stein, 2004). From a theoretical perspective, it is not always clear whether those
9
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factors should be understood as constraints or as determinants of preferences or beliefs. I
think that it is obviously impossible to evaluate the three potential theoretical explanations
without sensible measures for preferences and expectations. This dissertation reports on
research that shows that a large part of the reduced-form relationships documented by the
literature likely operates through expectations.
1.2 Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation consists of three chapters in addition to this introductory chapter and the
chapter with concluding remarks. Chapter 2 characterizes the heterogeneity of stock market
expectations among American households and aims at explaining that heterogeneity. The
results of Chapter 2 suggest that an important part of the heterogeneity is the result of
di¤erences in learning histories, which are in turn caused by di¤erences in returns to and
costs of learning (as well as in initial conditions).4 Chapter 3 provides additional empirical
analysis to support the explanation put forward in Chapter 2, and it looks for other potential
sources of heterogeneity in peoples personality traits.5 Chapter 4 examines the e¤ect of the
stock market crash of September 2008 on householdsexpectations.6 The main text is kept
relatively short to make it more accessible. Each chapter is complemented with its own
appendix, with technical details and additional empirical results.
1.3 Methods
The three chapters ask di¤erent questions and use di¤erent samples of the Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS); however, the chapters are based on the same (or very similar) survey
questions and use a common methodology. The measurement problem in each chapter is
4The title of Chapter 2 is "Heterogeneity in expectations about future stock returns, learning incentives
and portfolio choice". It is an updated version of a previous paper coauthored with Robert J. Willis.
The title of that previous paper was "Household Stock Market Beliefs and Learning," and the paper was
published as NBERWorking Paper 17614.http://www.nber.org/papers/w17614.pdf. The paper was featured
in VOX, the policy and popular economic-research portal of the Centre for Economic Policy Research at
http://www.voxeu.org/article/beliefs-and-stock-market.
5The title of Chapter 3 is "Financial knowledge, personality and expectations about future stock returns".
It is new. Preliminary results from that chapter were presented at the "Formation and revision of subjective
expectations" conference, held on November 8-9, 2012 in Québec city, Canada.
6The title of Chapter 4 is "Stock market crash and expectations of American house-
holds". It is an edited version of a paper coauthored with Péter Hudomiet and Robert
J. Willis. The paper was published in The Journal of Applied Econometrics, 26: 393415
(2011).http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jae.1226/abstract
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to characterize expectations about stock market returns based on answers to probability
questions.
All three chapters assume that people believe that yearly log returns are i.i.d. and
normally distributed. The mean of log returns is denoted as  and the standard deviation
as . For example,  = 0:1 means that the mean return is approximately ten per cent. At a
yearly frequency, the i.i.d. normal assumption for log returns is in line with historical data.
In the period of 1945 to 2012, for example, yearly log nominal returns of the Dow Jones index
were characterized by a mean of  = 0:06 and a standard deviation of  = 0:16. Di¤erent
windows can give lower and higher values of , and the value of  is remarkably stable.
Under the i.i.d. lognormality assumption, the beliefs of individual i about the stock market
returns are fully characterized by her beliefs about the mean and the standard deviation, and
we denote those subjective beliefs by ~i and ~i. (Index i refers to potential heterogeneity in
the parameters, and the tilde refers to the subjective nature of the parameters.) We dene ~i
and ~i as the parameters that would characterize individual beliefs in investment situations.
The goal in each paper is to characterize heterogeneity in ~i and ~i , understand the sources
of that heterogeneity, and, in Chapter 2, establish its relationship to the heterogeneity in
household portfolios.
~i and ~i are unobserved in the data. Instead, the HRS data includes answers to proba-
bility questions. In all three chapters we make use of the answers to two question. The rst
question is the same in each dataset: it asks what the respondent thinks is the probability
that the market will go up. Answers to this question are denoted as p0: In Chapter 2, the
second question (p10) asks about the probability that the market will go up by at least 10
percent. In Chapter 3, the second question (p20) asks about the probability that the market
will go up by at least 20 percent. In Chapter 4, the second question (pc) asks about the
probability that the market will go up by at least c per cent or go down by at least c percent
(c 2 f10; 20; 30; 40g) :
If answers to two probability questions are available, identifying the mean and standard
deviation of log returns from the two probabilities is relatively straightforward under the
normality assumption, by making use of the inverse normal c.d.f. Intuitively, higher ~i cor-
responds to higher probabilities, while higher ~i pushes the argument of the c.d.f. toward
zero thus pushing both probabilities towards 0:5.
To see the correspondence between the structural parameters (~i and ~i) and the prob-
abilities more intuitively, Figure 1.1 shows three probability distribution functions together
with vertical lines at the cuto¤ points of 0 and 0.1 log returns that correspond to the p0 and
p10 questions. The continuous line shows a p.d.f. with historical moments between 1945 and
2002 (  = 0:07 and  = 0:15) that is the relevant time period for the analysis in Chapter 2.
11
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The dashed line corresponds to a mean-preserving spread (higher perceived risk), and the
dotted line corresponds to a lower mean (more pessimistic beliefs).
0
-.5 0 .1 .5
Log yearly returns on stock market index
Historical Riskier
Pessimistic
Figure 1.1. Examples for probability densities of normally distributed log returns, with the
cuto¤ points for p0 and p10
If the probability answers were precise integrals of the relevant density, they would be
equal to the area to the right of the corresponding bars at 0 and 0:1 log returns. We can
denote those ideal probabilities with starts, such as p0. The series of post-war returns up
to 2002 (the year of the data used in Chapter 2) corresponds to p0 = 0:68, p

10 = 0:42 and
p0   p10 = 0:26. Holding risk constant, more pessimistic beliefs result in smaller values of
p0 and p

10. Therefore, we can think of the p
 variables as proxy variables for the perceived
level of returns. A mean-preserving spread leads to a smaller area between the two vertical
bars, which equals the di¤erence p0  p10. The di¤erence between the two answers may thus
serve as a proxy for the inverse of the perceived risks. Analogous transformations could be
used for other positive cuto¤ values instead of 10 per cent. These proxies are far from being
perfect, though, partly because of the measurement issues (see below) and partly because,
for example, a mean-preserving spread can also change p0 (see more details on that in Section
2.2).
The measurement problem means that, instead of the theoretical probabilities that we
denoted by p, we are likely to observe something else in the data. There are strong the-
oretical reasons to believe that peoples answers to the probability questions are not equal
to the p transformations of these parameters. There is little time to answer the questions,
and, beyond a spirit of cooperation, there are no incentives to get the answers right. It is
12
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therefore better to consider actual answers as "guesses" for what the p values may be, given
recollections of ~i and ~i.
The data shown in Chapters 2 and 3 (and the corresponding appendices) reveal answer
patterns that strongly support this view. Almost all answers are rounded to the nearest 10,
or to 25 or 75 percent. Focal values at 50 per cent account for an especially large part of
all answers. Many respondents give the same answer to p0 and pc (for positive values of c),
which, taken at face value, would imply innitely large standard deviations of log returns.
Rounding would allow for nite (but large) standard deviations to give that pattern. Some
respondents give p0 < pc (again, for positive values of c), which does not conform with the
laws of probability. It may be that these respondents do not understand probabilities at
all. It is also possible that these answers reect inattention to one or both questions. The
empirical evidence is in line with the latter interpretation. Fortunately, the data in the 2002
wave of the HRS allows for a direct assessment of survey noise because a small subset of
the respondents answered the same probability questions a second time, in an experimental
module. When these respondents were asked to answer the same probability questions a
second time during the same interview approximately half an hour later, most gave di¤erent
answers. Perhaps surprisingly, all three noise features (rounding, apparent violations of the
laws of probability and test-retest noise) appear largely random. Some of these answer
patterns make computing the p values impossible. All answer patterns indicate that actual
answers are noisy transformations of relevant beliefs.
To address those problems, we developed a structural measurement model to estimate the
heterogeneity in the relevant belief variables and to handle survey noise. The model relates
the latent belief variables (~i; ~i) to the observed answers to the probability questions (p0i; pci)
for any positive cuto¤ value c (negative cuto¤ values are straightforward to include in the
analysis, and section C.2 in Appendix C. shows the details). The model accommodates all
of the observed answer patterns and our intuition about how people answer di¢ cult survey
questions.
Our estimation strategy is structural in that it focuses on the theoretically relevant para-
meters and the relevant heterogeneity in those parameters (net survey noise). In particular,
we estimate the moments of the distribution of ~i and ~i in the population and in various
subpopulations (analogously to Table 1 above), and we investigate the role of the hetero-
geneity of ~i and ~i in the heterogeneity of stockholding. We model the di¤erences between
"theoretical" probabilities (the p variables above) and actual probability answers (the p vari-
ables) in two steps. The rst step introduces survey noise, and the second step introduces
rounding.
Noise is modeled as mean-zero additive components to the index ~=~ that enters the
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probabilities p0 and pc. The noise components, denoted by v0 and vc, are assumed to be
jointly normal and potentially correlated. Let pbr0i and p
br
ci denote hypothetical "before round-
ing" answers so that the observed answers p0i and pci may be rounded versions of the former.
Conditional on the draw of the noise variables, these hypothetical survey answers are then
the following:
pbr0i = 

~i
~i
+ v0i

(1)
pbrci = 

~i   c=100
~i
+ vci

(2)"
v0i
vci
#
 N
 
0; 2v
"
1 v
v 1
#!
(3)
The noise components are assumed to be independent of any relevant heterogeneity, which
is consistent with the randomness of the test-retest error and the near-randomness of the
other noise features. The bivariate nature of the noise accommodates answers of p0i < pci if
that phenomenon is due to inattention to the survey (which, as noted earlier, is supported
by the near-randomness of its prevalence). The correlation coe¢ cient between v0 and vc is
related to average inattention. v = 1 would mean that all respondents answer questions p0
and pc with the same noise, which would not allow for answers such as p0i < pci. At the other
extreme, v = 0 would mean that all respondents forget their previous answers completely.
The true value of v is likely to be in-between. Luckily we can use the test-retest evidence
in HRS 2002 to us identify moments of the noise process (2v; v) :We assume that the noise
components in the core and module answers are independent, which is consistent with the
evidence that we have.
Answers to the probability questions may di¤er from the hypothetical "before-rounding"
probabilities pbr due to rounding. We accommodate rounding by an interval response model.
An answer within a pre-specied interval can correspond to any probability pbr within that
interval. Round numbers are in the middle of those intervals, which are dened in an
exogenous fashion and are assumed to be the same for all respondents.
Formally, the vector of survey answers (p0i; pci) is in the quadrant Qkl if the vector of the
hypothetical probabilities pbrij is in that quadrant:
 
p0i
pci
!
2 Qkl ,
0@  ~i~i + v0i


~i c=100
~i
+ vci
 1A 2 Qkl (4)
Qkl =
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In the implemented model, the intervals are dened, in percentage terms, as [0; 5) ;
[5; 15) ; [15; 25) ; :::; [95; 100] : These intervals allow for rounding to the nearest ten. The
interval response model is the simplest way of accommodating rounding that is compatible
with the guesswork of calculating probabilities.
With additional assumptions on the cross-sectional distribution of in ~i and ~i, this
model allows for estimating moments of the relevant heterogeneity in ~i and ~i. We assume
that ~i is normally distributed and ~i follows a two-point distribution. We estimate the
conditional mean of the normal distribution, the conditional standard deviation of the normal
distribution, and the probability of the low point conditional on the right-hand-side variables.
The expected value of ~i across respondents is specied as a linear combination of right
hand-side variables, with parameter vector . Unobserved heterogeneity in ~i is assumed
to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation that is allowed to
be related, in a linear fashion, to the right hand-side variables, with parameter vector u:
This heteroskedasticity specication in ~i allows for estimating di¤erences in disagreement
by groups dened by the observable characteristics. Heterogeneity in ~i is specied as a
two-point distribution with the lower point xed to the historical standard deviation, the
upper point estimated as the same scalar for everyone, and the probability of the upper point
specied as a probit model with parameter  on the observable characteristics.
~i = + 
0
xi + ui (6)
ui  N (0; exp (0uxi)) (7)
~i 2 f~low; ~highg (8)
Pr (~i = ~low) =  (
0
xi) (9)
The model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The details of the likelihood
function are provided in section A3 in Appendix A.7
7The specication of ~i is di¤erent between the three chapters, with a minor technical di¤erence between
Chapters 2 and 3 and a more substantive di¤erence in Chapter 4. In The description above is correct
for Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, heterogeneity in ~i is modeled as a two-point distribution, very similarly,
only it is not the probability of the low point but the probability of the high point that is specied. Of
course, that is a minor technical di¤erence that a¤ects the interpretation of the coe¢ cients but not the
identication or estimation. However, in Chapter 4, heterogeneity in ~i is specied as a log-linear function
of right-hand-side variables, see equation (36). The parameters of that latter specication are more di¢ cult
to identify than parameters of the two-point specication. Consequently, the two-point distribution is the
preferred specication. Despite its apparent restrictions, the two-point distribution is rather exible (see, for
example Heckman and Singer, 1984). Despite their di¤erences, the two approaches yield qualitatively very
similar estimates, as the parameters on the demographic right-hand-side variables demonstrate (compare,
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With the exception of ; the parameter estimates from the structural econometric model
are not easy to interpret. At the same time, we can use the estimates to compute predicted
values of ^i and ^i for each respondent. The predictions use the estimates of the structural
econometric model and the observable right hand-side variables as well as the observed
probability answers. In formulae,
^i = bE [~ijxi; (p0i; pci) 2 Qkl] (10)
^i = bE [~ijxi; (p0i; pci) 2 Qkl] (11)
The conditional expectations are relatively straightforward to compute by Bayes rule
with the results of the structural model that species the full distributions for ~i and ~i.
The predicted ^i and ^i are then the sample analogues to those conditional expectations.
The details of the derivation are provided in section A3. in Appendix A. This prediction
method is analogous to the prediction of risk tolerance based on survey answers to hypothet-
ical gambles by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008). The predicted values are di¤erent from
the true values, creating measurement error in the variables. The measurement error is one
of prediction error. The measurement error has zero mean and thus leads to an unbiased
estimate of the population mean; however, the measurement error leads to an underestima-
tion of the population standard deviation (because the predicted values are less dispersed
than the true values). Using ^i and ^i on the right-hand side of a regression leads to con-
sistent estimates as long as all the covariates used in the predictions are also entered in the
respective regression. The standard errors in this regression are inconsistent, though; thus,
bootstrap standard errors are advised. If one uses the ^i and ^i in regressions that have
di¤erent covariates from the ones used in the prediction equations, OLS is inconsistent and
a more sophisticated GMM procedure is appropriate (see Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008,
for more details).
In all three chapters, the results from using the structural estimation method are quali-
tatively similar to, but stronger than, results using reduced-form linear regressions with the
probability questions. The structural results with p20 as the second variable (in Chapter 3)
are very similar to the results with p10 as the second variable (in Chapter 2) , except that the
former show substantially larger variation in ~i. Altogether, these results provide validity
to the structural model. However, if the second probability variable is based on a negative
threshold (as in the data description part of Chapter 4 and the robustness checks reported in
Appendix C), the survey noise appears to have very di¤erent patterns (note that v, the noise
for example, the coe¢ cient on the female variable in the equations for ~ in Tables 3.12, 4.4 and the female
variables combined with marital status in Table A4.1).
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correlation parameter, is estimated in such cases instead of using the calibrated value from
HRS 2002). This fact highlights the importance of appropriate evidence regarding survey
noise, which we do not have in relation to the negative-threshold stock market probability
answers.
1.4 Preview of the results
The substantive aims of Chapter 2 are to characterize the heterogeneity of the stock market
beliefs of American households, to understand the sources of that heterogeneity and to
establish its relation to household portfolios. We hypothesize that heterogeneity is the result
of di¤erences in learning histories, which are in turn caused by di¤erences in returns to and
costs of learning (as well as in initial conditions). People learn about nance in general
and the stochastic process of stock market returns in particular. The value of learning is
proportional to savings, however, the costs are xed. Consequently, people with higher
earnings prospects should learn more than people with lower income prospects, especially
if social security or dened benet pension plans provide enough retirement income for the
latter. Di¤erences in the costs of learning and di¤erences in general attitudes may also
be heterogenous, creating additional heterogeneity in learning outcomes. Initial conditions
matter as well. People with very low expectations will be less likely to learn and will see
their beliefs unchanged. Ultimately, those who learn will revise their initial beliefs to be
more precise, closer to what historical series would imply, and learning makes beliefs less
heterogenous. This explanation is a human capital argument applied to nancial knowledge
(as in Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008). This explanation can be also viewed as an
application of the information choice theory of Veldkamp (2011).
In line with the methods section above, beliefs are characterized by the subjective mean
and subjective standard deviation of the one year ahead log return on the stock market index
(~i and ~i, respectively). The subjective mean and the subjective standard deviation are
unobserved variables that we relate to the observed answers to two survey questions: one
question about the probability that the stock market return would be positive (p0) and the
other question about the probability that the returns would be 10 per cent or more (p10).
The chapter describes the noise features in the probability answers in detail and argues for
why the evidence is consistent with random survey noise.
We verify the implications of the learning theory by empirical evidence on stock market
beliefs using a sample of 55 to 64 years old respondents of the Health and Retirement Study.
Our sample consists of people who are at the peak of their asset accumulation process, and
their beliefs and household portfolios are the result of their learning and investment his-
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tory. We rst show correlations and OLS regressions using observable answers to probability
questions. Then we estimate the structural econometric model and estimate the theoret-
ically interesting belief parameters conditional on the survey answers (analogously to the
prediction of individual risk tolerance by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2009).
Our estimates show that respondents, on average, have low expectations and perceive
risk to be high, however, there is substantial heterogeneity in expectations. Results from
both the simple and the more structural analysis support the learning explanation. People
who had stronger incentives to learn in the past indeed possess beliefs that are consistent
with more learning. In particular, people with higher lifetime earnings, higher education,
higher cognitive abilities, dened contribution as opposed to dened benet pension plans,
and those who are more optimistic and less uncertain about things in general have stock
market beliefs that are less heterogeneous, somewhat less uncertain and considerably closer
to levels that historical time series would imply. Our results also show that people who
did not have strong incentives to learn in the past are very pessimistic about stock market
returns.
Expectations are shown to be strongly related to the portfolio choice of American house-
holds. This result validates the surveys expectation measures as measures of "real" ex-
pectations as opposed to some articial gures. This result also underlines the potential
importance of expectations in resolving the "stockholding puzzle" and maybe also the re-
lated equity premium puzzle.8
Chapter 3 uses new data from the Health and Retirement Study to shed more light
on heterogeneity in stock market expectations. In particular, this chapter considers two
questions: (1) Are measures of nancial knowledge, especially knowledge about past stock
market returns, related to expectations about future stock market returns? (2) Are aspects
of personality that are recognized to be important in psychology related to expectations
about future stock market returns?
The rst question is closely related to Chapter 2. The empirical analysis in that chapter
shows that measures of incentives and personal characteristics are indeed related to expecta-
tions about future returns. However, a lack of explicit information on the knowledge of the
8In his review paper, Micheal Hurd (2009) cites a parapgraph from a previous version of Chapter 2
(Kezdi and Willis, 2008): "We estimated relevant heterogeneity [in stock market expectations] and related it
to household investment behavior, with the help of a simple portfolio choice model. Our results conrm the
validity of survey measures of expectations in predicting real behavior after measurement error is properly
accounted for. A causal interpretation of the results suggest that heterogeneity in expectations leads to
heterogeneity in stockholding, and low average expectations, high uncertainty, and large heterogeneity in
expectations explain much of the stockholder puzzle." In order to make that statement more groudned, we
need to estimate risk preferences together with expectations and analyze them jointly in portfolio choices.
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history of stock market returns in the data used in that chapter prevents explicitly linking
knowledge to future expectations. The results in this chapter ll that gap.
The results provide strong support to the argument that knowledge of the history of
stock market returns is a major determinant of expectations about future stock returns.
Those people who know that stocks have outperformed bonds and saving accounts in the
past have beliefs about the distribution of future returns that are signicantly closer to
the characteristics of the historical return distribution. Their expectations are, on average,
positive (whereas expectations of other people are, on average, negative). Their belief about
risks are also closer to historical risks than the beliefs of other people, although their beliefs
are also substantially higher than historical risks. The results on disagreement (heterogeneity
in expectations) provide additional support to the learning argument. Expectations of those
people who know that stocks have outperformed bonds and saving accounts in the past are
less heterogeneous than the expectations of the rest of the sample.
Other aspects of nancial knowledge are also shown to be strongly related to stock mar-
ket expectations, even conditional on our measure of knowledge about the history of stock
returns. It is possible that the measure of other nancial knowledge is just another proxy
for the knowledge of the history because the measure for the latter is very imperfect. If this
assumption is true, the results provide no additional insight into the substantive question but
instead it shows how imperfect the nancial knowledge measures are. Another possibility
is that this result shows that stock market expectations are inuenced by other aspects of
nancial knowledge even conditional on knowledge about the history of stock returns. Thus,
people with a perfect knowledge of the history of stock returns may form di¤erent expec-
tations about future returns if they have di¤erent levels of nancial knowledge. Without
further evidence, it is impossible to separate the two explanations.
Question two asks what other factors may be behind the heterogeneity in expectations.
This question focuses on standard aspects of personality. The psychology literature on
personality aims at uncovering stable traits that a¤ect thinking, feeling, and acting. The
literature has come to a consensus that postulates that ve major dimensions describe per-
sonality on a broad level: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and
Openness/Intellect. The collection of these dimensions is often called the "Big Five person-
ality traits." According to this consensus view, an individuals scores in these 5 dimensions
characterize stable patterns of thoughts and feelings, and those scores are widely used to
predict individual behavior.
Another personality trait that is likely to be related to stock market expectations is
optimism. General optimism, as a stable personality trait, is dened as "a generalized ex-
pectancy that good, as opposed to bad, outcomes will generally occur when confronted with
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problems across important life domains" (Scheier and Carver, 1985). The assumption that
general optimism should be related to stock market expectations is motivated also by with
earlier work of mine with Robert J. Willis on optimism (Kézdi and Willis, 2003). That
analysis showed that a combined measure of optimism about various events is positively
related to many positive life outcomes, even conditional on many other personal charac-
teristics (including education or cognitive scores). A remarkable nding of that analysis is
the association of sunshine optimism with many life outcomes. That measure was dened by
comparing peoples subjective probability assessment of the day following the interview being
sunny to actual sunshine data for the day in question. Chapter 2 in this dissertation shows
similar results: sunshine optimism is positively correlated with stock market expectations
even conditional on many personal characteristics, including education, cognitive capacity
and lifetime earnings.
The results with respect to personality are largely negative, except for optimism. Four
of the Big Five personality traits (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Neu-
roticism) appear not to be related to stock market expectations. The fth trait, Openness
is associated with the level of expectations; however, that association becomes insignicant
conditional on gender and education. In contrast, general optimism is signicantly associated
with the level of stock market expectations (but not perceived risk or disagreement). This
last result is in line with intuition and our previous results on sunshine optimism. However,
the relationship appears to be signicantly stronger among people who do not own stock
market-based assets. This nding suggests that the role of optimism is rather complex in
shaping expectations and needs further investigation.
Altogether, the results of Chapter 3 imply that nancial knowledge in general, and knowl-
edge about the history of stock returns in particular, are an important determinants of ex-
pectations about future stock returns. There is substantial heterogeneity in expectations
conditional on nancial knowledge; however, understanding that variation proves to be dif-
cult and requires further research.
Chapter 4 asks whether and how peoples stock market expectations were a¤ected by the
stock market crash in September 2008 in the United States. The analysis uses data from
the 2008 wave of the Health and Retirement Study to study the impact of the stock market
crash on peoples expectations. We estimate the e¤ect of the crash on the population average
of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty about returns (subjective
standard deviation), and the cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected returns (an indicator
of disagreement). We show estimates from simple reduced-form regressions on probability
answers as well as from a more structural model that focuses on the parameters of interest
and separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity. The measurement strategy makes
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use of the fact that the respondents of HRS 2008 answered the survey during 12 months from
February 2008 to February 2009, a time period that includes the time of the stock market
crash in early autumn. We show that the date of interview is largely independent of the
respondentspast expectations about the stock market, so even if the date of interview is
non-random it is unlikely to bias our results.
Our results imply a temporary increase in the population average of expectations right
after the crash. At the same time, average uncertainty increased, perhaps as the result of
increased stock market volatility. Our most robust nding is that cross-sectional heterogene-
ity in expected returns, an indicator of the amount of disagreement, increased substantially
with the stock market crash. The e¤ects are found to be largest among stockholders, those
who follow the stock market, and those with higher than average cognitive capacity. The
result on average expectations thus masks a wide distribution of e¤ects of opposing signs. We
also document the co-movement of stock market expectations with ex post returns, implied
volatility and volume of trade.
Our nding suggests that there is heterogeneity in the cognitive processes (or mental
models) people use to convert public news into personal probability beliefs, in accordance
with some of the disagreement literature we mentioned above. The results on changes in
heterogeneity complement recent empirical investigations that show substantial heterogene-
ity in stock market expectations of individual investors (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003) as well
as households (Calvet et al., 2007, 2009a,b; Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Kezdi and Willis,
2008; Hurd et al., 2011; Gouret and Hollard, 2011). The ndings of this chapter add new
results to this empirical literature by showing that the stock market crash and the nancial
crisis had signicant e¤ects on average expectations, average uncertainty, and, perhaps most
importantly, the heterogeneity of expectations.
2 Heterogeneity in expectations about future stock re-
turns, learning incentives and portfolio choice
Acknowledgement 1 This section is an updated version of a previous paper coauthored
with Robert J. Willis. The title of that previous paper was "Household Stock Market Beliefs
and Learning" and it was published as NBER Working Paper 17614.9 The paper was featured
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Research10.
9http://www.nber.org/papers/w17614.pdf
10http://www.voxeu.org/article/beliefs-and-stock-market
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2.1 Introduction
Beliefs about stock market returns are important determinants of households investment
behavior. Recent research has established the strong relationship between beliefs and stock-
holding, and it also documented substantial heterogeneity in those beliefs (Vissing-Jorgensen,
2004; Dominitz and Manski, 2005 and 2007; Amromin and Sharpe, 2006). This heterogeneity
is puzzling since stock returns are publicly observable, and all of its history as well as many
analyses are public information. Understanding the source of heterogeneity is important to
understand heterogeneity in household nances, which is substantial (Campbell, 2006).
The goal of this paper is to characterize heterogeneity of the stock market beliefs of
American households, understand the sources of that heterogeneity, and establish its rela-
tion to household portfolios. Our substantive contribution is to provide a more systematic
account of the heterogeneity than the previous literature and relate it to a relatively simple
explanation. Our methodological contribution is to estimate structural belief parameters
from noisy survey answers to probability questions of the type advocated by Manski (2004).
We hypothesize that heterogeneity is the result of di¤erences in learning histories, which
are in turn caused by di¤erences in returns to and costs of learning (as well as in initial
conditions). People learn about nance in general and the stochastic process of stock market
returns in particular. The value of learning is proportional to savings, but the costs are xed.
As a result, people with higher earnings prospects should learn more than people with lower
income prospects, especially if social security provides enough retirement income for the
latter. Di¤erences in the costs of learning and di¤erences in general attitudes may also
be heterogenous, creating additional heterogeneity in learning outcomes. Initial conditions
matter, too. Those with very low expectations will be less likely to learn and will see
their beliefs unchanged. In the end, those who learn will revise their initial beliefs to be
more precise, closer to what historical series would imply, and learning makes beliefs less
heterogenous. This is a human capital explanation applied to nancial knowledge (as in
Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008). It is also an application of the information choice
theory of Veldkamp (2011).
We characterize beliefs by the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the
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one year ahead log return on the stock market index. These are unobserved variables that we
relate to observed answers to two survey questions: one about the probability that the stock
market return would be positive and the other one about the probability that the returns
would be 10 per cent or more. Our structural estimation model accounts for survey response
error due to rounding, potential inattention, and the unwillingness or inability to make the
necessary e¤ort to give precise answers. A subset of the respondents in our sample answered
the same pair of questions twice in the survey, about half an hour apart, which allows us to
calibrate the moments of survey noise in a direct way.
We verify the implications of the learning theory by empirical evidence on stock market
beliefs using a sample of 55 to 64 years old respondents of the Health and Retirement Study.
Our sample consists of people who are at the peak of their asset accumulation process, and
their beliefs and household portfolios are the result of their learning and investment his-
tory. We rst show correlations and OLS regressions using observable answers to probability
questions. Then we estimate the structural econometric model and estimate the theoret-
ically interesting belief parameters conditional on the survey answers (analogously to the
prediction of individual risk tolerance by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008). Our structural
model separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity.
Our estimates show that respondents have low expectations and high perceived risk on
average and substantial heterogeneity in expectations. Results from both the simple and
the more structural analysis support the learning explanation. People who had stronger
incentives to learn in the past indeed possess beliefs that are consistent with more learning. In
particular, people with higher lifetime earnings, higher education, higher cognitive abilities,
dened contribution as opposed to dened benet pension plans, and those who are more
optimistic and less uncertain about things in general have stock market beliefs that are less
heterogeneous, somewhat less uncertain and considerably closer in levels to what historical
time series would imply. Our results also show that the people who did not have incentives
to learn are very pessimistic about stock market returns.
On top of the small literature on beliefs, many papers have looked at reduced-form asso-
ciations of stock market participation with demography, education and wealth (Ameriks and
Zeldes, 2004; Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2002), cognitive capacity (Christelis, Jappelli
and Padula, 2010), health (Rosen and Wu, 2003), or social interactions (Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2004; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004). The results of our theoretical explana-
tion and our empirical investigation are all in line with the results of that literature. They
also suggest that part of those reduced form associations may operate through di¤erential
incentives for learning about attainable stock returns.
The rest of this chapter is structured the following way. Section 2.2 contains a brief
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characterization of stock market beliefs. Section 2.3 summarizes the setup and the most
important implications of a simple theoretical model of household portfolio choices with
learning. We then describe our data as briey as possible in Section 2.4, and move on to
descriptive evidence on the probability answers themselves in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 covers
the estimation of the structural parameters of beliefs and their association with stockholding
and the right hand-side variables. Section 2.7 concludes. Appendix A presents the details
of our investigation, divided into four sections. Appendix section A.1 contains the formal
structure of our theoretical model and its results. Appendix section A.2 shows more details of
our data, descriptive statistics and results from linear regressions on observables. Appendix
section A.3 contains the details of the structural estimation model, and Appendix section
A.4 contains detailed estimation results and robustness checks.
2.2 Characterizing stock market beliefs
We assume that people believe that yearly log returns are i.i.d. and normally distributed.
Throughout the paper we denote the mean of log returns as  and the standard deviation
as . For example,  = 0:1 means that the mean return is approximately ten per cent. At
yearly frequency, the i.i.d. normal assumption for log returns lines up well with historical
data available respondents to the 2002 wave of the survey we analyze. In the period of 1945
to 2002, yearly log nominal returns of the Dow Jones index were characterized by a mean of
 = 0:07 and a standard deviation of  = 0:15. Di¤erent windows can give lower and higher
values of , and the value of  is remarkably stable.
Under the i.i.d. lognormality assumption, the beliefs of individual i about the stock mar-
ket returns are fully characterized by her beliefs about the mean and the standard deviation,
and we denote those subjective beliefs by ~i and ~i. We dene ~i and ~i as the parameters
that would characterize individual beliefs in investment situations. The goal of this paper
is to characterize heterogeneity in ~i and ~i , understand the sources of that heterogeneity,
and establish its relationship to heterogeneity in household portfolios.
~i and ~i are unobserved in our data (the Health and Retirement Study). Instead, we
observe answers to probability questions. In the larger part of the sample that we use to show
descriptive statistics, one question was asked. This question (p0) asked what the respondent
thought the probability is that the market will go up. In the sample that we use for the
structural analysis, we have answers to another probability question as well (p10), about the
probability that the market will go up by at least 10 per cent. The questions themselves
were phrased the following way.
p0 question: By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
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invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than
they are today?
p10 question: By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have grown by 10 percent
or more? 11
When answers to both p0 and p10 are available, identifying the mean and standard devia-
tion of log returns from the two probabilities is relatively straightforward under the normality
assumption. Let R denote one year ahead gross returns, which is a random variable with
lnR  N (; 2). In principle, one can relate these probabilities to the parameters of the
lognormal distribution in a straightforward way. Let heterogeneity be denoted by an i in-
dex, the subjective nature of the probabilities by the tilde, and let stars denote theoretically
correct probabilities derived from subjective beliefs; actual survey answers may be di¤erent,
see later. Then,
p0i = ~Pi [R  1] = ~Pi [lnR  0] = 

~i
~i

(12)
p10i = ~Pi [R  1:1]  ~Pi [lnR  0:1] = 

~i   0:1
~i

(13)
Observing p0i and p

10i would allow for a simple computation of ~i and ~i by making use
of the inverse normal c.d.f. Higher ~i corresponds to higher probabilities, while higher ~i
pushes the argument of  toward zero and thus pushes both probabilities towards 0:5.
In order to see the correspondence between ~i and ~i on the one hand and p

0i and p

10i
on the other hand in more intuitive ways, Figure 2.1 shows three probability distribution
functions together with vertical lines at the cuto¤ points of 0 and 0.1 log returns that
correspond to the p0 and p10 questions. The continuous line shows a p.d.f. with historical
moments between 1945 and 2002 (  = 0:07 and  = 0:15). The dashed line corresponds to
a mean-preserving spread (higher perceived risk), and the dotted line corresponds to a lower
mean (more pessimistic beliefs).
11Note that the wording of the questions ("will be worth more") is somewhat vague. We interpret it as
nominal returns without taking ination, taxes or investment costs into consideration. If nancially more
sophisticated people have higher and more precise expectations, and, at the same time, they are more likely
to think in real and/or after-tax terms, we shall underestimate heterogeneity in beliefs and its relation to
variables that are related to nancial sophistication.
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Log yearly returns on stock market index
Historical Riskier
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Figure 2.1. Examples for probability densities of normally distributed log returns, with the
cuto¤ points for p0 and p10
p0i and p

10i are equal to the area to the right of the corresponding bars at 0 and 0:1
log returns, respectively. The series of post-war returns to 2002 corresponds to p0 = 0:68,
p10 = 0:42 and p

0   p10 = 0:26.
Holding risk constant, more pessimistic beliefs result in smaller values of p0i and p

10i. We
can therefore think of the answer to the p0 (or the p10) questions as proxy variables for the
perceived level of returns. A mean-preserving spread leads to smaller area between the two
vertical bars, which equals the di¤erence p0i   p10i. The di¤erence between the two answers
may thus serve as a proxy for the inverse of perceived risks.
These proxies are not clean, though. The e¤ect of risk on the probabilities can be am-
biguous: higher risk corresponds to a smaller area to the right of a cuto¤ point if the mean
is to the right (as for cuto¤ 0 when comparing the solid and the dashed curves), but it cor-
responds to a larger area if the mean is to the left (as for cuto¤ 0:1). Optimism/pessimism
a¤ects the di¤erence between the probabilities, too, in ambiguous ways. For example, opti-
mism decreases the di¤erence if the mean is shifted outside the interval between the two bars
from within the bars (as is the case for the dotted curve here), but the e¤ect is the opposite
if the mean is shifted towards to the middle of the interval. Simultaneous heterogeneity in
the mean and the variance can lead to more complicated heterogeneity in the level and the
di¤erence of p0i and p

10i.
Observing p0i and p

10i would identify ~i and ~i at the individual level. Instead of p

0i and
p10i, however, we are likely to observe something else, as answers to the probability questions
contain substantial noise with a complicated structure.
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~i and ~i are the parameters that are relevant in investment situations. There are, how-
ever, strong theoretical reasons to believe that peoples answers to the probability questions
are not equal to the p transformations of these parameters. There is little time to answer
the questions, and, beyond a spirit of cooperation, there are no incentives to get the answers
right. It is therefore better to look at actual answers as "guesses" for what the p values
may be, given recollections of ~i and ~i.
The data reveals answer patterns that strongly support this view, and we shall document
that later. Some of these answer patterns make computing the p values impossible. All
of the answer patterns indicate that actual answers are noisy transformations of relevant
beliefs. Our structural econometric model will address these problems.
2.3 Heterogeneity in beliefs and learning
In this section we briey summarize the explanation we propose for the heterogeneity in
stock market beliefs. It is in the spirit of the human capital literature and its application to
nancial knowledge (as in Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008), embedded in a standard
life-cycle model with borrowing constraints. It can also be viewed as an application of the
information choice theory of Veldkamp (2011). Section A.1 in Appendix A contains a formal
model, its numerical solution and its most important comparative static results.
Heterogeneity in stock market beliefs is the result of di¤erences in learning histories,
which di¤erences are in turn caused by di¤erences in returns to and costs of learning (and,
potentially, di¤erences in initial conditions). Suppose that individuals live for three periods:
young adulthood, mature adulthood and old age. Young people are endowed with some
initial sets of beliefs about the mean and the standard deviation of log returns (~i and ~i),
and they share the belief that returns are i.i.d. lognormal.
In young adulthood, people work, earn wages, consume and save, but are subject to
borrowing constraints. Mature adults look the same except that wages are considerably
higher. In old age, people receive pension benets and earn no wage. Importantly, pensions
are from a dened-benet system such as Social Security, and pension benets are a concave
function of lifetime earnings. As a result, people who earn below a certain threshold do not
have an incentive to save for retirement, people who earn above that threshold do save, and
their saving rate depends on their lifetime earnings. Savings can be held in risk-free bank
accounts or invested in risky stocks. Borrowing and short sales are not allowed, making
the share of stocks in per period savings between zero and one. The returns on stocks are
governed by the i.i.d. lognormal process with historical moments, regardless of individuals
beliefs. But whether and how much an individual chooses to invest into stocks in any period
depends on her beliefs about those moments at the beginning of the period.
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The essence of the model is the possibility to learn about the parameters of the returns
process. Learning is the result of a choice. If people choose to learn, they can observe a
long historical series of log returns and update their subjective beliefs in a standard Bayesian
fashion. The results are a posterior mean that is closer to the historical average and a smaller
posterior variance. Learning is more general than updating beliefs: it is understanding the
ways in which investment works. As a result, earning can increase the attainable expected
return and/or reduce the risk of their portfolio on top of the e¤ects of learning on beliefs
about stock market returns. If they choose to learn, people have to pay a xed cost. People
may also learn in a more passive fashion: If they have high enough earnings in young age,
they may invest those into stocks, and observing the returns will allow for updating beliefs.
The implications of this model are straightforward. The value of learning is proportional
to intended savings, but the costs are xed. Those who have higher lifetime earnings or lower
learning costs will be more likely to learn. Similarly, if we allow for heterogeneity in initial
belief endowments, higher initial subjective mean and lower initial variance will also lead
to higher propensity to learn. Higher risk tolerance and more patience also lead to higher
propensity to learn.
These results have important implications for the empirical analysis of heterogeneous
stock market beliefs and household portfolios. Heterogeneity in lifetime earnings reects
heterogeneity in general human capital which, in turn, is the result of di¤erences in the costs
of and the benets to investment based on probability beliefs about future returns. (Becker,
1964,1993; Willis, 1986; Card, 1999). If stock market beliefs are result of investment into
a specic form of human capital, all personal characteristics that are related to lifetime
earnings will also be related to beliefs as well, even conditional on lifetime earnings. This
is another channel through which earnings and household nances are related, on top of
the more traditional argument for the role of background risk (emphasized by, e.g., Viceira,
2001).
2.4 Data
In this section we give a brief overview of our sample and discuss the denition of the variables
we use in the analysis. Section A.2 in Appendix A contains additional information.
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a large biannual panel house-
hold survey that follows older Americans (see NIA, 2007, for review). The HRS is representa-
tive of the American population 50 years of age or older, and their households. HRS has had
a number of probability questions from 1992 on. It added questions on stock market beliefs
in 2002. Besides subjective probabilities, HRS collects data on the amount and structure of
savings, including tax-sheltered accounts such as 401(k), a rich set of demographic variables,
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and measures of cognitive functioning. In addition, retrospective earnings data from W2 tax
forms are linked to a large subset of the HRS respondents for long time periods (the latter
data are available in a secure data use setting). For the descriptive analysis in this paper,
we use data from four waves of HRS, from 2002 through 200812; for the structural analysis
we use data from 2002 only.
We restricted the sample to people who were 55 to 64 years of age and whose spouse
was also in that age range. The age restriction has both a theoretical and a practical
reason. Households in this age group are around the end of the wealth accumulation phase
of the life cycle but have not yet started decumulating their wealth. The cross-section of
these households allows us to analyze heterogeneity in the results of learning and investment
histories. The practical reason for the age restriction is the availability of retrospective
earnings data from administrative sources, an important variable in the analysis. Sample
sizes are in table A2.1 in Appendix A.
In 2002, the HRS asked the p0 and the p10 questions, while in 2004 and 2006 only the
p0 questions. In 2008, the p0 question was accompanied by a second question with eight
randomized threshold values ranging from a decrease of 40 per cent or more to and increase
of 40 per cent or more. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we use these probability variables
from HRS 2008 to look at the e¤ect of the crash of the stock market on householdsbeliefs.
In this paper we use answers to the p0 questions from all four survey waves and the p10
question from 2002.13
The 2002 wave of the HRS includes an "experimental module" with additional subjective
probability questions about stock market returns. About ve per cent of the respondents
were randomly assigned to answer the questions in this module. Among others, the module
included questions on p0 and p10 once more. Typically, people answered the experimen-
tal module about 30 minutes and 60 questions after they answered the original p0 and p10
questions. This small subsample allows for a direct analysis of measurement error in the
probability answers, in the spirit of the test-retest reliability studies in the survey measure-
ment literature.
Stockholding is measured at the level of households. In the HRS households are asked
whether they had investments in stocks or mutual funds. If yes,we call people in these
households stockholders outside retirement accounts. The survey asks about retirement
accounts as well and the fraction of stocks in those (the latter in a simplied way until 2006).
12In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we show that shortly after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 stock market beliefs of households changed substantially and in an unusual way. For this reason we
decided to drop interviews that were made after September 2008 in this paper.
13The varying thresholds for the second probability question in HRS 2008 introduce econometric compli-
cations that we do not address in this paper.
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Persons who lived in households in which someone had stocks or mutual fund investments in
retirement accounts are labelled stockholders in retirement accounts.The union of these
two sets is labelled stockholders.
The fraction of stockholders is 51 per cent in 2002. Conditional on stockholding, the share
of stocks in portfolios held outside retirement accounts is 59 per cent, and it is 80 per cent
on retirement accounts. Stockholding status declines between 2002 and 2008 and so does
the fraction of stocks in the portfolio conditional on stockholding. The likelihood of being
a stockholder increases in wealth (both total net wealth and nancial wealth). Conditional
on stockholding, the share of stocks in the portfolio seems unrelated to wealth. Tables A2.2
and A2.3 and Figures A2.1 through A2.4 in Appendix A show the details.
One of the most important variables is a proxy of lifetime earnings. The variable is
dened as the cpi-adjusted mean earnings of households with individuals between age 40 and
55 based on the W-2 tax forms. The variable is from condential data and is not available
for part of the sample, which needed imputed values. Other right hand-side variables include
standard demographics (age, gender, single or couple, years of education race and ethnicity)
and wealth (measured in categories, separately for total net wealth and nancial wealth).
Cognitive functioning is measured by the four short tests included in HRS (immediate
word recall, delayed word recall, serial 7s (successively subtracting seven from one hundred)
and dementia screening questions). We use the rst factor of the four aggregate scores for
each individual between 1992 and 2000. McArdle, Fisher and Kadlec (2007) argue that the
rst factor of these tests measures episodic memory.
We use three measures for general optimism/pessimism and one measure for general
uncertainty as personal attitudes. Each of these measures is based on survey answers prior
to the 2002 wave of the HRS. The rst optimism variable is a dummy denoting positive
errors in predicting sunny weather. HRS 1994 and 2000 included a "warm-up" question to
the series of subjective probability questions about the probability that the day following the
interview would be sunny. We obtained realized weather data for the day in question at the
zip-code location of the interview, and we regressed the probability answer on sunny hours
(their fraction to hours of daylight). The residual of this regression can be interpreted as a
forecast error. The variable we use is a dummy indicating whether the respondents average
forecast error was positive on both of the two surveys. The use of the answers to the HRS
sunshine question as a measure of optimism was rst proposed by Basset and Lumsdaine
(1999).
The second optimism variable is the individuals assessment of the likelihood that a
major recession would occur the near future. The question was asked in HRS 1992, 1996
and 1998, and the measure we use is the average of those answers. This variable appears
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in the survey well before the stock market answers and is likely to reect general pessimism
about the economy. The third variable is a score created from the nine-item psychological
depression tests administered to the respondents in all waves of the HRS between 1992 and
2000. This test lists symptoms of psychological depression, and we use the score as a measure
of time-invariant general pessimism.
The measure for general uncertainty is the fraction of fty per cent answers to all proba-
bility questions (except for the stock market questions) given by the individual in all of the
surveys from year 1992 to 2002. The idea behind this measure is that a persons propen-
sity to give 50-50 answers in many di¤erent domains indicates uncertainty in general. This
variable is very similar to the one used in Hill, Perry and Willis (2005) and Sahm (2007).
The right hand-side variables include a proxy for risk tolerance for HRS respondents
estimated by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008) from answers to hypothetical gambles over
lifetime earnings in HRS 1992 to 2002. Using these measures, Sahm (2007) found a signicant
positive relationship between risk tolerance and stockholding in a larger sample of HRS
respondents.
2.5 Descriptive analysis
Before turning to a more structural analysis, we show results from descriptive statistics and
simple linear regressions using the answers to the probability questions. We rst document
survey noise in the probability answers; then we characterize observed heterogeneity in those
answers; nally, we show that the probability answers predict stockholding in ways that are
consistent with portfolio choice theory.
The answers to the stock market probability questions contain substantial noise. Tables
A2.5 through A2.11 and Figure A2.5 in Appendix A show the detailed statistics.
95 per cent of the p0 answers are rounded to ten or 25 or 75 per cent. Focal values at
50 per cent account for an especially large part of all answers. In the American context, the
answer "fty-fty" to such a probability question may be interpreted as a synonym for "I
dont know."14 At the same time, 50 per cent is a frequent response to probability questions
in Europe as well (Hurd, Rohwedder and Winter, 2005). The rounding in p0 and p10 is
typical for survey probability answers; see Manski (2004) for examples.
14Beginning in 2006, HRS has asked a follow-up question to respondents who answer the p0 question with
an answer of 50 to distinguish between those who believe that the stock market is equally likely to go
up or down in the coming year from those who are just unsureabout the probability. About two-thirds
answer that they are unsure. See Bruine de Bruin and Carman (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the 50
per cent responses.
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Many respondents give the same answer to p0 and p10 that, taken at face value, would
imply innitely large standard deviations of log returns. Rounding would allow for nite (but
large) standard deviations to give that pattern. Some respondents give p0 < p10; which does
not conform the laws of probability. It may be that these respondents do not understand
probabilities at all. It is also possible that these answers reect inattention to one or both
questions. Empirical evidence is in line with the latter interpretation.
The most direct evidence on survey noise comes from comparing answers to the p0 and
p10 questions in the core questionnaire and the experimental module. When the randomly
selected small subset of the respondents were asked to answer the same probability questions
once again during the same interview about half hour later, most gave di¤erent answers.
Perhaps surprisingly, all three noise features (rounding, apparent violations of the laws
of probability, and test-retest noise) seem largely random (see tables A2.7 through A2.11 in
Appendix A). The prevalence of these answer patterns are not related to stockholding or
cognitive capacity. There are some weak associations between rounding and education, and
the propensity to give the same answer to p0 and p10 and education, lifetime earnings and
wealth. Some demographic characteristics are also weakly predictive but no clear pattern
emerges. The cross-sectional distribution of the probability answers in the experimental
module is very similar to the cross-sectional distribution of the probability answers in the
core questionnaire. The absolute di¤erence between the core and module answers is unrelated
to any observable variable.
Having established noise in the probability answers, we turn to relevant heterogeneity in
them. The goal is to show variation in the probability answers across groups of respondents
that, according to our argument, should have had di¤erent incentives for learning and thus
should have di¤erent beliefs.
We focus on four statistics: the sample average of p0 (p0) ; the variance of p0 in the sample
(V (p0i)), the average di¤erence between p0 and p10 (p0   p10) and the fraction of missing p0
answers. These statistics are computed using waves 2002 through 2008 of HRS, except for
(p0   p10), which is computed for 2002 only as p10 is not available in later years.
p0 can be thought of as a proxy for the mean level of stock market beliefs: higher values
correspond to more optimistic beliefs, and the closer p0 is to 0.68 (or 0.61 for more recent
years before 2002) the closer the level of beliefs is to what historical returns would imply.
V (p0i) is a measure of cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected stock returns, also called
disagreement in the nance literature (Hong and Stein, 2007). (p0   p10) is an inverse proxy
for perceived risk: the larger the di¤erence the lower risk is attributed to stock returns. The
fraction of missing p0 answers is a proxy for ignorance, which can be thought of as extreme
uncertainty about stock returns.
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Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics by lifetime earnings, fathers occupation, edu-
cation, cognitive capacity, risk tolerance and stockholding status. Those with higher lifetime
earnings, education and cognitive capacity should have beliefs that reect past learning be-
cause of stronger incentives to learn actively, both through its costs and benets. Dened
contribution (DC) pensions create higher incentives for learning than dened benet (DB)
pensions. Those with fathers who were managers or professionals grew up in families that
were more likely to be exposed to stockholding or had higher levels of nancial knowledge.
Fathers occupation is, of course, related to lifetime earnings as well, through intergenera-
tional income links. Risk tolerance is also likely to be related to stock market beliefs both
through passive learning (higher levels of risk tolerance lead to stockholding at least in case
of favorable beliefs) and active learning (by increasing expected benets). Finally, those who
hold stocks towards the end of their active career have stock market beliefs that reect past
learning; either passive learning through earlier stockholding or active learning.
Learning should lead to beliefs that are characterized by levels closer to historical average,
lower perceived risk, lower levels of ignorance. In addition, groups whose members learned
more should be characterized by lower levels of disagreement. Translated to the proxy
variables in Table 2.1, these would imply p0 closer to 0.68, lower V (p0i), higher p0  p10 (and
closer to 0.26) and lower fraction of missing p0 answers.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics of the subjective probability answers to the
stock market returns questions. HRS 2002 through 2008.
p0 V (p0i) p0   p10 Fraction
missing p0
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:56 0:067 0:113 0:03
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:44 0:079 0:061 0:26
Education college or more 0:56 0:062 0:123 0:06
Education high school or less 0:45 0:074 0:062 0:23
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:60 0:059 0:148 0:02
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:55 0:064 0:137 0:03
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:53 0:063 0:116 011
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:42 0:082 0:053 0:31
Father was manager or professional 0:55 0:064 0:109 0:10
Father had other occupation 0:50 0:072 0:084 0:15
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:51 0:070 0:095 0:16
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:45 0:078 0:073 0:16
Stockholder 0:55 0:063 0:107 0:06
Not stockholder 0:45 0:074 0:063 0:24
Entire sample 0:50 0:071 0:086 0:16
Total number of observations 11; 259 11; 259 3; 532 13; 408
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2002, 4, 6 and 8 (p0   p10 is from HRS 2002 only).
Respondents of age 55 through 64 with a spouse of the same age range (and singles)
p0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns on stock markets by following year
The results are all consistent with the predictions of the learning model. Individuals with
high lifetime earnings, DC pension plans, high levels of education, high cognitive capacity,
high risk tolerance or who grew up in families that were exposed to stockholding (more likely
if the father was manager or professional) have beliefs that reect learning more than the
beliefs of their complementary groups (non-stockholders, those with low lifetime earnings,
DB pensions, low education, low cognitive capacity, low risk tolerance, non-managerial or
non-professional father). Their beliefs are closer to historical probabilities, which also means
more optimistic beliefs and lower perceived risk. There is less disagreement about stock
returns in these groups, and there is less ignorance measured by the prevalence of missing
answers.
The gures also imply that expectations are low, disagreement is substantial and per-
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ceived risks are high. Note however that the probability answers match historical frequencies
well in combined groups for whom learning incentives should be the highest. College edu-
cated people with top 25 per cent lifetime earnings and DC pension plans have an average p0
of 0:64; average p0   p10 at 0:17, zero per cent missing answers and very little disagreement.
Nevertheless, low expectations and high perceived risk among the general population, and
among non-stockholders in particular, is remarkable.
Table A2.12 in Appendix A shows substantial variation of beliefs by the year of interview.
Interestingly, average beliefs of stockholders exhibit remarkable stability over the years, and
much of the cross-year variation is due to non-stockholders. The same is true for missing
probability answers. Conversely, much of the cross-year variation in disagreement comes
from stockholders.
OLS regressions reveal partial correlations that are very similar to the simple inter-group
di¤erences in Table 2.1 above (see table A2.13 in Appendix A). The belief-specic right hand-
side variables predict stock market probabilities in expected ways, too. Sunshine optimism is
positively related to the level of p0 answers, while past beliefs about economic recession and
depressive symptoms are negatively related. The propensity to have given fty-fty answers
in the past is strongly negatively related to the di¤erence between p0 and p10, indicating
strong positive correlation with perceived stock market risk. There are strong di¤erences
among demographic groups as well, even after holding the other variables constant. Women,
singles and African Americans give probability answers that indicate more pessimistic beliefs,
higher perceived risks, and they and Hispanics are more likely to give missing answers.
The probability answers predict stockholding, as documented by OLS regressions in Table
A2.14 in Appendix A. We estimated two separate linear regressions for stockholding, one for
the probability of nonzero stock-market based assets in the household portfolio, Pr (si > 0)
and one for the share of such assets if nonzero E [sijsi > 0]. The two types of regressions
allow for looking at the relation of beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin and the
intensive margin separately. This specication does not "handle" selection into stockholding
but it is the simplest way to look at the two margins.15 For each left hand-side variable,
we estimated one regression on the entire sample (with the appropriate age restriction) that
includes p0i and the dummy for missing p0i, and another one on the HRS 2002 sample that
includes p0i   p10i.
The results are all consistent with the role of beliefs in portfolio choice. Stockholding
15Credible identication of a selection model would require exlcusion restrictions in the second regression,
i.e. instruments that a¤ect stockholding at the extensive margin but not the intensive margin. In principle,
one would need variation in xed costs that is exogenous to anything that a¤ects investment choices that
lead to variation in the fraction of stocks. We argue that xed costs are mostly related to learning, the
results of which naturally a¤ect all investment choices. Valid instruments are thus hard to nd in this case.
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is strongly positively related to p0 answers, negatively related to the propensity to give a
missing p0 answer, and it is positively related to p0   p10, indicating a negative relation
to perceived risk. Conditional on stockholding, the fraction of stock-market based assets
in household portfolios are positively related to p0 answers and p0   p10, the latter again
indicating a negative correlation with perceived risk. These results are strong because they
are conditional on lifetime earnings, education, cognitive capacity and demographics. The
results at the intensive margin are all the more remarkable because only beliefs and education
have signicant coe¢ cients. Controlling for detailed measures of household wealth decreases
the coe¢ cients by half, but most remain signicant. Wealth in this age group is endogenous
as it is the result of savings and investment history, and thus these latter results are likely
biased downward in magnitude.
The descriptive statistics and the linear regression results are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that stock market beliefs are results of learning over the lifetime and predict stockholding.
These results are robust in the sense that they are free from additional econometric assump-
tions. At the same time, they yield estimates that are hard to interpret, for two reasons.
First, the probability answers and their simple transformations may be a¤ected by hetero-
geneity both in the subjective mean (~) and the subjective standard deviation (~). Second,
measurement error is likely to distort the observed probability answers and thus the descrip-
tive statistics derived from them. The next section presents a more structural measurement
model that deals with these problems.
2.6 Structural analysis
We develop a structural measurement model to estimate heterogeneity in the relevant belief
variables and handle survey noise. The model relates the latent belief variables (~i; ~i) to
the observed answers to the probability questions (p0i; p10i). It accommodates the observed
noise features in the data and our intuition about the way people answer di¢ cult survey
questions.
Our estimation strategy is structural in the sense that it focuses on the theoretically
relevant parameters and the relevant heterogeneity in those parameters (net of survey noise).
In particular, we estimate the moments of the distribution of ~i and ~i in the population
and in various subpopulations (analogously to Table 2.1 above), and we investigate the role
of heterogeneity of ~i and ~i in heterogeneity of stockholding.
The assumption of i.i.d. normal log returns implies that individual beliefs are fully
characterized by ~i and ~i. As we noted earlier, probability judgments elicited in a survey
situation are likely to be very di¤erent from those that enter into a real life investment
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decision. The survey response to a probability question takes less than thirty seconds, on
average, and there are practically no incentives to get the answers right.16 We model the
di¤erence in two steps. The rst introduces survey noise, and the second step introduces
rounding.
Noise is modeled as mean-zero additive components to the index ~=~ that enters the
probabilities p0 and p10. The noise components, denoted by v0 and v10, are assumed to
be jointly normal and potentially correlated. Let pbr0i and p
br
10i denote hypothetical "before
rounding" answers so that the observed answers p0i and p10i may be rounded versions of the
former. Conditional on a draw of the noise variables, these hypothetical survey answers are
then the following:
pbr0i = 

~i
~i
+ v0i

(14)
pbr10i = 

~i   0:1
~i
+ v10i

(15)"
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The noise components are assumed to be independent of any relevant heterogeneity, which
is consistent with the randomness of the test-retest error and the near-randomness of the
other noise features. The bivariate nature of the noise accommodates answers of p0i < p10i if
that phenomenon is due to inattention on the survey (which, as noted earlier, is supported
by the near-randomness of its prevalence). The correlation coe¢ cient between v0 and v10 is
related to average inattention. v = 1 would mean that all respondents answer questions p0
and p10 with the same noise, which would not allow for answers like p0i < p10i. At the other
extreme, v = 0 would mean that all respondents forget their previous answers completely.
The true value of v is likely to be in-between.
We identify moments of the noise process (2v; v) by making use of answers from the
experimental module. Recall that a small subset of the respondents answered the same
probability questions once more, in an experimental module. We assume that noise compo-
nents in the core and module answers are independent.17 Comparing answers to the core
16At the same time, it is important to stress that more than a half century of survey research has shown
that data from properly designed and executed sample surveys can be used to make valid inferences to
population characteristics despite short response times and lack of incentive to tell the truth (or to lie).
17This is probably a lower bound to the noise variance, because any "noise" that would be specic to
the entire survey situation but would not a¤ect investment decisions (e.g. the experience of a bad day)
would a¤ect the "core" and "module" answers in similar ways and would not be measured by the test-retest
di¤erence.
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and experimental module questions identies the noise variance 2v. Conditional on 
2
v, joint
moments of the p0i and p10i answers identify the correlation v. Section A.3 in Appendix A
contains the details of identication and the calibration results. Our preferred estimates are
v = 0:95 and v = 0:42 or 0:61 (the latter depending on whether covariates are entered or
not).
Answers to the probability questions may di¤er from the hypothetical "before-rounding"
probabilities pbr because of rounding. We accommodate rounding by an interval response
model. An answer within a pre-specied interval can correspond to any probability pbr within
that interval. Round numbers are in the middle of those intervals, which are dened in an
exogenous fashion and are assumed to be the same for all respondents.
Formally, the vector of survey answers (p0i; p10i) is in the quadrant Qkl if the vector of
hypothetical probabilities
 
pbr0i ; p
br
10i

is in that quadrant:
 
p0i
p10i
!
2 Qkl ,
0@  ~i~i + v0i


~i 0:1
~i
+ v10i
 1A 2 Qkl (17)
Qkl =
 
[qk; qk+1)
[ql; ql+1)
!
(18)
In the implemented model, the intervals are dened, in percentage terms, as [0; 5) ;
[5; 15) ; [15; 25) ; :::; [95; 100] : These intervals allow for rounding to the nearest ten. The
interval response model is the simplest way of accommodating rounding that is compatible
with the guesswork of calculating probabilities.
With additional assumptions on their cross-sectional distribution, this model allows for
estimating moments of the relevant heterogeneity in ~i and ~i. We assume that ~i is normally
distributed and ~i follows a two-point distribution. We estimate the conditional mean of
the normal distribution and the probability of the low point conditional on right hand-side
variables. In the benchmark model we estimate the variance of the normal distribution and
the high value of  unconditionally, and we set the low value of  to the historical standard
deviation of log returns. As a robustness check, we explore models in which the low value of
 is estimated as well.
~i = + 
0
xi + 
0
zi + ui; ui  N
 
0; 2u

(19)
~i 2 f~low; ~highg (20)
Pr (~i = ~low) =  (
0
xi + 
0
zi) (21)
In the equations, z is the vector of optimism variables (positive error in forecasting
sunshine, low expectations about the economy in the past, symptoms of clinical depression),
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z is the proxy variable of person-specic uncertainty (the fraction of fty-fty answers to
all probability answers in the past), and xi denotes the vector of all other right hand-side
variables.18  stands for the constant in the equation for ~. We estimated it as a vector, by
allowing for a di¤erent constant for ~i = ~low versus ~i = ~high, which allows for a correlation
between ~i and ~i.
We estimated the model by Maximum Likelihood. The details of the likelihood function
are in Section A.3 in Appendix A. We estimated the model with and without the right hand-
side variables. The details of the parameter estimates are in table A4.1 of Appendix A.19
Table 2.2 shows the estimates of the most important unconditional moments of the relevant
heterogeneity in stock market beliefs.
Table 2.2.
Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
Model without Model with
covariates covariates
Point estimate SE Point estimate SE
Population average of ~  0:066 0:018  0:050 0:015
Population standard deviation of ~ 0:197 0:019 0:218 0:027
Population average of ~ 0:576 0:077 0:532 0:091
Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
The results imply low expectations and high perceived risks on average and substan-
tial heterogeneity in expectations. The population moment estimates are similar whether
covariates are used or not used in the estimation, but the model with covariates indicates
somewhat less pessimistic expectations and lower perceived risk. According to the estimates
with covariates, the population average of ~i is negative 5 per cent. The population standard
deviation of ~ is 22 per cent, indicating that over 40 per cent of the population has positive
expectations, and almost 30 per cent have expectations at or above the historical average of
18Excluding z from the equation of ~ and excluding z from the equation of ~ are motivated by the fact
that they do not inuence the belief proxies in the simple linear regressions (Appendix A, Table A2.13).
These exclusions may in principle be important in identifying the association of ~i and ~i on the one hand
and stockholding on the other hand in the stockholding equations below. However, the inclusion of z and z
in all equations (including the stockholding equations) does not change any of the results, see the additional
estimates presented in Tables A4.9 through A4.11 in Appendix A.
19There we show additional results for the restricted sample of nancial respondents and for a more
exible way of estimating heterogeneity in ~i. Those results are qualitatively very similar to our benchmark
esitmates, except that heterogeneity in ~i is less successfully pinned down in some cases.
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0:07. The population average of the perceived standard deviation is over 50 per cent, to be
compared to the historical standard deviation of 15 per cent.
Perhaps even more interesting are the moments conditional on the covariates. Instead of
interpreting the estimated coe¢ cients of the model, we show estimated moments of ~i and
~i in various groups.
The moments within subgroups are based on predicted values of ~i and ~i, which are
conditional on observed survey answers p0i and p10i and the other covariates in the estimation
model. The predicted subjective mean and subjective standard deviation are denoted by
^i and ^i, and they come from the following conditional expectations (where hats on the
expectation operator mean estimates):
^i = bE [~ijxi; zi; (p0i; p10i) 2 Qkl] (22)
^i = bE [~ijxi; zi; (p0i; p10i) 2 Qkl] (23)
The conditional expectations are relatively straightforward to compute by BayesRule
after the results of the structural model that species the full distributions for ~i and ~i. The
predicted ^i and ^i are then the sample analogues to those. The details of the derivation
are in section A.4 in Appendix A.
This prediction method is analogous to the prediction of risk tolerance based on sur-
vey answers to hypothetical gambles by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008). The predicted
values are di¤erent from the true values, creating measurement error in the variables. The
measurement error is one of prediction error. It has zero mean and thus leads to an unbiased
estimate of the population mean, but it leads to an underestimation of the population stan-
dard deviation (because the predicted values are less dispersed than the true values). Using
^i and ^i on the right-hand side of a regression leads to consistent estimates as long as all
the covariates that are used in the predictions are also entered in the regression in question.
The standard errors in this regression are inconsistent, though, and thus bootstrap standard
errors are advised. If one uses the ^i and ^i in regressions that have di¤erent covariates
from the ones used in the prediction equations, OLS is inconsistent and a more sophisticated
GMM procedure is appropriate (see Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008, for more details).
Table 2.3 shows the average predicted belief variables in various groups in the sample.
The table is analogous to Table 2.1 in the descriptive analysis, except that Table 2.3 does
not have a measure of disagreement (because that is not estimated well by the dispersion of
^i), and it does not repeat the fraction of missing answers.
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Table 2.3.
Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
Average ^i Average ^i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:065 0:542
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings  0:070 0:540
Education college or more 0:041 0:539
Education high school or less  0:094 0:536
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:072 0:536
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:051 0:573
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:023 0:551
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity  0:138 0:517
Father was manager or professional 0:030 0:519
Father had other occupation  0:049 0:550
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:008 0:515
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance  0:141 0:569
Financial respondent in couple 0:031 0:512
Non-nancial respondent in couple  0:051 0:558
Entire sample  0:041 0:539
Total number of observations 3; 314 3; 314
Sample: HRS 2002. Respondents of age 55 through 64 (partner also 55-64)
^i and ^i: predicted subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return
The inter-group di¤erences in average expectations are large. Those with top 25 per cent
lifetime earnings or top 25 per cent cognitive capacity believe that expected stock returns
are 15 percentage points higher than those with bottom 25 per cent earnings or cognitive
capacity. College educated respondents believe that expected returns are 13 percentage
points higher than those with high school education or less. Average ^ is still below the
historical average of 0:07 in these categories, but in combined categories it exceeds that (it
is 0:11 for college educated respondents with top 25 per cent lifetime earnings and a DC
pension plan). The di¤erences by pension plan, the fathers occupation, risk tolerance and
nancial respondent status are sometimes smaller but still substantial. These di¤erences
are all in line with the predictions of the learning model. On average, individuals who had
higher incentives to learn believe that expected stock market returns are positive and closer
to historical evidence than other individuals.
The estimated intergroup di¤erences in perceived risk are smaller and do not always have
the expected direction, because our model is less successful in capturing heterogeneity in ~.
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Nevertheless, in most of the cases when the di¤erence is substantial, the results are in line
with the predictions of the learning model: those who had higher incentives to learn believe
that risks are lower and closer to historical evidence.
Finally, we examine the association of predicted individual beliefs with stockholding.
Stockholding is specied as a two-tier hurdle model. The extensive margin (whether a
household holds any stock-market based assets at all) is a probit, and the intensive margin
(how much it holds if it holds any) is a truncated regression. Subjective beliefs are entered
in the right-hand side of these equations in the form of their predicted values ^i and ^i, in
additive ways.
Pr (si = 0) =  (1^i + 1^i + 
0
1xi) (24)
si = 2^i + 2^i + 
0
2xi + u2i (25)
We estimated both models in two ways, rst without the stock market belief estimates
and second with them. Apart from the belief-specic variables, the same right hand-side
variables are included in the structural model as in the stockholding equations. As a result
the coe¢ cients of the belief variables are consistently estimated (see our discussion above
and also in Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008). Because of inconsistency of the analytical
standard errors, we present bootstrap standard errors that are re-sampled at the level of
households (in order to allow for within-household correlations that are obviously strong
because of the common left hand-side variable).
Besides the coe¢ cients of the belief variables, it is also interesting to see whether and
to what extent coe¢ cients of the other variables change with the inclusion of the belief
variables. Table 2.4 shows the most important results from the stockholding equation (24).
Table A4.2 in Appendix A contains all estimates.
Expected stock market returns (^i) are strongly predictive of the probability of stock-
holding and the share of stocks in household portfolios. Individuals who believe that stock
market returns are higher by one percentage point live in households that are 0.7 percentage
points more likely to own stocks, and if they own stocks, the share of stocks among their
nancial assets is 0.3 percentage points higher. The estimated correlation of perceived risk,
^; is not signicant in the equations.
Other right hand-side variables have strong associations with the probability of stock-
holding, and most are of the expected sign. They are, however, at most weakly predictive
of the share of stocks in household portfolios, which makes the strong predictive power of
expected returns even more remarkable.
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Inclusion of the stock market beliefs decreases the association of stockholding and the
other right hand-side variables. The association with education and cognitive capacity are
cut by a third. Single men and women are signicantly less likely to hold stocks than
couples in the reduced form but not if we condition on their stock market beliefs. Females
in couples are of course just as likely to hold stocks as the reference group of coupled men
because stockholding is dened at the household level. Their beliefs are, however, a lot less
optimistic, and thats why, conditional on their beliefs, they should be more likely to hold
stocks according to the second model. African Americans are 23 percentage points less likely
to hold stocks in the rst model (conditional on all the other right hand-side variables), and
the di¤erence drops to 18 percentage points if beliefs are also controlled. The di¤erence
between Hispanics and non-Hispanics are 23 percentage points (again conditional on the
other right hand-side variables), and is una¤ected by the inclusion of beliefs.20
Overall, our ndings suggest that those people who should learn about returns in the
stock market do learn and, given their beliefs, those people who should invest do invest. It
is important to emphasize that the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 2.4 do not capture the
causal e¤ect of beliefs about stock returns on stock holding. Rather, as our theoretical model
emphasizes, beliefs are the product of a process of learning (or failure to learn) that takes
place over the life cycle with many feedback loops between observations of market returns,
evolution of earnings and wealth and investments in learning.
20For robustness checks, we re-estimated all models with the nancial respondents only, as well as with
alternative specications for the heterogeneity in ~i: The results, shown in Tables A4.3 through A4.10 in
Appendix A, are very similar to those presented above.
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Table 2.4
Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin
Pr (si > 0), partial e¤ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^i 0:734 0:302
(0.088) (0.110)
^i  0:050 0:144
(0.108) (0.131)
Log lifetime earnings 0:041 0:034 0:000  0:003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Education 0:033 0:023 0:011 0:008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.05) (0.005)
Cognitive capacity 0:069 0:044 0:002  0:009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Log risk tolerance 0:023  0:039 0:048 0:030
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Single female  0:110 0:021  0:023 0:009
(0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
Single male  0:094  0:031  0:022  0:005
(0.029) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038)
Female in couple  0:003 0:087 0:010 0:029
(0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.025)
African American  0:233  0:181 0:034 0:057
(0.030) (0.030) (0.046) (0.053)
Hispanic  0:229  0:225  0:008  0:004
(0.044) (0.043) (0.066) (0.064)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4)
 signicant at 1%;  signicant at 5%
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
2.7 Conclusions
Using survey data on subjective probabilities and a rich set of personal characteristics, this
paper estimates heterogeneity in stock market beliefs and proposes an explanation for the
source of that heterogeneity. We show descriptive evidence and develop a structural measure-
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ment model to capture the theoretically important belief parameters and separate survey
noise from relevant heterogeneity. We provide detailed evidence on survey noise and the
measurement model accommodates all the noise features we document. The results are con-
sistent with our proposed explanation for heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. They also
reinforce previous results about the predictive power of beliefs on stockholding.
Our results establish the importance of belief heterogeneity in household nances. They
show that survey answers to probability questions can be helpful in characterizing individual
beliefs, but their analysis should recognize the importance of survey noise. Our econometric
model is a simple but sensible attempt to deal with measurement error that may be a useful
reference for further research in this direction.
Our structural estimation results on the subjective mean of stock returns are relatively
strong, while our results on the subjective standard deviation are weaker. We explored
di¤erent models with di¤erent assumptions about the form of heterogeneity in the subjective
standard deviation, and the results were always qualitatively similar. It is possible that
answers to more probability questions or probability questions that are dened for more
distant horizons would result in stronger identication in the presence of substantial survey
noise.
So, what can we learn from these results? First, the HRS survey data is consistent with
a model in which beliefs about the stock market depend on nancial knowledge and the
acquisition of nancial knowledge is costly. Although our results emphasize the importance
of beliefs, on a cautionary note, they also suggest that the strong correlation between beliefs
and stock market participation in the HRS and other surveys cannot be interpreted as
a causal relationship. Second, our results in some ways support the recent emphasis on
nding ways to improve nancial literacy as potentially useful policy to help people prepare
for retirement. It would be useful to know more than we do about the mechanisms by
which people acquire nancial knowledge. Our model suggests that feedback e¤ects through
learning by doing may have large cumulative e¤ects in the long run. Thus, policies that
encourage participation in stockholding at a small scale early in the life cycle may motivate
people both to improve their knowledge of risks and returns and to increase their level of
saving.
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3 Financial knowledge, personality and expectations
about future stock returns
Acknowledgement 2 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the "Formation and
revision of subjective expectations" conference, held on November 8-9, 2012 in Québec city,
Canada.
I thank Charles Bellemare, Hector Calvo-Pardo, Michael Hurd and Robert J. Willis for their
valuable comments.
3.1 Introduction and theoretical motivation
Expectations about future returns attainable on the stock market vary considerably. In the
previous chapter, Robert J. Willis and I argued that knowledge about the stock market
in general, and historical stock market returns in particular, is an important determinant
of stock market expectations. We contrasted various implications of that argument with
empirical evidence using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), but we did
not have explicit measures of knowledge about the history of stock market returns or other
elements of nancial knowledge.
That work also left open the question of what else may a¤ect expectations beyond nan-
cial knowledge. Two people with the same knowledge about the past and the same knowledge
of the way the economy works may have very di¤erent expectations for the future. Those
di¤erences may be at least partly driven by di¤erences in personality.
In this paper I use new data from the HRS to shed more light on heterogeneity in stock
market expectations. In particular, I consider two questions:
1. Are measures of nancial knowledge, especially knowledge about past stock market
returns, related to expectations about future stock market returns?
2. Are aspects of personality that are recognized to be important in psychology related
to expectations about future stock market returns?
The psychology literature on personality aims to uncover stable traits that a¤ect think-
ing, feeling, and acting. The literature has come to a consensus that ve major dimensions
describe personality on a broad level: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neu-
roticism, and Openness/Intellect. The combination of these dimensions is often called the
"Big Five personality traits." According to this consensus view, an individuals score on
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these ve dimensions characterize stable patterns of thoughts and feelings, and these scores
are widely used to predict individual behavior.
The Big Five personality theory reduces individual di¤erences in personality to the ve
categories and characterizes them accordingly. A more theoretical approach to the Big Five
personality theory postulates that its ve dimensions capture something fundamental about
peoples way of thinking and feeling. There are more complicated theoretical structures
that include the Big Five personality traits to provide a better understanding and a better
connection to neurobiological structures. For my analysis, these more complicated structures
are not essential. However, it is important to remember that the Big Five theory is not simply
and ad-hoc representation of observed personality but is a theory with a deeper structure.
That structure is the subject of intensive research.
Agreeableness is associated with the degree of cooperation versus exploitation of others.
It is therefore conceptually related to altruism as it is used in economics research. Con-
scientiousness is associated with the degree of control. It is also thought to be related to
the ability to follow rules and to pursue goals with potentially delayed rewards. In a sense,
it may be related to time preference, but that relationship is not obvious (see more later).
Extraversion is associated with higher sensitivity to rewards. This can be understood at a
broad level, including the anticipation of rewards and its e¤ect on behavior as well as the
enjoyment of actual rewards and its e¤ect on behavior. Neuroticism, sometimes referred to
by its reverse measure, Emotional Stability, is associated with an individuals reactivity to
threats and punishments. Openness, sometimes called Intellect, is associated with higher
willingness and ability to think in abstract ways and to explore and analyze information.
This willingness may be closely related to ones capacity to think in abstract ways and to
analyze information. Therefore, openness is closely related to cognitive capacities.
The measurement of the Big Five factors is typically based on answers to survey questions
about self-assessed characteristics. These self-assessment measures have been validated by
evidence provided by peers as well as relevant choices and behavior.
There is a growing body literature that attempts to connect the Big Five personality traits
to the most important dimensions of individual preferences that are relevant for economic
decision making. In a sense, that research is part of the broader literature that attempts to
validate the Big Five personality structure. In another sense, that research aims to uncover
the fundamental psychological bases of economic preferences.
Anderson, Burks, DeYoung and Rustichini (2011) nd that Neuroticism is related to risk
preferences conditional on cognitive skills. However, they nd that other personality traits
are not related to risk preferences or time preference. The lack of a relationship between
Conscientiousness and time preference is surprising, but this negative result is common in
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the literature. However intuitive it is to relate Conscientiousness to time preference, little
empirical evidence has linked the two.
In their survey, Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk and Kosse (2012) nd that Big Five
personality measures are at most weakly related to time preference and risk preference. They,
conclude that time preference is not signicantly related to personality traits. Moreover,
their conclusions on associations with risk preferences not very positive. They note that,
although some studies nd relationships between Neuroticism and risk preferences, similarly
to Anderson, Burks, DeYoung and Rustichini (2011), others do not conrm that relationship.
In contrast with time preference and risk preferences, social preferences (such as trust or
reciprocity) are found to be strongly associated with Big Five personality traits. However,
the role of social preferences is not straightforward in investment decisions.
The nding of a weak relationship between Big Five personality traits and economic
preferences that are relevant for investment decisions is somewhat puzzling. Some of these
personality traits are found to be related to individual behavior and outcomes that are likely
a¤ected by nancial decisions. Using personality measures from earlier survey waves of
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Duckworth and Weir (2010) found that Conscien-
tiousness and Emotional Stability (the reverse of Neuroticism) are strongly related to lifetime
earnings, conditional on cognitive skills and education. Even more importantly for house-
hold nance research, they found that Conscientiousness is related to retirement savings,
conditional on cognitive skills, education and lifetime earnings.
It seems that personality, as measured by self-assessment survey questions, explains part
of the variation in wealth conditional on lifetime earnings and part of the variation in lifetime
earnings. However, personality seems to be, at most, weakly related to risk preferences and
time preferences. These ndings raise the question of what may be responsible for the
association with wealth if not association with preferences. It is possible that personality
di¤erences are related to di¤erences in expectation, which is part of the reason they explain
variation in wealth.
Another personality trait that is likely to be related to stock market expectations is
optimism. General optimism, as a stable personality trait, is dened as "a generalized
expectancy that good, as opposed to bad, outcomes will generally occur when confronted
with problems across important life domains" (Scheier and Carver, 1985). Optimism is also
viewed as part of positive individual traits, along with hope and courage, for example (see,
for example, the January 2000 issue of the American Psychologist and the introduction by
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Quite naturally, if general optimism exists, it is likely
to emerge in expectations about specic positive events. Its relationship with stock market
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returns is more natural for stockholders, for whom higher stock returns are positive events,
but not for other people.
Note that the relationship between general optimism and the Big Five personality traits
is not straightforward and is the subject of ongoing research in psychology. Sharpe, Martin
and Roth (2011) nd that Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Neuroticism
are all related to general optimism, in rather complicated ways. Indeed, it is possible that
general optimism captures aspects of personality that are conceptually di¤erent from the
aspects that Big Five theory can capture. It is also possible that those aspects are at least
as important for decision under uncertainty as the Big Five personality traits.
The association of general optimism with stock market expectations is motivated by
earlier work of mine with Robert J. Willis on optimism (Kézdi and Willis, 2003), too. That
analysis showed that a combined measure of optimism about various events is positively
related to many positive life outcomes, conditional on many other personal characteristics
(including education or cognitive scores).
A remarkable nding of that analysis was the association of sunshine optimism with
many life outcomes. That measure was dened by comparing peoples subjective probability
assessments of the day after the interview being sunny to actual sunshine data for the
day in question. The measure is a binary variable, indicating a positive residual when
sunshine expectations were regressed on actual sunshine data (collected from weather station
observations). The binary variable is therefore one for those provided a higher probability of
a sunny weather for the day after the interview than for other respondents who faced the same
actual sunshine the day after. In that analysis (Kézdi andWillis, 2003), we found that people
with sunshine optimism had higher expectations for many events, including survival to old
age and economic growth. The data we used for that analysis did not contain expectations
about the stock market. However, we have shown that optimism predicts stockholding (as
well as many other outcomes), which we have interpreted as indirect evidence for optimism
a¤ecting stock market expectations and, in turn, stockholding.
Indeed, these interpretations turned out to be correct when we analyzed stock market
expectations directly in a later paper, included in the previous chapter of this dissertation.
The results there show that sunshine optimism is positively correlated with stock market
expectations, conditional on many personal characteristics, including education, cognitive
capacity and lifetime earnings.
Taken together, the psychology literature and our earlier ndings suggest that general
optimism may be associated with expectations. Moreover, this association is likely to remain
positive conditional on nancial knowledge.
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3.2 Data
I use two di¤erent subsamples of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the analysis.21
The initial sample is the 2010 wave of the HRS, which contains answers to the stock market
expectations questions (see below for more detail). In each wave of the HRS, randomly
selected subsamples are invited to answer a few more questions, collected in "experimental
modules." In 2010, one experimental module contained questions on nancial sophistica-
tion.22 The rst subsample of my analysis consisted of respondents in this experimental
module.
The second subsample consisted of respondents to the "leave-behind" questionnaire of
HRS 2010. This was a self-administered paper-and-pencil questionnaire that respondents
were invited to complete and mail using pre-paid envelopes. In 2010, half of the sample
received the "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire" as a leave-behind questionnaire. This
questionnaire contained measures of the standard Big Five personality dimensions as well as
measures of optimism.
Altogether, 15,372 respondents participated in the 2010 wave of the HRS. Of these, 1545
answered the experimental module on nancial literacy, and 8184 answered the personality
measures in the leave-behind questionnaire.
I restrict the analysis to respondents 50 to 70 years of age. IN principle, the HRS is
representative of the people 51 years old (the "age eligible") and their spouses. In practice,
the sample is refreshed every six years to include new cohorts to represent the entire age
distribution starting with age 51. In 2010, the age-eligibles were 56 years old or older. My
sample of people 50 years or older therefore consisted of younger spouses (between age 50
and 55) and age-eligible respondents (between age 56 and 74).
The size of the 50- to 70-year-old sample was 685 for the experimental module on nancial
literacy and 3547 for the personality measures.
Throughout the analysis, I use control variables of gender, age, years of education, a
measure for cognitive capacity (the standardized number series score) and wealth.
Cognitive capacity is measured by the number series score. The number series test was
adapted from the Woodcock-Johnson (WJ-R) battery (McArdle, Fisher and Kadlec, 2007).
The questions in this test present puzzles that must be solved by recognizing patterns, in
numbers. The number series test is considered one of the most valid and reliable measures of
uid intelligence. The age-adjusted scores of pattern recognition tests, such as the number
series test, are often referred to as "IQ."
21See the data section of the previous chapter for more details on the HRS.
22The module was designed by Annamaria Lusardi, Olivia Mitchell, Miles Kimball and Tyler Shumway.
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Fluid intelligence is thought to represent reasoning and thinking in novel situations. Mod-
ern cognitive psychology distinguishes uid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc)
in classifying cognitive abilities. Crystallized intelligence is thought to represent acculturated
knowledge, potentially as a result of individualsinvestment in knowledge (Horn and McAr-
dle, 2007). The number series measure is therefore conceptually di¤erent from knowledge,
which is important to keep in mind throughout the analysis.23
The number series test was administered for the rst time in the HRS in 2010. It was
an adaptive test with up to six items. Adaptive tests adjust the di¢ culty of the question
to the results of previous answers, thus increasing the power of the test in di¤erentiating
between people over a larger support of the underlying ability distribution. For this analysis,
I use a standardized score from this test for the entire HRS sample. Approximately 15 per
cent of the respondents had no valid number series score; I lled in sample means for these
respondents for each analysis subsample separately. (Dropping observations with missing
number series scores does not change any of the results).
Wealth is measured as the natural logarithm of total household wealth net of debts. Total
household wealth includes nancial wealth as well as housing and other non-nancial wealth
items own by members of the household, added up. About 10 per cent of the sample has
non-positive wealth (most of them negative wealth, sometimes quite large negative wealth)
and I use a binary variable in the analysis for people in such households.
The summary statistics of these control variables in the entire sample and the two sub-
samples of my analysis are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The 50- to 70-year-old
subsample has better cognitive abilities and higher education than the entire sample, due to
the age restriction. The remaining di¤erences between the entire HRS sample and the 50- to
70-year-old subsample are not very large. Further restrictions change the picture in di¤erent
ways. The subsample with measures of nancial knowledge is slightly more educated but has
slightly lower abilities and lower wealth and includes more minorities than the entire age-
restricted subsample, whereas the personality subsample is more educated and has higher
average abilities and higher wealth and includes a lower fraction of minorities at the same
time.
The analysis focuses on stock returns expectations. In 2010, three stock returns questions
were asked:
23In ongoing work with Robert J. Willis, Susann Rohwedder and Péter Hudomiet ("Financial knowledge,
uid intelligence and investment decisions"), we use a more precise version of the number series score that has
more items. That work uses other, substantially more detailed cognitive data. It shows that other potential
measures of uid intelligence, including, most importantly, Ravens matrices, are conceptually similar but
less powerful measures of uid intelligence in the analysis if nancial decisions. Note that HRS does not
have other measures of uid intelligence. I describe our ongoing research in more detail in the next footnote.
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p0 question: By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than
they are today?
p20 question: By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
invested in blue-chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will have gained in value
by more than 20 percent compared to what they are worth today?
pltn20 question: By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
invested in blue-chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will have fallen in value
by more than 20 percent compared to what they are worth today?
Recall from the previous chapter that in 2002, HRS asked two questions, p0 and p10 (the
chance that stocks would gain in value by 10 per cent or more), and in 2004 and 2006 it asked
p0 only. In 2008, HRS asked two questions, p0 and another question with varying threshold.
(The 2008 data are analyzed in the study presented in the next chapter.) The 2010 stock
market expectations questions di¤er from the 2002 questions in that they consist of three
questions instead of two, and the second question is, p20 instead of p10. Note, however, that
p20 is similar to the original p10 question, only the threshold is higher. The third question,
pltn20; is di¤erent in that it asks about a negative threshold and the probability that returns
would be below that threshold.
These di¤erences between the 2002 data and the 2010 data are important. First, the
2010 thresholds cover a larger part of the support of the returns distribution, 0, +20 and
 20 per cent (compared to 0 and +10 per cent in 2002). Second, there are three points
in the distribution compared to the two points in 2002. In principle, these di¤erences can
produce more precise estimates than the estimates that use p0 and p10 only.
Recall from the previous chapter that answers to probability questions are likely to be
plagued by missing observations and serious survey noise. The fraction of missing answers is
substantially higher for the stock market probability questions than for other questions in the
survey, including all other probability questions, too. Most of the valid answers are multiples
of 10 per cent or 25 per cent, in the case of both stock market expectations and subjective
probabilities of other events. Perhaps more importantly, some answer combinations for stock
returns probabilities do not conform to the laws of probability. Finally, and perhaps most
interestingly, comparing answers to the p0 question asked twice in HRS 2002 (from a small
subset of respondents who answered an experimental module) revealed a substantial test-
retest di¤erence.
The fact that more than one probability is elicited about stock returns allows for the
identication of more features of the distribution, but it also poses additional problems.
As discussed in the previous chapter, some combinations of answers violate the laws of
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probability, and other combinations imply zero probability mass between two points of the
support. In the 2002 data, the laws of probability are violated if p0 < p10, and zero probability
mass is implied by p0 = p10, apparently violating the normality assumption of log returns.
The analogous violations in 2010 are p0 < p20 and p0 = p20, respectively. The third question
asked the probability of returns falling below a threshold (of negative 20 per cent), which is
a slightly di¤erent event. Here, the laws of probability are violated if p0 + pltn20 > 1, and
zero probability mass is implied between 0 and negative 20 per cent if p0 + pltn20 = 1:
As we argued in the previous chapter, although those violations may indicate that many
respondents simply cannot think in terms of probabilities, it is also possible that those
apparent violations are the results of simple survey noise. Noise of this type may arise if
respondents answer the two probability questions by making up answers without much think-
ing and/or without keeping in mind their answer to the previous question. In the previous
chapter, we provided evidence that strongly support the survey noise argument. Moreover,
we have also provided evidence that survey noise is largely random and independent of
cognitive capacity or other relevant heterogeneity.24
Our rst piece of evidence was that shows that test-retest noise seems completely indepen-
dent of everything we measure about people, including their memory scores and numeracy
measures. Among other things, this implies that anything that is due to survey noise should
be unrelated to those characteristics. Second, we found that the propensity to give "funny"
answer combinations to the stock return probability questions is very weakly related to ob-
servable characteristics, at least if we properly condition on the rst probability answer. In
this chapter, I present further evidence to support our claim that apparent violations of the
laws of probability and zero mass events are largely due to random survey noise.
Table 3.1 summarizes the noise features in the 2010 data and compares them to the 2002
data (both samples refer to 50- to 70-year-old people at the time of the interview, which is
di¤erent from the sample used in the previous chapter and table A2.5 of Appendix A). Table
B.1 in the appendix to this chapter shows the corresponding regression results.
24The lack of association of survey noise with personal characteristics, especially cognitive capacity, may
seem surprising. One would think that people with better memory or higher levels of uid intelligence would
be more able to remember their previous answers and, as a result, would be less susceptible to test-retest
errors. This is not that obvious, however, if we recognize that answers to di¢ cult survey questions of this
sort are also a function of cognitive e¤ort, which is a choice variable and is therefore endogeneous. It is
possible that respondents with higher levels of ability put less e¤ort into answering cognitively demanding
questions than people with lower levels of ability, which may result in a lack of association between cognitive
abilities and survey noise.
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Table 3.1. Some patterns of survey answers in 2002 and 2010 in the HRS
stock market probability questions. 50 to 70 years old respondents
Per cent of responses where HRS 2002 HRS 2010
p0 = 0:5 20.6 24:2
p0 = 0:0 or p 0 = 1:0 11.0 7:6
p0 rounded other ten per cent 31.1 41:8
p0 rounded 25% or 75% 7.3 7:6
p0 not round number 4.8 5:5
p0 missing 25.2 13.3
Total 100:0 100:0
p0 > p10 41.6
p0 = p10 44:0
p0 < p10 14:4
Total 100:0
p0 > p20 58.9
p0 = p20 30.2
p0 < p20 10.1
Total 100.0
p0 + pltn20 < 1 65.5
p0 + pltn20 = 1 14.6
p0 + pltn20 > 1 19.9
Total 100.0
We can draw three conclusions from the tables. First, rounding, apparent violations of
the laws of probability, and zero probability mass answers show similar patterns in 2002
with the p0 and p10 combination and in 2010 with the p0 and p20 combination. Second,
these patterns are consistent with the survey noise argument and that this noise is largely
random. Third, the patterns with respect to pltn20, the probability that returns are less than
the negative threshold, are quite di¤erent.
In detail, we can conclude that rounding in p0 is pervasive both in 2002 and 2010. The
fraction of 50, 0, and 100 per cent responses was 32 percent in both 2002 and 2010, with
more 50s in 2010 and more 0s and 100s in 2002. The fraction of unrounded answers is
similar in 2002 and 2010. The fraction of missing answers is approximately 25 per cent in
2002 but only 13 per cent in 2010. The decrease in missing answers may be due to familiarity
with the survey question (the stock market questions were asked in 2002 for the rst time)
or decreased uncertainty (most missing answers reect genuine ignorance, as we argued in
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the previous chapter).
The joint response patterns in p0 and p10 in 2002 and in p0 and p20 in 2010 are di¢ cult to
compare because of the di¤erent thresholds. The incidence of both zero mass answers and
apparent violations is lower in 2010, which may be due to learning the survey questions or
the fact that the thresholds are farther apart. The relationship of the propensity to provide
these answer combinations to other personal characteristics is very similar in 2002 and 2010
(see Table B1.2)The negative probability question is di¤erent. Both the prevalence of the
patterns of those answer combinations and their relationship to other personal characteristics
is very di¤erent for the answer patterns of p0 when combined with pltn20.
These results have important implications for our analysis. First, we can analyze the p0
and p20 answers in 2010 in ways that are very similar to our previous analysis of the p0 and
p10 answer pair in 2002. On the contrary, incorporating the pltn20 answer would be a mistake
without a better understanding the answer patterns and the role of survey noise in those
patterns. Unfortunately, a test-retest analysis is impossible to perform in 2010. As a result,
I cannot say more about the noise patterns in pltn20.
As a result of these considerations, I do not use the pltn20 variable in the analysis and
concentrate on p0 and p20 only.
The rst substantive question of this paper is the relationship of stock return expectations
to nancial knowledge. In contrast with the 2002 data, in 2010, we have direct measures
of nancial knowledge. Financial knowledge is measured by using questions administered
in Experimental Module 8, on nancial literacy, in the 2010 wave of the HRS. The most
important variable is knowledge of historical returns. The question did not ask for the
respondents estimate of past returns. Instead, it asked whether the respondent thought
that stocks outperformed bonds and saving accounts. The exact wording of the question
was as follows:
Which asset do you think historically has paid the highest returns over a
long time period, say 20 years or more savings accounts, bonds, or stocks? (1.
Saving accounts 2. Bonds 3. Stocks)
The distribution of the answers to this question is shown in Table 3.2. Fifty-four percent
of the answers indicated that stocks to had the highest returns, 27 per cent indicated bonds,
11 per cent indicated savings accounts, and 8 per cent did not know. Not surprisingly, those
who indicated stocks (the right answer) were more educated and had higher cognitive scores
than the rest of the sample.
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Table 3.2
Answers to which asset paid the highest returns over the past 20 years.
Distribution and some statistics (n = 685)
Which asset paid Distribution Fraction Avg. years Avg. standardized
highest historical returns (%) female (%) of education number series score
Saving accounts 11 61 11.2  0:45
Bonds 27 61 13.0  0.04
Stocks 54 59 13.8 0.30
Does not know 8 77 11.7  0:36
All 100 61 13.1 0.08
HRS 2010. Financial literacy experimental module, 50- to 70-year-old respondents.
I use four other questions from the nancial literacy module that measure nancial knowl-
edge other than knowledge of past returns. There are more questions in the module but these
four are the cleanest and least controversial measures. The questions are as follows
Whether it is a good idea to own stocks of foreign companies;
whether one should diversify individual stocks;
whether bond prices fall if the interest rate falls;
whether it is easy to pick stocks that will have better than average returns.
These questions are a subset of the nancial knowledge module of the CogEcon survey
that I used in a paper with Robert J. Willis, Susann Rohwedder and Péter Hudomiet.25
25"Financial knowledge, uid intelligence and investment decisions." The rst draft of that paper is being
nalized now (January 2013) and will be available as a working paper in March 2013. The paper combines
insights from cognitive psychology and economics to distinguish knowledge from uid intelligence and ex-
amins their role in nancial decisions. Using a battery of nancial knowledge questions and intelligence
tests administered in two surveys, CogEcon and another survey called the American Life Panel, we show
that nancial knowledge is strongly associated with stockholding and with better investment decisions both
before and throughout the nancial crisis. Fluid intelligence has predictive power, but the associations with
nancial knowledge remain strong when controlling for uid intelligence, whereas the associations with uid
intelligence diminish substantially when nancial knowledge is controlled. In the paper we argue that nan-
cial knowledge is likely to be the key factor that makes people with higher uid intelligence make better
nancial decisions (see, for example, Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson, 2009, and Grinblatt, Keloharju
and Linnainmaa, 2011). Our results also imply that research on nancial literacy (where literacy is usually
meant to encompass knowledge, uid intelligence and other potential inputs into nancial decision making)
could benet from distinguishing uid and crystallized elements both for better measurement and for more
careful consideration of policies (see, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Guiso and Jappelli, 2009;
Kimball and Shumway, 2010; van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie, 2011).
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CogEcon is a panel survey with observations from 2008, 2009 and 2011.26 The rst wave was
administered by mail and internet to a national sample of 1,222 persons aged 51 and older
and their spouses regardless of age. The 2008 CogEcon survey contained a 25-item battery
of nancial literacy questions. Survey participants were randomly assigned a true or a false
version of each question. Of the 25 questions only 13 were adequate measures of nancial
knowledge (the remaining 12 either combine nancial knowledge with cognitive skills or are
worded in ambiguous ways). The four questions listed above are a subset of those 13.
Table 3.3 shows the fraction of correct answers to each of the four nancial knowledge
questions and summary statistics in the correct answer categories.
Table 3.3
The fraction of correct answers to each of the four nancial knowledge questions
and summary statistics in the correct answer categories (n = 685)
Statistics in the correct answer categories
Fraction Fraction Avg. years Avg. standardized
correct (%) female (%) of education number series score
Foreign stocks 46 61 13.8 0.26
Diversify stocks 66 58 13.3 0.19
Bond prices 46 57 13.7 0.30
Picking stocks 70 59 13.5 0.20
Sample total n.a. 61 13.1 0.08
HRS 2010. Financial literacy experimental module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
In the spirit of the psychometric literature, and similar to our nancial knowledge paper
coauthored with Willis, Rowhedder and Hudomiet, I created a standardized score from the
nancial knowledge questions. Naturally, the measure can take on ve values: the number
of correct answers to the four questions. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of the score along
with the descriptive statistics I have shown in the previous tables. The modal score is three
correct answers out of four, and 60 per cent of respondents got two or three questions right.
The nancial knowledge score tends to be smaller among women, and it is positively related
to education and the number series score.
26The CogEcon data are described in detail on the University of Michigan Cognitive Economics Project
website, http://cogecon.isr.umich.edu/survey/index.html . The survey was designed by Daniel Benjamin,
Andrew Caplin, Miles Kimball, Kathleen McGarry, Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro, Tyler Shumway and
Robert J. Willis.
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Table 3.4
The nancial knowledge score: number of correct answers to all questions
and summary statistics in the score categories (n = 685)
Financial knowledge Statistics in the score categories
score: Number of Distribution Fraction Avg. years Avg. standardized
correct answers (%) female (%) of education number series score
0 6 65 12.0  0.44
1 19 68 12.1  0.28
2 29 64 12.6  0:08
3 31 56 13.6 0.30
4 15 54 14.8 0.61
Sample total 100 61 13.1 0.08
HRS 2010. Financial literacy experimental module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The second substantive question of my analysis is the relationship between stock return
expectations and personality. The analysis focuses on the Big Five personality traits and
optimism.
The Big Five personality traits are measured by a standard battery of self-assessment
items. When answering these questions, respondents state the extent to which they think
the listed adjectives characterize them. The adjectives used in the survey are the following
(grouped by personality trait for this listing but not in the survey):
Agreeableness: helpful, friendly, warm, caring, softhearted, sympathetic
Conscientiousness: organized, responsible, hardworking, careless, thorough
Extraversion: outgoing, lively, active, talkative, adventurous
Neuroticism: moody, worrying, nervous, calm
Openness: creative, imaginative, intelligent, curious, broad-minded, sophisticated
The ve items for each measure were converted into a score that was standardized for the
entire sample. The resulting personality measures are, quite naturally, not independent of one
another. The correlation is strong between four of the ve measures, with Neuroticism as the
only exception. It seems that the personality items are uncorrelated with the number series
score, with the potential exception of Openness. Table 3.6 shows the pairwise correlations.
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Table 3.5
Pairwise correlation of the Big Five personality measures and the number series score
Agreeable- Conscientious- Extro- Neuro- Open- Number
ness ness version ticism ness Series
Agreeableness 1.00
Conscientiousness 0.42 1.00
Extroversion 0.62 0.25 1.00
Neuroticism  0:03  0:14  0:08 1.00
Openness 0.57 0.33 0.65  0:08 1.00
Number series 0.01 0.05 0.09  0:05 0.11 1.00
HRS 2010, "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire" 50- to 70-year-old respondents.
Table B1.3 in Appendix B shows the regression results with each of the personality
measure on the left-hand-side and the other personality measure on the right-hand-side
together with the number series score, education, demographic variables and wealth.
The regression results conrm the correlated nature of the personality items, although
the strength of the correlation is reduced by half when the other right-hand-side variables are
controlled. The number series score is, at most, weakly related to the personality measures,
but education has signicant explanatory power. Higher education is negatively associated
with Agreeableness and Neuroticism and positively related to Extroversion and, especially,
Openness. The correlation between number series and Openness becomes insignicant be-
cause education takes on a positive association. There are systematic gender di¤erences in
the personality measures: women have signicantly higher scores for Agreeableness, Consci-
entiousness, Extroversion, and they have signicantly lower score for Openness. Age e¤ects
are also signicant for Extroversion (increasing), Neuroticism (decreasing) and Openness
(decreasing, perhaps because of cognitive decline). Ethnic and racial di¤erences are also
signicant, especially for Conscientiousness and Neuroticism.
Conscientiousness is positively related to wealth even after controlling for cognitive ca-
pacity and the usual right hand-side variables. This result is in line with the results of
Duckworth and Weir (2010), who used earlier measures in the HRS and found that con-
scientiousness was a strong predictor of wealth, even after controlling for lifetime earnings.
This result is an important motivation for my inquiries into whether personality measures
in general, and conscientiousness in particular, can help to explain heterogeneity in stock
returns expectations.
General optimism is measured using questions on the same "Participant Lifestyle Ques-
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tionnaire" in the 2010 wave of the HRS that contains the Big Five personality measures.
Optimism is measured as the score of answers to three questions, which asking respondents
whether they
are optimistic about the future;
expect the best things in uncertain times;
expect more good things to happen.
These measures were developed and validated by Scheier, Carver and Bridges (1994).
Each question is measured on a six-point scale. The measure of optimism used in this paper
is the score from the answers to these three questions, standardized to the entire sample.
Table B1.4 in Appendix B shows the regression results to shed light on the (partial)
correlations of the measure of optimism with various right-hand-side variables, which include
the sunshine optimism measure we used in previous research.27 That measure is derived from
questions administered in 1994 and 2000. It is available for a subset of the respondents with
measures of optimism from 2010 but not for the entire sample. Therefore, I show results
from two regressions, one with the sunshine measure and another one without. The number
of observations in the rst regression is less than half of the number of observations in the
second.
The most important conclusion from table B1.4. is that the measure of general optimism
from HRS 2010 and the sunshine optimismmeasure from HRS 1994 and 2000 are signicantly
correlated, even conditional on the other right-hand-side variables. This is a remarkable
result for two reasons. First, both measures are likely to be rather noisy; the general optimism
measure is based on three questions, and the sunshine optimism measure is based on two
weather forecast questions compared to actual weather data. Second, the two measures
are separated from each other by ten years or more. The signicant relationship between
sunshine optimism and the 2010 measure of general optimism cross-validates each measure,
giving them high credibility.
The remaining correlations are consistent across the two subsamples. Women are slightly
more optimistic than men, more educated and wealthier people are signicantly more opti-
mistic, and so are minorities. The di¤erences between racial and ethnic groups are, of course,
conditional on education and wealth, which should be kept in mind when interpreting them.
27Recall that this measure was dened by comparing peoples subjective probability assessment of the day
after the interview being sunny to actual sunshine data for the day in question. The measure is a binary
variable, indicating a positive residual when sunshine expectations were regressed on actual sunshine data.
The binary variable is therefore one for those who erred on the positive side more than other people (i.e.,
those who predicted sunshine with a probability that was above the average probability of people who faced
the same actual sunshine).
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The result for non-positive wealth is a phenomenon that is quite general in the analyses of
expectations. Those with non-positive wealth are more optimistic than those with low levels
of positive wealth in many domains, and we see the same association here with respect to
general optimism. This association is driven primarily by households that are leveraged, in
that they have higher value of debt than assets. The remaining results are intuitive and are
consistent with the psychology literature and our earlier results (Kézdi and Willis, 2003).
Table B1.5 in Appendix B shows the correlation between nancial knowledge, Big Five
personality items, and optimism. Financial knowledge is uncorrelated with Big Five person-
ality traits but weakly positively correlated with optimism. This is important because the
theoretically interesting associations between personality and expectations are conditional
on nancial knowledge, but the sample is very small for a joint analysis of personality and
nancial knowledge. When we look at associations of expectations with personality measures
without conditioning them on nancial knowledge, the results on the Big Five personality
traits are likely to be very similar to conditioning them on nancial knowledge.
3.3 Methods
The main analysis ignores the fact that HRS 2010 asked three probability questions on stock
market returns and uses the answers to the rst two questions, p0 and p20. The reason for this
methodological decision is that we simply do not understand the survey noise in the third
question, pltn20. Recall that pltn20; asked the question of whether the returns would be below a
certain (negative) threshold, whereas the rst two questions asked whether the returns would
be above certain (nonnegative) thresholds. The analysis of the answer patterns, documented
in the previous section, suggests that the properties of the survey noise that enter this third
variable are di¤erent from the properties that enter the rst two. Moreover, because we
have no direct test-retest evidence for the third variable, we are unable to characterize the
noise pattern in a credible way. On the contrary, our analysis of the rst two questions (or
a question-pair that is very similar) in chapter one made use of test-retest data and arrived
at a credible characterization of the noise process.
The methods that use two probability answers are identical to the methods used in the
previous chapter, with the exception that p20 is used in place of p10 in the structural analysis.
For brevity, I do not elaborate on the method but simply summarize it.
The goal of the structural econometric model is to estimate heterogeneity in the subjective
beliefs of the mean and standard deviation of log returns, ~i and ~i, respectively. Let R
denote one-year-ahead gross returns, which is a random variable with lnR  N (; 2). ~i
and ~i denote the individual-specic beliefs about those parameters (the i index refers to
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potential heterogeneity, and the tilde refers to the subjective nature). These parameters
characterize the subjective beliefs about future stock market returns in the situation of an
investment decision.
In principle, one can relate the probability answers to the parameters of the lognormal
distribution in a straightforward way. Unfortunately, observed answers to the probability
questions are not suited for such a straightforward transformation. There are theoretical
reasons to believe that peoples answers to the probability questions are not equal to the
probability transformations of ~i and ~i if those parameters are interpreted as the subjective
mean and standard deviation that are relevant in an investment decision. There is little time
to answer the questions in a survey situation, and, beyond a spirit of cooperation, there are
no incentives to get the answers right. It is therefore better to look at actual answers as
"guesses" of what the probabilities may be, given recollections of the returns distribution,
which would be characterized by ~i and ~i in an investment situation.
As documented in the previous section (as well as the previous chapter), answers to the
probability questions reveal patterns that support this view. Some of these answer patterns
make it impossible to compute the probabilities. All of the answer patterns indicate that
actual answers are noisy transformations of relevant beliefs. The strongest evidence is the
test-retest evidence documented in the previous chapter using data from HRS 2002.
The structural model addresses the two main problems, the transformation of the proba-
bility answers to the theoretically relevant belief parameters and survey noise, in a simultane-
ous fashion. It relates the latent variables ~i and ~i to observed responses in the probability
answers and the right hand-side variables (gender, education,etc.). The procedure species
the way heterogeneity in ~i and ~i is related to heterogeneity in the right hand-side variables,
taking observed probability answers and survey noise into account.
The expected vale of ~i across respondents is specied as a linear combination of right
hand-side variables, with parameter vector . Unobserved heterogeneity in ~i is assumed to
follow a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation that can be related, in a
linear fashion, to the right-hand-side variables, with parameter vector u: This specication
for heteroskedasticity in ~i allows for the estimation of di¤erences in disagreement by groups
dened by the observable characteristics. Heterogeneity in ~i is specied as a two-point
distribution with the lower point xed to the historical standard deviation (0:15), the upper
point estimated as the same scalar for everyone, and the probability of the upper point
specied as a probit model with parameter  on the observable characteristics.
With the exception of ; the parameter estimates from the structural econometric model
are not easy to interpret. Therefore, as outlined in the previous chapter, I computed pre-
dicted values of ^i and ^i for each individual. The predictions use the estimates of the
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structural econometric model and the observable right-hand-side variables as well as the
observed probability answers.
Survey noise is taken into account in the following ways. Rounding is handled by looking
at intervals of the probability answers instead of the answers themselves, where the intervals
are dened as rounding neighborhoods around multiples of 10 per cent. For example, answers
of 77 percent, 80 percent and 83 percent are treated in the same way; similarly, 0 percent, 2
percent and 4 percent are treated the same way.
Test-retest noise, or, theoretically, the notion that people are likely to respond to survey
questions by fast-and-frugal guessing instead of thorough cognitive e¤ort, is taken into ac-
count by allowing random noise to the theoretical parameters as they enter the probability
transformation. The potential for inconsistent answers, or, theoretically, the possibility for
inattention when answering multiple questions on the same underlying variable, is handled
by allowing for this noise component to di¤er for the di¤erent probability answers. The
noise components are allowed to be correlated: a correlation of 1 means that all respondents
answer the multiple probability questions in a fully consistent way, and a correlation of 0
means that they answer these questions in fully independent ways.
The distribution of the noise component is an important assumption of the structural
model, and the additive mean-zero i.i.d. normality assumption is maintained. The variance
and the covariance of the noise components are calibrated using the test-retest evidence doc-
umented in the previous chapter. Importantly, that calibration is based on the test-retest
p0 and p10 variables, but I use the same numbers in this analysis with p0 and p20. However,
note that the Maximum Likelihood method can identify the between-question correlation
coe¢ cient of the test-retest noise components (because the fraction of answers that do not
conform to the laws of probability identify that parameter if everything else is specied).
When allowing for such an identication, the estimated correlations are very similar to the
calibrated correlations for p0 versus p20. When a similar exercise is performed with respect
to p0 and pltn20, the result is always a negative correlation coe¢ cient, which is di¢ cult to
interpret. This highlights the need for a better understanding of the noise process with re-
spect to pltn20 before including it in the analysis. Nevertheless, a relatively straightforward
generalization of the structural econometric model can incorporate the answer to the third
probability question, by transforming the third answer into pn20 = 100%   pltn20 . For ro-
bustness checks, all models are re-estimated, with results provided in section B3 in Appendix
B.
An alternative method that requires fewer assumptions considers heterogeneity in the
probability answers directly. Holding risk constant, more optimistic beliefs result in higher
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values of the probabilities. We can therefore think of them as proxy variables for the perceived
level of returns. A mean-preserving spread leads to smaller area of the density function
between two points of the support, as shown in Figure 2.1 in the previous chapter. The
di¤erence between two probability answers may thus serve as an inverse proxy variable for
the subjective belief about the standard deviation of suture stock returns, which is a measure
of perceived risk.
As we argued in the previous chapter, these proxies are not clean. The e¤ect of risk on
the probabilities can be ambiguous; higher risk corresponds to a smaller area to the right
of a cuto¤ point if the mean is to the right, but it corresponds to a larger area if the mean
is to the left (as for signicantly higher cuto¤s). Optimism/pessimism a¤ects the di¤erence
between the probabilities in ambiguous ways. Thus, although this more direct approach
requires fewer assumptions, the results of such regressions are more di¢ cult to interpret.
Nevertheless, I show results for the probabilities themselves in the spirit of the previous
chapter. I look at categories of the main explanatory variable in question (nancial knowl-
edge, personality) and show the average p0, the standard deviation of p0, the average of the
p0   p20 di¤erence and the fraction of missing p0 answers.
3.4 Results on nancial knowledge
I rst examine the rst question of the paper: whether and to what extent expectations
di¤er for people who are characterized by di¤erent levels of nancial knowledge. I consider
two types of nancial knowledge: rst, the specic knowledge that, historically, stocks have
outperformed bonds and savings accounts, and, second, more general nancial knowledge.
The results with respect to the rst dimension of nancial knowledge can be thought of
as testing the hypothesis in the previous chapter. The hypothesis in that paper states that
knowledge about past returns is an important determinant of expectations of future returns.
The experimental module in wave 2010 was the rst time that HRS asked a question about
historical stock returns. Unfortunately, the question was asked of a random 10 per cent of
the entire sample, limiting the scope of the analysis because of sample size considerations.
Moreover, the historical returns question did not ask about historical stock market returns
per se but whether those returns were higher than returns on bonds or savings accounts.
This limits variation in potential answers: those who think that stock returns were relatively
low but still somewhat above bond returns should give the same answer as those who think
stock returns were very high. At the same time, their expectations about future stock returns
are likely to be very di¤erent.
Nevertheless, even this crude version of the historical returns question should be related
to signicant di¤erences in stock market expectations if our hypothesis is correct. Table
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3.6 shows the simplest evidence: the average of the p0 answer (the probability of positive
returns), its standard deviation (a measure of disagreement), the average of the di¤erence
between p0 and p10 (an inverse measure of perceived risk), and the fraction of missing p0
answers (an indicator of ignorance, extreme risk, or uncertainty that prevents respondents
from quantifying their expectations).
Table 3.6
Statistics of the stock market expectation answers by respondentsanswers to
which asset paid the highest returns over past 20 years
Which asset paid Average p0 Standard deviation Di¤erence Fraction
highest historical returns (in %) of p0 (%) p0   p20 (%) missing p0 (%)
Saving accounts 37 28 4 13
Bonds 46 24 12 5
Stocks 51 25 19 4
Does not know 48 32 15 43
All 48 26 16 9
Observations 626 626 476 685
HRS 2010. Financial literacy experimental module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The gures in Table 3.6 provide strong support for our hypothesis of knowledge about
past returns being an important determinant of expectations about future returns. In HRS
2010, respondents who thought that saving accounts provided the highest returns historically
thought, on average, that the probability that stock prices would go up within a year of the
interview was 37 per cent. Respondents who thought that bonds provided the highest returns
historically, thought, on average, that the probability was 46 per cent. Respondents who
did not know which asset class performed best historically thought, on average, that the
probability was 48 per cent (equal to the overall average). However, those who answered,
correctly, that stocks outperformed the other asset classes thought, on average, that the
probability of positive returns would be 51 percent.
Knowledge about historical returns is also related to perceived risk and uncertainty. The
crude measure of perceived risk shown in Table 3.6 is the di¤erence between p0 and p20. The
larger this di¤erence is, the smaller the perceived risk (because a larger di¤erence means
more probability mass between the two points of the support and thus a steeper c.d.f. or
a taller and thinner p.d.f.). Those who thought that stocks earned the highest return are,
on average, characterized by lower perceived risk than other respondents. According to this
measure, the highest perceived stock market risk is characteristic of the group that thought
that bank saving accounts produced the highest returns. The fraction of missing answers can
be thought of as a measure of extremely high perceived risk, and it may include uncertainty
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of the type that may make people unwilling to quantify expectations. The fraction of such
people is smallest among those who thought that stocks produced the highest returns.
The cross-sectional standard deviation in the p0 answers is also smallest among those
who thought that stocks outperformed other assets historically. This fact can be interpreted
as additional support for the learning hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter. Learning
leads to lower levels of disagreement, which should appear in a lower cross-sectional standard
deviation of the answers. Note that a lower standard deviation in his group is not the result
of a mechanical relationship. In principle, expectations about stock returns may be as diverse
among people who think that stock returns are higher than bond returns as among people
who think that stock returns are lower than bond returns. The fact that those who think
stock returns are higher are also more homogeneous in their expectations is evidence that
this group has more knowledge supporting their beliefs.
The second question addresses other types of nancial knowledge. Here, the theoretical
predictions are less straightforward. First, the measure of other nancial knowledge may be
just another proxy variable for knowledge about historical returns. This is likely the case
if we do not condition on our measure of historical returns analyzed above. However, it
may be true even conditional on that measure because variation in this measure of nancial
knowledge may be related to variation in knowledge about past returns among those who
gave the correct answer, that stocks had outperformed the other assets.
Second, expectations are likely to di¤er even among people who have the same knowledge
about past returns. This additional variation may be completely random; it may be related
to personality traits and general optimism, or may be related to other dimensions of nancial
(or other) knowledge.
Table 3.7 shows statistics for the probability answers analogously to the previous table,
in categories of the nancial knowledge score. Recall that the score is the number of correct
answers to the four questions listed in the Data section above.
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Table 3.7
Statistics of the stock market expectation answers by respondentsnancial
knowledge score
Financial Average p0 Standard deviation Di¤erence Fraction
knowledge score (in %) of p0 (%) p0   p20 (%) missing p0 (%)
0 50 30 13 40
1 44 27 12 9
2 45 26 12 9
3 51 25 20 4
4 52 24 18 3
All 48 26 16 9
Observations 626 626 476 685
HRS 2010. Financial literacy experimental module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The relationship between the mean p0 and the score variable is almost monotonic, with the
exception of zero correct answers being higher than the mean. The gradient is rather steep;
those who gave one correct answer thought, on average, that stock prices would go up with
a 44 percent chance, whereas those whose answers were all correct thought, on average, that
stock prices would go up with a 52 percent chance. Perceived risk, as measured, in an inverse
fashion, by the di¤erence between p0 and p20, is nearly monotonically related to the nancial
knowledge score. The largest di¤erences are again in terms of the fraction of missing answers.
Although 40 percent of those with zero correct answers said "I dont know" to the stock
market expectation question (p0), this number was only 3 percent among those whose answers
were all correct. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, disagreement in expectations, as
measured by the standard deviation of the p0 answers, is inversely monotonically related to
the nancial knowledge score, providing additional support to the learning argument.
Of course, as discussed in detail in the previous section, answers to the probability ques-
tions are imperfect proxies of the parameters of expectations that are of interest. For that
reason I turn to structural estimates of heterogeneity in the relevant belief parameters, ~i
(the belief about the mean returns) and ~i (the belief about the standard deviation of returns,
a measure of their risk).
First, I show the parameter estimates of the structural model.  denotes the associ-
ation of the subjective mean of the returns with the right-hand-side variables. u denotes
the association with unobserved heterogeneity in perceived mean returns, a measure of dis-
agreement.  is the association between right-hand-side variables and the probit index of
high perceived risk. Although the magnitude of this last parameter is especially di¢ cult to
67
               dc_564_12
interpret, its sign indicates associations with perceived risk, and its statistical signicance
indicates the statistical signicance of the association with perceived risks.
Table 3.8. shows the estimation results with the two measures of nancial knowledge en-
tered together. The rst measure, "Historical returns," is a binary variables that is one if the
respondent indicated that stocks outperformed bonds and saving accounts in recent history
and zero otherwise. The second measure, "Other nancial knowledge," is the standardized
(mean zero, standard deviation one) score.
Table 3.8
Stock market expectations and nancial knowledge. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model (n = 619; log likelihood =  2637:6)
Perceived Log unobserved Probit coe¢ cient for
mean
 


heterogeneity in (u) high perceived risk ()
Historical returns 0.11  0:83  0:61
(S.E.) (0:04) (0:30) (0:28)
Other nancial knowledge 0.05  0:50  0:17
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:13) (0:13)
Constant  0:15  1:35 1.26
(S.E.) (0:03) (0:20) (0:27)
Historical returns: dummy for response stocks had higher returns than bonds and savings accounts.
Other nancial knowledge: standardized score. See the methods section for details of the model.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. Financial literacy module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents. No other RHS variables
The results are qualitatively similar to, but stronger than, the results of the direct analysis
of the probability answers in Table 3.6. This nding lends validity to the structural model
in general and its handling of survey noise in particular.
Those who thought that stocks outperformed other assets had, on average, 11 percentage
points higher subjective expected value of future stock returns than those who did not
think that stocks outperformed other assets. A one-standard-deviation higher score on the
other nancial knowledge test is associated with a 5 percentage points higher subjective
expected value. Unobserved heterogeneity in beliefs about mean returns is signicantly lower
among those who thought stocks outperformed other assets, and other nancial knowledge
is signicantly negatively associated with unobserved heterogeneity in expectations. Finally,
knowing that stocks had higher historical returns than bonds and saving accounts is also
signicantly negatively associated with beliefs about the standard deviation of returns, our
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measure of perceived risk.28
Note that the model in Table 3.8 does not contain other right hand-side variables. When
the number series score, education and other demographic variables are entered in the regres-
sion (table B2.1 in Appendix B), the coe¢ cients on the historical returns indicator drop by
almost half and lose their statistical signicance, but the coe¢ cients on the other nancial
knowledge score remain similar. The relatively small sample size (n = 619) may be largely
responsible for the loss of signicance. Also note that conditioning on variables such as edu-
cation may bias the estimated associations with nancial knowledge toward zero; two people
with the same nancial knowledge indicator but di¤erent levels of education may have di¤er-
ent levels of true nancial knowledge that are not captured by our indicator. For that reason
I argue that the unconditional estimates, presented in Table 3.8, provide a better picture
of the association between beliefs about stock market returns and nancial knowledge. The
more conservative estimates are very similar with respect to the other nancial knowledge
score but show an association with the historical returns indicator that is half as strong as
the unconditional estimates.
To get a better sense of the magnitudes, Table 3.9 shows the statistics of the predicted
^i and ^i variables. Recall that these are predicted values of the latent variables conditional
on the right-hand-side variables (the two nancial knowledge variables in this case) as well
as the answers to the stock market probability questions (p0 and p20 in this case). The table
shows the statistics in four categories by peoples assessments of historical stock returns
(lower than other assets or higher than other assets) and other nancial knowledge (lower
than average or higher than average).
28Tables B2.6 and B2.7 in Appendix B show corresponding estimates from a structural model that uses the
answers to all three probability questions. Those results are substantially weaker than the results reported
above. However, as discussed in the data section above, using the answers to the third probability questions
are problematic because the noise features regarding that survey answer are poorly understood.
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Table 3.9
Stock market expectations and nancial knowledge. Implied average of the subjective
mean (^), heterogeneity in the subjective mean (^) and implied average of perceived
risk (^) :
Beliefs about historical returns Average Standard deviation Average
and other nancial knowledge of ^ of ^ of ^
Low returns, low knowledge  0:17 0.27 0:50
Low returns, high knowledge  0:09 0.06 0.49
High returns, low knowledge  0:07 0.09 0.46
High returns, high knowledge 0:02 0.03 0.41
All  0:07 0.17 0.46
High/low returns: response of stocks higher/lower returns historically than bonds and savings accounts.
High/low other nancial knowledge: standardized score above/below average.
Statistics of predicted values from the structural estimation model in Table 3.8.
HRS 2010. Financial literacy module, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents. No other RHS variables
The results show strong associations. They also show low expectations among people
who thought that historically, stock returns had been lower than returns on bonds or saving
accounts or who are characterized by lower nancial knowledge than average. Indeed, only
people with higher than average knowledge and who knew that stock returns were higher in
the past had positive stock return expectations (28 percent of the entire sample). Perceived
risk is also signicantly negatively related to nancial knowledge. Perceived risk is estimated
to be high even among those with higher than average scores and those who know that stock
returns have historically outperformed other assets; the 0.41 standard deviation of log returns
is more than twice as large as the historical gure. Nevertheless, those in the lowest quarter in
terms of nancial knowledge are characterized, on average, by a signicantly higher standard
deviation of 0.50.
The standard deviation of ^ captures the magnitude of disagreement in its natural unit
of measurement. It is perhaps the best measure of disagreement; it combines observed
heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity (although in this particular case, with no other
covariates, this feature is not important). Estimated disagreement is strongly associated
with nancial knowledge. In fact, estimated heterogeneity in the lowest nancial knowledge
group is extremely high, suggesting that people in that category may make wild guesses
when they assess the prospects of the stock market.
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3.5 Results on Big Five personality traits
After analyzing the associations with nancial knowledge, I turn to the second question of
the paper, whether heterogeneity in expectations is related to personality traits. In contrast
to the role of nancial knowledge, the theoretical predictions for the association between
stock market expectations and personality traits are not straightforward. This is especially
true if we consider personality conditional on nancial knowledge. Consciousness and Open-
ness may be related to expectations, but this may be because they are related to nancial
knowledge. We may nd some relationship between the level of expectations or perceived
risk because there is heterogeneity in expectations even conditional on nancial knowledge.
Note, however, that personality and disagreement are unlikely to be related. Disagreement
is likely to be smaller among those with higher nancial knowledge, but similar associations
do not naturally arise with respect to personality.
Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow for a joint analysis of personality and
nancial knowledge. Therefore, I look at associations with personality without conditioning
on nancial knowledge. In principle, therefore, these results should be interpreted as upward-
biased estimates of associations between expectations and personality. These associations
include the association between personality and nancial knowledge. In practice, however,
the bias should be negligible. As discussed earlier, the Big Five personality measures are
uncorrelated with nancial knowledge in the sample.
Table 3.10 shows the statistics for the observed probability answers by personality mea-
sures, with each personality measure transformed into a binary variable indicating a below
average or above average score.
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Table 3.10
Statistics of the stock market expectation answers by categories of the Big Five
personality score.
Big Five Average p0 Standard deviation Di¤erence Fraction
personality trait (in %) of p0 (%) p0   p20 (%) missing p0 (%)
Agreeableness
above average 48 26 15 9
below average 47 26 18 13
Conscientiousness
above average 48 25 17 10
below average 47 26 16 12
Extroversion
above average 48 26 17 9
below average 46 26 16 13
Neuroticism
above average 47 26 15 12
below average 48 26 18 10
Openness
above average 49 25 17 9
below average 45 26 15 14
Overall average 47 26 16 11
Observations 3169 3169 2390 3547
HRS 2010. "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire", 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Neuroticism do not seem to be re-
lated to stock market expectations. There are no di¤erences in average p0, suggesting that
these personality traits, at least as measured in the HRS, are not associated with the level
of expectations. Similarly, heterogeneity in p0 is the same for low and high values of these
measures.
The gures show some associations with respect to the average di¤erence in the prob-
ability answers and the fraction of missing p0 answers, but these associations are weak at
best. More importantly, they do not show consistent patterns. The di¤erence in the proba-
bility answers can be viewed as an inverse proxy for perceived risk. The fraction of missing
answers can be thought of as an indicator of uncertainty (which can be interpreted in a
Bayesian framework as extremely high perceived risk). Associations with perceived risk and
uncertainty should be of similar directions; thus, associations should be of opposite signs
with respect to the two measures. For example, as shown in Table 3.6, nancial knowledge
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is positively related to the average p0   p20 di¤erence and negatively related to the fraction
of missing p0 answers. The same is not true for Agreeableness in Table 3.10, where the
associations are in the same direction. There are no associations with Conscientiousness,
and only missing answers are related, weakly, to Extroversion. Neuroticism shows consistent
associations with the di¤erence in the probabilities and missing answers, but the magnitude
of the associations is small.
Only the Openness score shows a signicant association with the level of expectations
and some association with perceived risk and uncertainty. The Openness measure seems
unrelated to disagreement.
The results on the probability answers suggest no relationship between stock market
expectations and Big Five personality traits, with the potential exception of Openness.
To conrm this conclusion, we must consider the structural estimates. Table 3.11 shows
the parameter estimates from ve models without other control variables. The full set of
estimation results and alternative results with the right-hand-side variables are in Tables
B2.1 through B2.5 in Appendix B. The personality measures were entered on the right-
hand-side of the models one by one. In contrast with the models with nancial knowledge
measures, these models do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity to vary with the right-
hand-side variable because, as we have seen in Table 3.10, the personality measures are not
related to the dispersion of the probability answers.
73
               dc_564_12
Table 3.11
Stock market expectations and personality. Parameter estimates from ve structural
econometric models, estimated separately with each Big Five personality measure
Big Five Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
personality trait returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Agreeableness score above average 0.00 0.15
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11)
Conscientiousness score above average 0.00 0.00
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Extroversion score above average 0.02  0:03
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:11)
Neuroticism score above average  0:01 0.14
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11)
Openness score above average 0.05 0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11)
Observations 3057 3057
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire" subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The models contain only the respective dummy variable on their right hand side.
The parameter estimates in Table 3.11 yield the same conclusions as the direct analysis
of the probability answers. Except for Openness, the Big Five personality measures are not
related to the level of stock market expectations, and none of them, including Openness, is
related to perceived risk.29
Openness is conceptually related to education and knowledge. I have shown in Table
B1.3 in Appendix B that it is signicantly related to education in our sample. The observed
associations with Openness may, therefore, reect the e¤ect of education. Table 3.12 shows
results from the structural model with other right-hand-side variables entered together with
the Openness measure. (The table also repeats the results without other right-hand-side
variables.)
29Tables B2.8 through B2.12 in Appendix B show corresponding estimates from a structural model that
uses the answers to all three probability questions. Those results are qualitatively similar to the results
reported above.
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Table 3.12
Stock market expectations and Openness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model.
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Openness above average 0:05 0:02  0:03 0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:10)
Female  0:08 0.58
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:10)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.02  0:04
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04)
Number series score 0.04  0:33
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:17)
Constant  0:10  0:05 1.02 0.72
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:02) (0:11) (0:27)
Log likelihood  13074  12996
Observations 3057 3057
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire" subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The results indicate that the association between Openness and stock market expecta-
tions diminishes by more than half and loses its statistical signicance if the other right
hand-side variables are entered in the models. Comparing the results to the partial corre-
lations in Table B1.3 in Appendix B, we can see that gender and education are primarily
responsible for that drop. In other words, although people with a higher Openness score
have higher stock market expectations on average, if we compare people of the same gender
and the same level of education but di¤erent measures of Openness, there are no signicant
di¤erences in stock market expectations.
It seems, therefore, that the Big Five measures are not signicantly related to stock mar-
ket expectations. Note that these negative results are rather strong; the sample size is large
(ve times the sample size for the nancial knowledge estimates), the estimated coe¢ cients
are practically zero with relatively small standard errors, and the estimates are likely biased
upwards in magnitude because the models do not condition on nancial knowledge.30
30The signicance is also biased upwards from a multiple testing point of view. Testing multiple hypotheses
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3.6 Results on optimism
Finally, I analyze the relationship between the measure of general optimism and stock market
expectations. The analysis is analogous to the previous ones. I rst look at the statistics of
the stock market probability answers in categories dened by the measure of optimism, and
then I turn to the results of the structural econometric model. Table 3.13 shows the rst set
of results.
Table 3.13
Statistics of the stock market expectation answers by respondentsoptimism score
Optimism Average p0 Standard deviation Di¤erence Fraction
score (in %) of p0 (%) p0   p20 (%) missing p0 (%)
Lower third 44 26 14 13
Middle third 49 25 18 10
Upper third 49 26 17 10
All 47 26 16 11
Observations 3159 3159 2526 3538
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The general measure of optimism is related to the level of stock market expectations,
especially at low levels. Respondents in the lower third of the optimism score gave, on
average, responses that were percentage points lower to the p0 question than the rest of the
sample. There are no detectable di¤erences between those who scored in the middle of the
general optimism score and those who scored at the top.
There are no di¤erences in terms of the cross-sectional standard deviation of the p0
answers in the optimism score categories. Considering the di¤erence between the two prob-
ability answers suggest that the may be a weak negative relationship between optimism and
our measures of perceived risk. Similarly, considering the fraction of missing p0 answers
suggests that optimism maybe negatively related to extreme perceived risk or uncertainty.
As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, the relationship between general optimism
and stock market expectations is more natural among stockholders than non-stockholders.
invokes corrections for the p-values that result in higher values (less likely rejections of the null hypothesis
of no association). The signicance test results shown above (in the form of stars to denote "signicance")
do not adjust for multiple testing. They are therefore overly ready to reject the null of no association.
The negative results are strong because the tests fail to reject the null even without proper adjustments. (A
suitable approach in exploratory analyses of this kind is the False Discovery Rate adjustment to the p-values,
which can be approximated by the easy rule of thumb of multiplying simple p-values by two; see Anderson,
2008).
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For stockholders, higher returns are a positive event, whereas for non-stockholders, higher
returns are not necessarily a positive event. Table 3.14 shows the average of the p0 answers
by the three groups of the optimism score separately for people who live in households that
own stock-market-based assets and people who live in households that do not own such
assets. Note that the three optimism categories are dened for the whole sample and not by
stockholding category. This does not matter because the stockholding rate is very similar in
the di¤erent optimism categories.
Quite surprisingly, the relationship between general optimism and average p0, the crude
proxy variable for the level of expectations, is as strong among non-stockholders as stock-
holders. Stockholders, in line with our nding in the previous chapter, have substantially
higher levels of expectations. However, more optimistic respondents have higher levels of
expectations among non-stockholders as well as stockholders. A similar puzzle emerges if we
relate average p0 to the sunshine measure of optimism (not shown here): the relationship is
similar among stockholders and non-stockholders.
Table 3.14.
Average p0 answers by respondentsoptimism score
separately for stockholders and non-stockholders
Optimism Average p0 (%)
Non-stockholder Stockholder
score household household
Lower third 41 53
Middle third 47 53
Upper third 47 55
All 45 54
Observations 2310 849
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
Taken at face value, these results for the entire sample are in line with the intuitive
hypothesis of the association of general optimism with higher levels of stock market ex-
pectations. The fact that the relationship seems to exist among non-stockholders as well
as stockholders is less intuitive. Similarly, the results with respect to perceived risk and
uncertainty are less straightforward to interpret. The lack of association with respect to
dispersion of beliefs suggests that, if there is any relationship between general optimism and
stock market expectations, it is unlikely to be associated with learning. Note, however, that
the associations with respect to perceived risk are not very strong, and the interpretation
of all results may be problematic due to the complicated relationship between probabilities
and the mean and standard deviation of stock returns.
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The structural estimates help to provide more insight into the magnitudes in terms of
relevant heterogeneity, and they can help determine whether the observed association with
general optimism remains signicant if we condition on other right-hand-side variables. Table
3.15 shows the parameter estimates of the structural model without and with other right-
hand-side variables in the entire sample. Table 3.16 shows the parameter estimates for 
separately estimated for stockholders and non-stockholders. Similar to the Big Five person-
ality analysis, the structural model here does not allow for heteroskedasticity in unobserved
~i.
Table 3.15
Stock market expectations and optimism. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Optimism above average 0.05 0.04  0:26  0:14
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:14) (0:11)
Female  0:08 0.58
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:14)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Years of education 0.02  0:05
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:05)
Number series score 0.04  0:34
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:14)
Constant  0:10  0:06 1.15 0.80
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:02) (0:12) (0:21)
Log likelihood  13083  13004
Observations 3058 3058
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
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Table 3.16
Stock market expectations and optimism. Parameter estimates of  from the
structural econometric model, separately for stockholders and non-stockholders
Perceived mean returns
 


Not stockholder Stockholder
household household
Optimism above average 0.08 0.08 0:01 0:01
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:02) (0:01) (0:01)
Female  0:08  0:05
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:01)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:01)
Years of education 0.01 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:01)
Number series score 0.02 0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Constant  0:20  0:11 0.01 0.03
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:03) (0:01) (0:02)
Log likelihood  9680  9641  3996  3962
Observations 2315 2315 903 903
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50- to 70-year-old-respondents.
The results are rather robust. They reinforce the relationship between the level of stock
market expectations and the measure of general optimism. According to our point estimates,
those who score above average on the optimism measure believe, on average, that the mean
of future stock returns is 5 percentage points higher than those who score below the average.
This association is true if we compare people with the same cognitive score, education and
demographic characteristics. However, there are no signicant associations with perceived
risk.31
Surprisingly, according to our results in Table 3.16, the positive association between
general optimism and the level of stock market expectations is a characteristic of people
31Table B2.13 in Appendix B shows corresponding estimates from a structural model that uses the answers
to all three probability questions. Those results are substantially weaker than the results reported above.
However, as discussed in the data section above, using the answers to the third probability questions are
problematic because the noise features regarding that survey answer are poorly understood.
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who live in households without stock market-based assets. General optimism is not (or, at
most, weakly) related to the level of stock market expectations among people who live in
households that own stock market-based assets This puzzle seems robust to the composi-
tion of stockholders versus non-stockholders in terms of education, cognitive capacity and
demographic characteristics.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter focused on two questions: whether expectations about future stock market
returns are related to nancial knowledge and whether they are related to personality traits.
The answer to the rst question is positive. Stock market expectations are strongly re-
lated to nancial knowledge. From a theoretical point of view, the most important aspect
of nancial knowledge is knowledge of historical stock returns distribution. The previous
chapter presented the theoretical arguments for the role of incentives and some personal
characteristics in the acquisition of knowledge about past returns of the stock market. It
argued that knowledge about the distribution of past returns should be important in deter-
mining expectations about future returns. The empirical analysis in that chapter showed
that measures of incentives and personal characteristics are related to expectations about
future returns, as predicted by the theory. However, a lack of explicit information about
knowledge of the history of stock market returns prevented us from explicitly linking knowl-
edge to future expectations.
The results in this chapter lled that gap. They provided strong support for the ar-
gument that knowledge of the history of stock market returns is a major determinant of
expectations about future stock returns. The results show that people who know that stocks
have outperformed bonds and saving accounts in the past have beliefs about the distribution
of future returns that are signicantly closer to the characteristics of the historical return
distribution. Their expectations are, on average, positive (whereas other peoples expecta-
tions are, on average, negative). Their beliefs about risks are also closer to historical risks
than are other peoples beliefs, although they are substantially higher than historical risks.
The results on disagreement (heterogeneity in expectations) provide additional support for
the learning argument. The expectations of people who know that stocks have outperformed
bonds and saving accounts in the past are less heterogeneous than the expectations of the
rest of the sample.
Other aspects of nancial knowledge are shown to be strongly related to stock market ex-
pectations, even conditional on our measure of knowledge about the history of stock returns.
It is possible that the measure of other nancial knowledge is another proxy for knowledge
of history because the measure of the latter is very imperfect. If this is true, this result
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provides no additional insight into the substantive question, but it shows how imperfect the
nancial knowledge measures are. Another possibility is that this result shows that stock
market expectations are inuenced by other aspects of nancial knowledge, even conditional
on knowledge about the history of stock returns. In other words, people with perfect knowl-
edge of the history of stock returns may form di¤erent expectations about future returns if
they have di¤erent levels of nancial knowledge. Without further evidence, it is impossible
to separate the two explanations.
The answer to the second question on personality traits is largely negative. Four of the Big
Five personality traits (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Neuroticism) do
not seem to be related to stock market expectations. The fth trait, Openness, is associated
with the level of expectations, but that association becomes insignicant conditional on
gender and education. In contrast, general optimism is signicantly associated with the level
of stock market expectations (but not perceived risk or disagreement). This last result is in
line with intuition and our previous results on sunshine optimism. However, the relationship
seems to be signicantly stronger among people who do not own stock market-based assets.
Taken together, these results imply that nancial knowledge in general, and knowledge
about the history of stock returns in particular, are important determinants of expectations
about future stock returns. There is substantial heterogeneity in expectations conditional on
nancial knowledge, but understanding that variation proves di¢ cult. Standard measures
of personality, at least as measured by the self-assessment survey questions, do not seem
to be related to heterogeneity. General optimism does seem to be related, but there are
some puzzling patterns in this relationship. The origins and consequences of the relationship
between general optimism and stock market expectations are di¢ cult to assess without
further research.
A methodological conclusion of this analysis is that the structural model developed in
the previous chapter adequately captures the most important aspects of systematic variation
in stock market expectations, at least with respect to ~i, the belief about the mean of future
returns. Variation in perceived risk (~i; the belief about the standard deviation of future
returns) is better captured using two points of the support if those points are farther from
each other (returns above zero and returns above 20 per cent as opposed to returns above zero
and returns above 10 per cent in the previous chapter). Although more points of the support,
especially in the negative domain, should further help to identify perceived risk, the response
patterns suggest that the particular question on the HRS in the negative domain (returns
below negative 20 percent) is characterized by survey noise that is qualitatively di¤erent
from the noise we characterized in the previous chapter. Further evidence is needed on the
nature of survey noise in the negative domain before such variables can be incorporated into
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the analysis.
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4 Stock market crash and expectations of American
households
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4.1 Introduction
The stock market crash of 2008 and the nancial crisis constitute a rare episode whose scope
and implications fall outside the life experience of most American households. Whether
and how those events a¤ect peoples expectations is an important question. To the extent
that expectations guide investment behavior, substantial changes in expectations due to the
nancial crash can lead to substantial changes in investment. Besides average beliefs of the
representative household, the crisis may have an impact on heterogeneity of such beliefs.
This study uses data from the 2008 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to
study the impact of the crisis on peoples expectations. We estimate the e¤ect of the crash
on the population average of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty
about returns (subjective standard deviation), and the cross-sectional heterogeneity in ex-
pected returns (an indicator of disagreement). We show estimates from simple reduced-form
regressions on probability answers as well as from a more structural model that focuses on
the parameters of interest and separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity. The mea-
surement strategy makes use of the fact that the respondents of HRS 2008 answered the
survey during 12 months from February 2008 to February 2009, a time period that includes
the time of the stock market crash in early autumn. We show that the date of interview is
largely independent of the respondentspast expectations about the stock market, so even if
the date of interview is non-random it is unlikely to bias our results. Our analysis looks at
changes in expectations during the HRS sampling period of February 2008 to February 2009.
It may be useful to recall some of the important events during this period. The subprime
mortgage crisis began well before 2008, but the Dow Jones peaked in October 2007 above
32http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jae.1226/abstract
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14,000. By early 2008, though, the Dow was down to 12,000, and the rest of the year was
characterized by a general decline until the crash of October. March 2008 saw the failed
bailout of Bear Sterns and its subsequent sale to JP Morgan, but the rest of the Spring
and the Summer went relatively quietly. On 15 September Lehman Brother led for bank-
ruptcy. The nancial system was thought to be in severe danger, and it took a few weeks
of uncertainty and heated debates before the US Congress passed the TARP bill on 3 Octo-
ber. The fall of 2008 also witnessed the run-up to the Presidential election on 4 November,
which focused many peoples attention towards economic issues, but it also led to a natural
uncertainty about future economic policy.
Figure 4.1 shows time series of four stock market variables over the course of the HRS
sampling period. We divided the sampling period into four sub-periods on the gure: Feb-
ruary to June, July to September, October to November, and December to February 2009.
We shall use these sub-periods throughout our analysis; their denition was based on the
stock market time series we discuss below.
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Figure 4.1. Level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (daily closing), the VXD annualized
volatility index, weekly volume of trade in billions of dollars and Google search for Dow
from the US in the sampling period of HRS 2008 (February 2008 through February 2009)
The left panel of Figure 4.1 shows the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the
VXD annualized volatility index.33 After initial ups and downs, the level of the index started
a substantial but gradual decline in June that stopped in August. The stock market crash
hit in early October with a 3000-point drop in the Dow. The stock market experienced large
swings in October and November, and the Dow reached a 6-year low of 7500 in late November.
After some recovery and a brief period of stability, the Dow experienced another period of
33The VXD index is derived from prices of options on the DJIA, and it measures the future (30-day) ex-
pected volatility of investors. The details about this index can be found at http://www.cboe.com/micro/vxd/
84
               dc_564_12
steady decline in the rst months of 2009. During the entire period, volatility showed the
mirror image of the time series in levels, except that its increase started in September, and
it reached its maximum in October and November. The right panel of Figure 4.1 shows the
weekly volume of trade of the shares of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) together
with the trend of searches for the term Dowon Google.34 The latter variable is an indicator
for the attention people give to news about the stock market. The gure shows a strong
co-movement of the two time series: increased attention to stock market news coincided with
increased volumes in March and July of 2008, February of 2009, and, especially, October of
2008. The Google index is normalized so that its 5-year average is one. The maximal 8.8
value in the rst week of October means that almost nine times as many searches were made
from the USA for the Dow Jones Industrial Average than in normal times. Looking at the
two panels together, we can see that the volume of trade was the highest at times when the
stock market index was decreasing, when uncertainty was increasing and when people paid
a lot of attention to news about the market.
The main question of this paper is whether and how expectations changed during the
stock market crash in early October 2008 and the following months. We compare post-crash
expectations to those earlier in 2008. It is important to keep in mind that the baseline period
was characterized by early signs of the crisis and a depressed stock market. Nevertheless, the
comparison can shed light on the e¤ect of a large and perhaps qualitatively di¤erent event
compared to the more normaldeclining market.
The crash may a¤ect the population average of expected returns for various reasons.
If people are unsure about the parameters of the returns process, they may use recent
realizations to update their beliefs. In such a case, the crash would have a negative e¤ect
on everyones expectations. If, on the other hand, people believe in mean reversion in stock
market prices, the e¤ect may be of the opposite sign. Of course, people may not want to
update their beliefs if they dont learn from the returns. Besides stock prices, the political
and policy news may have also a¤ected peoples expectations about the future of the economy
and the nancial sector in general, and the stock market in particular.
Empirical papers about stock market expectations usually nd that average expectations
track recent changes in the level of the stock market. When the stock market is increasing,
average beliefs become more optimistic and conversely. See, for example, Kézdi and Willis
(2008) about American households and Hurd et al. (2011) about Dutch households. Accord-
ing to Kézdi and Willis (2008), it took a 500-point gain in the Dow Jones to generate a one
percentage point gain in expected yearly returns in 2002. With such a relationship, expected
returns of respondents in November 2008 should be more than ve percentage points lower
34http://www.google.com/trends
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than expected returns of respondents 2 or 3 months earlier. On the other hand, the nancial
crisis of 2008 may have a¤ected peoples expectations in qualitatively di¤erent ways from
the more gradual changes witnessed in 2002, especially if people had di¤erent views about
the condition of the economy in 2002 and in 2008. People may expect asset prices to change
in di¤erent ways after large sudden changes than gradual trends. This is the conclusion of
Calvet et al. (2009b) who, using Swedish data, found that people tend to invest in well-
performing mutual funds but also tend to dispose of winning individual stocks at the same
time.
The e¤ect of the crisis on average uncertainty is more predictably positive. Stock market
risk increased dramatically, as indicated by the trend in volatility on Figure 4.1. Even those
who do not follow the stock market could become more uncertain about the future of the
economy in general and the stock market, in particular, as general uncertainty has been in
the airthroughout the crisis.
The crisis may also a¤ect the cross-sectional heterogeneity in householdsbeliefs. Het-
erogeneity and potential subjectivity of peoples beliefs about future stock market returns
has been the focus of recent developments in nance theory (see Hong and Stein, 2007,
for an overview of disagreement models in nance). Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel
and Pearson (1995) show that public announcements can increase disagreement about the
fundamental value of assets if people interpret the news in di¤erent ways (see also Kondor,
2012). As Hong and Stein (2007) observe, this pattern is precisely the opposite of what
one would expect based on a simple rational expectations model with heterogeneous pri-
ors, where public information should have the e¤ect of reducing disagreement, rather than
increasing it. Similar mechanisms may increase disagreement after the stock market crash
as well. Dominitz and Manski (2011), for example, assume that the population is a mix of
people who believe in the random walk hypothesis, who believe in the mean reversion of
stock-prices, and who believe in the persistence of trends on the nancial markets. When
the crash hit the economy and stock prices fell sharply, people holding these various views
should have interpreted its implications in di¤erent ways, and consequently the disagree-
ment among them should have increased. Indeed, a potential explanation of the trading
pattern shown in Figure 1 is that the increase of disagreement created space for trade as
more optimistic traders wanted to buy and more pessimistic traders wanted to sell. Note
that potential heterogeneity in the e¤ect of the crash implies that the average e¤ect could
go either way.
Our results imply a temporary increase in the population average of expectations right
after the crash. At the same time, average uncertainty increased, perhaps as the result of
increased stock market volatility. Our most robust nding is that cross-sectional heterogene-
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ity in expected returns, an indicator of the amount of disagreement, increased substantially
with the stock market crash. The e¤ects are found to be largest among stockholders, those
who follow the stock market, and those with higher than average cognitive capacity. The
result on average expectations thus masks a wide distribution of e¤ects of opposing signs. We
also document the co-movement of stock market expectations with ex post returns, implied
volatility and volume of trade.
Our nding suggests that there is heterogeneity in the cognitive processes (or mental
models) people use to convert public news into personal probability beliefs, in accordance
with some of the disagreement literature we mentioned above. The results on changes in
heterogeneity complement recent empirical investigations that show substantial heterogene-
ity in stock market expectations of individual investors (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004) as well
as households (Calvet et al., 2007, 2009a,b; Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Kezdi and Willis,
2008; Hurd et al., 2011; Gouret and Hollard, 2011). This paper adds new results to this
empirical literature by showing that the stock market crash and the nancial crisis had sig-
nicant e¤ects on average expectations, average uncertainty, and, perhaps most importantly,
the heterogeneity of expectations.
4.2 Data
We use stock market expectations data from HRS-2008. Before turning to our analysis, it is
helpful to provide some background on the evolution of the HRS stock market expectation
questions.
In 2002, HRS introduced probabilistic expectations questions about returns in the stock
market to the battery of subjective expectation questions that have been asked in HRS since
it began in 1992. One motivation for adding these questions is that expectations about
stock returns are a key component in determining retirement saving and portfolio choice.
In addition, stock market expectations are of methodological interest because the history
of stock returns and their daily realizations are public information, enabling researchers to
investigate how news a¤ects the updating of beliefs without the need to adjust for di¤erences
in private information.
Like other HRS probability questions, stock market expectations are asked as a percent
chance based on a 0to 100scale where the respondent is told that:
0means that you think there is absolutely no chance, and 100means that
you think the event is absolutely sure to happen.
The instruction goes on to say:
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For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrows weather, but if you
think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a 10 percent
chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will rain tomorrow,
you might say that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.
Beginning in 2002, the HRS introduced a question about stock market expectations that
has been asked in every wave of HRS since 2002. We call this the p0 question. It reads:
We are interested in how well you think the economy will do in the next year.
By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will
be worth more than they are today?
Like other HRS subjective probability questions, many answers to the HRS stock market
questions are heaped on 50(Hurd and McGarry, 1995) and, unlike most other probability
questions, a substantial number of people fail to answer the stock expectation questions at all.
A number of researchers have suggested that 50is an indicator of epistemic uncertaintyor
imprecise probability beliefs (Fischo¤ and Bruine de Bruin, 1999; Lillard and Willis, 2001).
Of course, it is also possible that some people who answer 50mean that the event in question
has a 50% chance of occurring or that they think that the probability falls within some range
such as 40 60% and give 50as a rounded approximation (Manski and Molinari, 2009).
Beginning in 2006 the HRS added an epistemicfollow-up question to several probability
questions, including the p0 question, to help understand the meaning of 50answers:
Do you think that it is about equally likely that these mutual fund shares will
increase in worth as it is that they will decrease in worth by this time next year,
or are you just unsure about the chances?
We now turn to a discussion of the 2008 data that we use in this paper. In 2008, HRS
continued to ask the epistemicfollow-up to persons who answered 50 to p0 . For those who
did not respond 50 to p0 or, if they answered 50, indicated that the shares were equally
likely to increase or decrease in value, HRS added a follow-up question:
By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have grown by x
percent or more? (For negative values of x: By next year at this time, what is
the chance they will have declined by -x percent or more?)
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where the probability of a gain of x% from the set of f10; 20; 30; 40g or a loss of  x%
from the set of f 10; 20; 30; 40g is randomly assigned.35 We denote the answer to this
question as px+ if the random value of x is positive and as px  if it is negative. Note that
px+ denotes the probability that returns would be greater than x, while px  denotes the
probability that they would be less than  x.
The full sample consists of 17,217 individuals from 11,897 households. We restricted the
sample to those 14,735 persons who participated in the last three waves of HRS (2004, 6,
and 8). In 2004, the sample was refreshed by a new, younger cohort. Out of the 14,735
people, 2,850 (19%) did not answer the p0 question (the majority answered I do not know),
leaving us a sample of 11,885 people. As we indicated earlier, HRS did not ask the px+ or
px  questions from those who stated that they were unsure in response to the epistemic
follow-up question (2005 individuals).
Answer to the px+ or the px  question is missing for another 486 individuals, and edu-
cation was missing for an additional 45 individuals. Putting all these restrictions together,
we ended up with a sample of 9348 individuals. The average age is 68 years, and 90% of
the sample is 55 89 years old. We divide the sample into four subsamples based on the
date of the interview (see Figure 4.1). These subsamples are very unbalanced in terms of
the number of observations. 6285 respondents gave interview between February and June
2008, 2286 between July and September 2008, 556 in October and November 2008, and 211
between December 2008 and February 2009.
As we see, there are many missing values in the HRS stock market expectation data. Of
the 14,735 people asked, only 9348 (63%) gave adequate answers to both questions. The two
main sources of missing values are the I do not knowanswers to any of the questions and
being unsureafter giving a 50% answer to p0 . In the analysis we shall ignore the missing
values. We think that their omission does not invalidate our results for two reasons. First,
people who do not knowor are unsuremight not have meaningful expectations about
the stock market and thus they are not part of the population we would like to represent.
These questions are not easy to answer, and if someone has no stocks and is sure that she
will never have to deal with nancial assets, she does not have to form expectations about
the 1-year-ahead returns asked in the survey. Second, our goal is to analyze the changes
in expectations after the crash. As long as the crash itself did not result in an increase
or decrease of missing answers, the sample selection problem does not inuence our main
results. Analysis of the time series of missing answers reveals that the stock market crash did
35Randomization of x was not complete in the survey: those who gave 0 percent for the p0 question were
assigned to get a random x with x<0 but not x>0, while those who answered p0=100 percent were assigned
to get a random x with x>0 but not x<0.
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not bring about more dont knowor unsureanswers. There is a small temporary decrease
in the fraction of dont knowanswers in October, but the decrease is both quantitatively
small and statistically insignicant.
The distribution of p0 answers is shown in the histograms of Figure 4.2. In part (a) we
see the above-mentioned heaping at 50. Part (b) shows that the heaping disappears if we
only leave in those 50 respondents who think that shares were equally likely to increase or
decrease in value (rather than being unsure). Note that HRS did not ask the follow-up px
questions from the unsurepeople, so later in the analysis we will only use people from the
panel (b).
Figure 4.2 also highlights another interesting issue: excessive rounding. Table 4.1 shows
that almost 99% of the answers are multiples of 5, and more than 80% are multiples of
10. The fact that people give approximate answers to these probability questions is not
surprising, since it is very hard to compute these numbers more precisely. A careful analysis
should therefore incorporate this feature of the data.
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Figure 4.2. Histogram of the p0 answers in the total sample (on the left) and in the nal
sample (on the right)
Table 4.1, however, highlights an even more important problem: that of inconsistent
answer pairs to the probability questions. Strongly inconsistent answers are those that
contradict the laws of probability: p0<px+ or p0 + px  > 100. Zero mass answers are the
ones that imply zero probability of returns between the asked probabilities: p0 = px+ and
p0 + px  = 100. Nearly 17% of the answers are strongly inconsistent, and more than 21%
imply zero mass. On top of these problems, Kezdi and Willis (2008) document that many
HRS respondents do not give the same answer to the same probability question (say, p0 ) when
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it is asked twice within the survey 20 minutes apart. Analyzing stock market expectations
in another dataset, Gouret and Hollard (2011) show that few people give answers that imply
the same expectations if they are asked in two slightly di¤erent ways within the same survey.
Perhaps surprisingly, both Kézdi and Willis (2008) and Gouret and Hollard (2011) nd no
relationship between personal characteristics and the propensity to give problematic answers,
with the potential exception of income and expectations themselves.
We argue that such answers are due primarily to question-specic survey noise due to
inattention. Survey responses are the results of individual behavior under circumstances
that di¤er from circumstances when making an actual investment decision. Answers are
given in a matter of seconds and there are practically no incentives to get the answers right.
Therefore, we would be wrong to assume that the survey answers are equivalent to the
probabilities that represent peoples subjective return distribution which forms the basis for
their investment decisions. In Section 4.4 we propose a method to separate survey noise
from relevant heterogeneity in expectations.
Table 4.1
Fraction of rounded and inconsistent probability answers. HRS 2008.
fraction
Rounding p0 is a multiple of 10 0:806
p0 is 5, 25, 75, or 95 0:140
p0 is a multiple of 5 0:986
Strongly inconsistent answers 0:169
Zero mass answers 0:215
N 9; 438
: p0 < px+ or p0 + px  > 100%
: p0 = px+ or p0 + px  = 100%
4.3 Descriptive analysis
In this section we analyze the answers to the probability questions in a direct way. This
should be viewed as preliminary descriptive analysis that cannot estimate the magnitude of
the e¤ect of the stock market crash, for two reasons: rst, the probabilities themselves are
not the objects of interest; second, survey noise can lead to biased estimates (especially on
the heterogeneity of beliefs). At the same time, the descriptive analysis is free of additional
assumptions that we need to make in order to recover more meaningful statistics.
Before the descriptive analysis, it is instructive to discuss how probabilities p0 and px
are related to the parameters of interest. Standard portfolio choice models include rst
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and second moments of the (perceived) distribution of future returns as opposed to the
probabilities themselves. With the help of additional distributional assumptions, answers to
two probability questions can help identify the subjective mean and variance of the returns.
Recall that the object of interest is the distribution of the 1-year-ahead returns of the stock
market as viewed by the respondent. If we assume that people believe that the distribution
of percentage returns is normal, two points in the subjective distribution identify the entire
distribution and thus both the mean and the variance. Figure 4.3 shows a normal cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.) that is identied by the two points. The gure depicts the case
where the mean of returns is 0.07 and standard deviation is 0.15  numbers close to the
post-war moments of nominal yearly returns on the Dow Jones (ending with year 2007). The
probability of positive returns is around 68% (1   0.32), while the probability of returns of
at least 20% (0.2) is around 20% (1   0.8). A respondent with the postwar  pre-2008
distribution in mind would answer p0 to be 68% and p20 to be 20%.
Figure 4.3. Standard normal c.d.f. (=0.07, =0.15), with p0 and p20 shown.
Using answers to the two probability questions, one can in principle derive the mean
() and the standard deviation () of the beliefs of individual i. Intuitively, the mean is
identied from the level of the answers, while the standard deviation is identied from the
distance between the two answers (larger distance means smaller variance). Formally, we
can take the inverse of the appropriate probabilities:
p0i = 

i
i

(26)
px+i = 

i   x=100
i

(27)
px i = 

x=100  i
i

(28)
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where, p0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns, px+ is the answer to the
probability of returns at least x percent, and px  is the answer to the probability of losses
of at least x percent. Note that a mean-preserving spread in uncertainty (i) pushes the
probabilities towards 0.5, because an increase in  moves the index towards zero. This is very
much in line with the casual interpretation of a "fty-fty" answer as reecting ignorance.
Using the example of positive x returns, inverting the probabilities would give this simple
nonlinear but exactly identied system of two equations and two unknowns (i and i):
 1 (p0) =
i
i
(29)
 1 (px+i) =
i   x=100
i
(30)
 1 (px i) =
x=100  i
i
(31)
Unfortunately, survey answers to the probability questions are not suited for such a
direct transformation at the individual level. The excessive rounding and the relatively high
fraction of inconsistent probability answers discussed in the previous section would invalidate
such an analysis. In the next section, we propose a method for modeling both rounding and
survey noise within a structural model. Before that, we present some basic descriptive results
in this section.
In order to see if the stock market crash brought about changes in expectations about
stock market returns, we estimate simple OLS regressions with crude proxies for the subjec-
tive mean (i) the subjective standard deviation (i) and the heterogeneity of expectations.
In each regression, the right-hand side variables include three dummies for the four periods
we focus on: February through June 2008 is the reference category, the rst dummy is for
July through September 2008, the second dummy is for October through November 2008,
and the third dummy is for December 2008 through February 2009.
We estimate regressions with the probability answers themselves on the left-hand side in
order to assess the e¤ects on the population average of the level of the return distribution. If
people become more pessimistic on average, we expect their answers to both the p0 and the
px+ question to drop on average. If the second probability question has a negative threshold,
their answer px  would go up on average. We therefore run two regressions, one with p0 on
the left-hand-side, and one with px+ or 1   px  on the left-hand-side. In order to partial
out any threshold-specic factors that may bias answers to the second question, the second
regression includes dummies for the di¤erent thresholds. The reference category is x = +10.
In order to see the e¤ect of the crash on the cross-sectional heterogeneity of expectations
(which we call disagreement), we look at regressions in which the left-hand side variables are
93
               dc_564_12
the absolute values of the residuals from the previous regressions. If disagreement increases,
the residuals from the previous regression would become more dispersed, and their absolute
value would therefore go up.
The e¤ect of the crash on the population average of subjective uncertainty is approxi-
mated by a regression with the di¤erence in the two probability answers on the left-hand
side. Recall from Figure 2 that the di¤erence between p0 and px+ is inversely related to the
standard deviation of the subjective distribution. Another way to see the connection is in
terms of the p.d.f.: a larger di¤erence would imply a larger probability mass concentrated on
the support between p0 and px+, which implies a less dispersed distribution. If the threshold
of the second probability question is negative, the probability mass between p0 and px  is
given by 1   (p0 + px ). In order for an increase in uncertainty to show up with a positive
sign in the regressions, we used the negative of the di¤erences for left-hand-side variables:
px+   p0 for positive thresholds and [(p0 + px )  1] for negative thresholds.
Before we turn to the results of the regressions, we address the question of whether the
date of the interview is exogenous to prior stock market expectations. This is our most
important identifying assumption in analyzing the e¤ect of the stock market crash. The
interview date was not randomly assigned. The HRS released the names of all sample
households to its national eld sta¤ of interviewers at the beginning of the eld period in
February, 2008. Interviews were then completed in a sequence determined by each interviewer
in consultation with regional eld supervisors over the entire eld period which ended in
February, 2009. Sample members who are hardest to locate, most di¢ cult to schedule and
most reluctant to be interviewed tend to receive interviews relatively late in the eld period.
Ultimately, over 90 percent of eligible sample members were interviewed.
In the 2004 and 2006 waves of the survey, HRS collected data on p0 from respondents
in our sample (but there were no second probability questions asked on stock market ex-
pectations). Using these variables we can look at whether the date at which people were
interviewed in 2008 is related to their answers to the p0 questions in previous interviews. We
estimated four regressions with stock market expectation variables from 2004 and 2006 on
the left hand side and interview date in 2008 on the right hand side. The rst two regressions
have p0 on their left hand side, while the third and fourth regressions have the residuals from
those regressions (in each pair one is for 2004 and the other is for 2006). According to the
discussion above, these regressions estimate the e¤ect of interview date in 2008 on the
average level of expectations prior to 2008 and heterogeneity of those expectations prior to
2008, respectively. The results from these placeboregressions are shown in Table 4.2. The
only signicant correlation with interview date in HRS 2008 and previous expectations is
in column [2]: those who answered HRS 2008 between October and November gave slightly
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higher p0 answers in 2004 on average. At the same time, no such relationship was found in
more recent 2006. Overall, the results suggest that the date of the interview in HRS 2008
was largely exogenous to stock market expectations prior to 2008, a result that is especially
robust in terms of disagreement.
Table 4.2
Placebo regression results: OLS estimates with proxies for the level (columns 1-2) and
heterogeneity (columns 3-4) of expectations in 2004 and 2006 as dependent variables,
the time of the interview in HRS 2008 as right-hand side variables.
Dependent variable p0 in 2006 p0 in 2004 jup0j in 2006 jup0j in 2004
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Constant 49:38 50:76 20:41 20:61
(0:36) (0:35) (0:23) (0:22)
Interview between 0:73 1:31  0:71  0:09
July 2008 and Sep 2008 (0:70) (0:68) (0:81) (0:43)
Interview between 0:79 2:49  0:71 0:20
Oct 2008 and Nov 2008 (1:28) (1:25) (0:91) (0:78)
Interview between 3:90  1:82 1:39 1:24
Dec 2008 and Feb 2009 (1:99) (2:00) (1:26) (1:26)
N 7941 8444 7941 8444
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
We can now turn to the e¤ects of the interview date in 2008 on expectations in 2008. Table
4.3 shows the results. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are the probability
answers, our proxies for the population average of the level of the expectations. The results
from the two regressions are very similar. The summer of 2008 brought no changes, and the
average level was similar to the reference period in December 2008 through February 2009
as well. However, October and November 2008 saw a signicant, if temporary, increase in
the average level of expectations
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Table 4.3
OLS regressions with proxies for the level (columns 1-2), heterogeneity (columns 3-4)
and uncertainty (column 5) of expectations. HRS 2008.
Dependent variable p0 Px jup0j juPxj Px   p0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 45:63 64:81 24:49 21:43 -24.53
(0:36) (0:79) (0:18) (0:43) (0:97)
Interview between  0:14 0:57  0:39 0:17 1.70
July 2008 and Sep 2008 (0:70) (0:63) (0:36) (0:34) (0:77)
Interview between 4:92 3:65 1:71 1:76 4.34
Oct 2008 and Nov 2008 (1:25) (1:213) (0:64) (0:62) (1:39)
Interview between 0:04 1:06 2:56 2:33  0:18
Dec 2008 and Feb 2009 (2:00) (1:80) (1:02) (0:98) (2:21)
N 9348 9348 9348 9348 9348
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes. px is dened as px+ for positive thresholds and (1-px ) for negative thresholds
px- p0 is dened as (px+-p0) for positive thresholds and (p0+px -1) for negative thresholds.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results on the absolute value of the residual from the
previous regressions, which are our proxies for disagreement. The estimates imply that
disagreement stayed constant before October 2008, but it increased signicantly after the
crash. Contrary to the average level of expectations, the increase in disagreement lasted to
the end of the sampling period. Column (5) shows the estimates on the di¤erence between the
two probability questions, which proxy the e¤ects on the population average of uncertainty.
Uncertainty seems to have increased already during the summer, and the crash brought
about a substantially larger increase. Similarly to the average level of expectations, though,
average uncertainty returned to its baseline level in the last period.
The results from these regressions suggest that on average, people became more optimistic
but also more uncertain after the crash, but those increases were temporary. Cross-sectional
heterogeneity in expectations also increased after the crash, and that remained high a few
months later as well. Unfortunately, as we highlighted earlier, these results are not suited for
drawing quantitative conclusions for two reasons: they use crude proxies for the left hand
side variables of true interest, and they do not incorporate the complex survey response
problems shown in the previous section.
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4.4 Structural estimation
In the previous section we derived the relation between the probability answers and the rst
two central moments of the subjective return distribution under the assumption of normally
distributed returns. Because of rounding and response error, as discussed earlier, these
relations cannot be mechanically applied to the data. We incorporate rounding and survey
noise in our model in two steps.
Assume that when making an investment decision, individual i thinks of one-year ahead
returns as Ri with mean i and standard deviation i. Throughout the analysis, we assume
that Ri is normally distributed. (Results are robust to alternative distributional assumptions
of Student-t and log-normal as presented in section C.2 of Appendix C.) The survey answers
of individual i are, however, based on a noisy version of Ri that we denote as Rji (where
j denotes the question so that j = 0, x+ or x ). The noise is assumed to be additive:
the mean of Rji is i + Vji, where vji is a mean-zero noise variable specic to question and
individual. The idea behind this assumption is that in a survey situation individuals have
little time and no incentives to retrieve their subjective distribution of stock market returns.
As a result, the subjective distribution they have in mind when answering the questions is
likely to be di¤erent from the subjective distribution they would consider in an investment
situation. We allow the noise terms to be di¤erent for the two probability questions (p0 and
px) but correlated across questions: Corr (v0i; vxi) = x. The estimation model will allow
for estimating both the variance of the survey noise and the correlation. When estimating
the noise variance, we assume that it is proportional to subjective uncertainty i. The
intuition behind this assumption is those who have more di¤use expectations are likely to
have a harder time retrieving those expectations. A consequence of this assumption is that
V ar [Ri ] =V ar [Rji] is constant. That is, this assumption ensures that the signal-to-noise
ratio is constant in terms of perceived stock market returns.36
A second feature of our model is that we consider interval responses instead of the reported
probabilities themselves. If the reported probability (pji) is in a pre-specied interval or bin
[b1; b2] then the trueprobability (including the noise component vji) is assumed to be in
the same bin but not necessarily the reported probability itself. Because a large fraction of
the answers are multiples of 10 (see section 4.2), we have dened 10 percentage point wide
bins: [0, 5); [5, 15); ... [95, 100). One consequence of this assumption is that a round answer
can represent any expectation that would lead to probabilities around the particular round
36Note that this assumption is the same as the one we made in the previous chapters, but the notation
is di¤erent. In the previous chapters, we had

i
i
+ vij

, whereas here we have

i+vji
i

. Using the rst
notation we assumed that V ar [vij ] is constant. Using the second notation, here we assume that V ar [vij ] =i
is constant. The two are equivalent.
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number.
The two assumptions are combined to
p0 2 [b1; b2), b1  

i + v0i
i

< b2; (32)
px+i 2 [b1; b2), b1  

i + vx+i   x=100
i

< b2; (33)
px i 2 [b1; b2), b1  

x=100  i   vx+i
i

< b2 (34)
where, as before, p0 is the probability of positive returns; px+ is the probability of returns
of at least x percent; and px  is the probability of losses of at least x percent.
Using interval responses is quite common in the literature dealing with subjective prob-
abilities, but the explicit modeling of survey noise and the maximum likelihood approach is
not. For example, Manski and Molinari (2009) argue that, because of rounding, the parame-
ters of interest are only partially identied, and they propose an alternative estimator based
on the theory of partial identication and set estimation. Their conservative strategy re-
sulted in very wide estimated parameter sets, especially on the HRS data, probably because
of excessive rounding. To avoid this problem we have chosen instead to specify the model
fully with distributional assumptions on all the unobserved random variables (see later).
We specify heterogeneity in the subjective mean and variance of returns by equations in
two latent left-hand-side variables i, i, of the form
i = 
0
wi + 
0
xi + 
0
zi + ui (35)
ln (i) = 
0
wi + 
0
xi + 
0
zi (36)
In the equations, w is the vector of date of interview dummies; x is the vector of covariates
such as race, gender, age, education, and cognitive capacity; the z vectors are equation-
specic variables. We say more about them later when we discuss identication.
An important issue addressed in this paper is the possibility of increased cross-sectional
heterogeneity in expectations, which may be labeled as disagreement. In order to capture
disagreement, we let unobserved heterogeneity in  vary with the date of the interview.
Variance in u (unobserved heterogeneity in ) measures the heterogeneity of expected returns
among individuals who share the same x and z variables. Formally, we let the standard
deviation of u be related to the date of interview dummies (w) and the other covariates (x):
ln (Std (ui)) = 
0
uwi + 
0
xi (37)
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The last equation is for the standard deviation of the noise, v, which is assumed to be
proportional to i:
Std (vji) = i (38)
Equations (35) and (36) describe the parameters of interest as e¤ects on (or correlations
with) the expected value of latent variables (i; i), and equation (37) captures the e¤ects
on (or correlations with) the standard deviation of the latent variable i. These latent
variables are mapped to the probability answers as specied by the interval response model
in equations (32) to (34), which include additive question-specic noise components (v0 and
vx), as well. The model is completed by distributional assumptions on unobservables u
and v. We assume that u, v0 and vx are jointly normally distributed and that unobserved
heterogeneity, u, is independent of survey noise. However, we allow for v0 and vx to be
correlated, and we estimate their correlation. One can argue that the correlation can be
di¤erent for positive versus negative thresholds in the second question, and thus we estimate
two correlation coe¢ cients, one for v0 and vx+ and one for v0 and vx .
With these elements the model is complete and can be estimated using Maximum Like-
lihood. Before we turn to the results, it is worthwhile to spend some time on identication
issues. For simplicity, assume for a moment that there are no covariates on the right hand
side of (35)-(37). In this unconditional model we would have six parameters to estimate:
, , Std(u), , Corr (v0; vx+) and Corr (v0; vx ). In order to estimate them we need at
least six moments. Interesting moments are E [pji], V [pji], E [p0i   pxi], V [p0i   pxi] and
the fraction of inconsistent answers. Intuitively E [pji] and E [p0i   pxi] help identify E [i]
and E [i], while V [pji], V [p0i   pxi] and the fraction of inconsistent answers help identify
Std(u),  and the correlations.
The estimation models include covariates and some exclusion restrictions as well. We
use two instruments for  (z in equation 35) and one for  (z in equation 36). The rst
instrument for  is the average probability that respondents assigned to the possibility of an
economic recession in the near future in the previous two waves, 2004 and 2006, of the survey.
The second instrument is an average score on nine questions about depressive symptoms of
the interviewees in 2004 and 2006, such as feeling lonely or feeling sad, etc. again from the
previous two waves of the survey. The instrument for  is the fraction of 50 probability
answers in 2004 and 6. The idea behind using this variable is that people who are generally
uncertain tend to give a lot of 50-50 answers to probability questions.37
37This approach was rst suggested by Lillard and Willis (2001) and has also been used by Sahm (2007)
and Pounder (2007).
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4.5 Results of the structural model
The main question addressed by our analysis is how structural parameters of stock market
expectations changed through the sample period. Using the model outlined in the previous
section, we estimate changes in the population average of i (the subjective expected value
of returns), the population average of i (the subjective standard deviation of returns),
and the population standard deviation of ui (unexplained heterogeneity in the subjective
expected value). We capture the change of expectations in time by dummy variables for the
four periods: February to June 2008 (the reference period, characterized by relatively high
level of stock market indices and low volatility); July to September 2008 (gradual decline,
relatively low but increasing volatility); October to November 2008 (the aftermath of the
stock market crash and subsequently low levels and high volatility); and December 2008 to
February 2009 (low levels with some further decline, and lower volatility). In order to help
interpret the coe¢ cients, all right-hand side variables except the interview date dummies are
normalized to have zero mean. As a consequence, the regression constant shows the expected
value of the left-hand side variable in the reference period (February through June 2008) for
an average respondent in the sample. Note that the mean of the right-hand-side variables
in the reference period is very close to the overall sample mean. As a result, the regression
constant is very close to the actual average response in the reference period. The results are
shown in Table 4.4.
The estimates are in line with the reduced-form OLS results of Table 4.3. Average
optimism about stock market returns increased temporarily in October-November: on av-
erage, people seemed to expect a recovery during this period. By December, the average
expectations returned to where they were prior to the crash. Average uncertainty about
stock market returns increased by 11 percent during the summer, and it increased again
in October-November, by almost an additional 20 percent. However, average uncertainty
seemed to return to its initial level afterwards. Unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations increased by 13 percent in late summer as well, and it increased substantially in
the fall. By October and November, the cross-sectional standard deviation was more than 50
percent larger than it was at the beginning of the year. Heterogeneity decreased somewhat
after December, but it remained larger than before the crash.
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Table 4.4
Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns () ;
average subjective standard deviation (log ()) and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations (logStd (u)). Results from structural regressions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log(Std(u))
Constant -0.088 -0.606 -1.23
(0.006)** (0.023)** (0.079)**
July 08 to September 08 0.001 0.113 0.131
(0.010) (0.037)** (0.047)**
October 08 to November 08 0.062 0.292 0.569
(0.025)* (0.088)** (0.099)**
December 08 to February 09 -0.028 0.019 0.38
(0.033) (0.119) (0.135)**
Female -0.062 0.235 0.146
(0.009)** (0.034)** (0.044)**
Single 0.004 0.04 0.121
(0.010) (0.039) (0.048)*
Black -0.017 0.589 0.56
(0.025) (0.093)** (0.096)**
Hispanic 0.002 0.387 0.332
(0.027) (0.107)** (0.114)**
Age -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(0.000)** (0.002)** (0.002)
Years of education 0.002 -0.034 -0.031
(0.002) (0.007)** (0.009)**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.101 -0.198
(0.010)** (0.037)** (0.048)**
Follow the stock market 0.049 -0.129 -0.073
(0.010)** (0.038)** (0.047)
Stockholder 0.072 -0.058 -0.18
(0.010)** (0.038) (0.050)**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average (0.000)**
Depressive symptoms -0.017
2004-2006 average (0.005)**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.512
2004-2006 average (0.191)**
Log-likelihood -42277
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.085
Mean(s ) 0.616
Mean(Std(u) 0.343
s 2/(s 2+V(v)) 0.645
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.491
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.252
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male, non-Black and non-Hispanic, married
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The coe¢ cients on the other right-hand side variables indicate that women are signi-
cantly more pessimistic and more uncertain about stock returns; minorities are substantially
more uncertain; older people are less optimistic and less uncertain; more educated people
are less uncertain; and smarter people are more optimistic and less uncertain. Stockhold-
ers and those who follow the stock market are signicantly more optimistic, and the latter
are also less uncertain. The results imply that heterogeneity in beliefs is also di¤erent in
di¤erent groups; those that are characterized by higher uncertainty on average tend to be
more diverse in their beliefs. The sign on the variables that serve for exclusion restrictions
are intuitive: those who were more pessimistic about the economy in the past have lower
expectations on average, and the same is true for those with more depressive symptoms.
The fraction of fty-fty probability answers in the past is a strong predictor of uncertainty
about stock market returns.
The last three lines of Table 4.4 contain estimates for the technical parameters. The
ratio of true uncertainty to total variance that includes uncertainty as well as survey noise
(2= (2 + V [v])) is constant by assumption and is estimated to be0:645. This implies that
the noise variance is almost as large as true uncertainty. The noise terms are allowed to
be correlated across questions. The correlation is positive when both probability questions
ask about returns higher than a particular threshold value. It is negative when the second
question is about the probability of returns smaller than the predened values.
At rst sight, it is surprising that the population average of expected returns is negative
during the baseline period. Note, however, that male stockholders who follow the stock
market and have above average cognitive capacity expect substantial positive returns on
average; their average  of 0.06 is close to the pre-2007 historical mean of 0.07.
The coe¢ cients on the interview date dummies in Table 4.4 show overall changes in the
average level, average uncertainty, and heterogeneity of expectations. It is interesting to see
whether those changes were di¤erent in di¤erent groups. In order to examine such possi-
bilities, we estimated the model with full interaction using dummy variables that split the
sample into two parts. The rst model with interactions distinguishes between stockholders
and non-stockholders. The second model looks at those who follow the stock market versus
those who do not. The third model looks at those whose cognitive capacity is above the
average versus those below average. The coe¢ cient estimates of the three models are in
Appendix C.1. The main results are summarized below with the help of three gures.
We rst look at stockholders versus non-stockholders. Stockholders include all those who
owned stocks directly, through mutual funds or in tax-sheltered accounts such as 401(k)
accounts. Since asset holdings are dened at the household level, members of the same
household were assigned the same stockholder status. From an asset pricing point of view,
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the e¤ect of the crash on stockholders is more interesting than the e¤ect on other households.
Note that stockholding may be endogenous to the nancial crisis. Therefore, we used the
pre-crash stock-holding status from the 2006 wave of HRS. Figure 4 shows the results from
the interaction model. The gure shows the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the popu-
lation distribution of subjective expected returns (i) for the four sampling periods. The
distributions are recovered from the empirical distribution of the covariates and the normal
assumption for the unobservables.
The results of Figure 4.4 indicate that stockholders have substantially higher and less
uncertain expectations, consistently with standard portfolio choice models. Note that the
di¤erences are not captured in full by the interaction of stockholding status with interview
date dummies presented in Table C1.1 in Appendix C, as the two groups di¤er in terms
of the covariates as well (e.g. demographics and education). The median of the expected
return distribution among stockholders is positive throughout the sample period, while the
median of the non-holder distribution is negative. Changes in average  (and average , see
appendix) are similar in the two groups, heterogeneity among stockholders reacted to the
stock market crash more in relative terms. In October and November 2008, the estimated
inter-quartile range in expected returns rose from about 35 percentage points to almost 60
percentage points among stockholders and from around 60 percentage points to slightly more
than 80 percentage points among non-stockholders.
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Figure 4.4. Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns among stockholders and
non-stockholders. Quartiles of the distribution by the date of the interview, estimated from
the structural model with interactions (detailed results in Table C1.1 in Appendix C)
Next we look at the results for the better informed versus less informed individuals. HRS
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2008 asked how closely the respondent follows the stock market. 8.5 percent answered very
closely, and another 36 percent answered somewhat closely.The rest answered not at all
or did not know or refused to answer. We merged the very closelyand somewhat closely
categories and called the subsample informed respondents.The rest we call uninformed
respondents.Being informed and stockholding are of course correlated, but the correlation
is far from being perfect. 70 percent of stockholders claim to follow the stock market (and
30 percent do not), while 30 percent of non-holders claim to follow the stock market (and 70
percent do not). Note that, similarly to stockholding status, whether one follows the stock
market is potentially endogenous to the stock market crash. Unfortunately, only HRS 2004
contains the information for our sample, and it is missing there for quite a few individuals.
We decided to use the 2008 measures for the analysis despite its potential endogeneity. The
results are very similar if one uses the 2004 measures instead.
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Figure 4.5. Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns among those who follow the
stock market (informed respondents) and those who do not (uninformed respondents).
Quartiles of the distribution by the date of the interview, estimated from the structural
model with interactions (detailed results in Table C1.2 in Appendix C)
Figure 4.5 shows the results on the quartiles of expected returns in a way similar to the
previous gure. The results are similar to the stockholder versus non-stockholder compar-
ison, with some qualications. The two groups di¤er less in terms of the initial level and
heterogeneity of expectations than stockholders versus non-stockholders. The increase in
the median of the distribution in October and November is more pronounced among the
uninformed respondents, while the increase in the inter-quartile range is only marginally
larger among the informed people. These results show that actual stockholding status is
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more strongly related to the e¤ect of the stock market crash on expectations than whether
one follows the stock market.
The third comparison is between those with above average cognitive capacity versus
those with below average cognitive capacity. Cognitive capacity is measured by the principal
component of various measures from HRS 2008. The measures include categories of self-rated
memory, the score on immediate and delayed word recall and serial subtraction of seven from
one hundred, and answers to three computing exercises, one of which is about compound
interest rate. Cognition is correlated with whether one follows the stock market, but the
correlation is not extremely strong (66 percent of informed respondents are above average
in terms of cognitive scores, compared to 40 percent of uninformed respondents). Figure 4.6
shows the results again in terms of the estimated quartiles of subjective expected returns.
In terms of the median, the patterns are more similar to what we found for informed versus
uninformed people, while the patterns in terms of the inter-quartile range are closer to the
patterns by stockholding.
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Figure 4.6. Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns among people with above
average cognitive capacity and those with below the average. Quartiles of the distribution
by the date of the interview, estimated from the structural model with interactions
(detailed results in Table C1.3 in Appendix C)
The results of the estimates suggest that the e¤ect on the stock market crash on expec-
tations was di¤erent in di¤erent groups of the population. The most pronounced di¤erences
are found between stockholders and non-stockholders. Di¤erences between informed and
uninformed people or higher cognition versus lower cognition people are similar but weaker.
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They all suggest, however, that disagreement increased more among those who initially
agreed more.
The nal question we investigate in this paper is whether the changes brought by the
stock market crash are close to what one would predict by changes in di¤erent stock market
indices. We seek to answer two questions. The rst question is whether the patterns of
stock market expectations found above are related to the evolution of the stock market. The
second question is whether the link between the stock market indices and expectations broke
after the crash.
We have created three indicators, all based on the Dow Jones index. The rst is the
monthly log-return, dened as the log of the average DJIA index from the ve days before
the interview minus the same lagged by one month. The second indicator is the average
of the VXD annualized volatility measure from the ve days before the interview. The
third measure is the log of the average daily volume of trade of shares in the DJIA index,
again from the ve days before the interview. These indicators are dened from the same
data as the series on Figure 1, but their exact denition is somewhat di¤erent. The rst
indicator enters the equation of expected returns (), the VDX indicator enters the equation
of uncertainty (), and the trading volume indicator enters the equation of disagreement
(Std(u)). The rationale for the last inclusion is that high trading periods might be the ones
when traders disagree about the fundamental price of assets and thus volume patterns might
be able to predict disagreement.
Table 4.5 contains the estimates from two di¤erent specications. Specication [1] is
identical to the specication of Table 4.4 above, except that the stock market indicators are
entered instead of the date of interview dummies. Specication [2] di¤ers from specication
[1] by allowing for an interaction of the stock market indicators with a dummy variable that
is one if the interview date is after the crash (October 2008 through February 2009) and zero
otherwise. If the relationship between the stock market indicators and expectations are the
same before and after the crash, their coe¢ cients should be stable across the specications,
and all the interaction terms should be zero.
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Table 4.5
The e¤ects of recent returns and volatility of the stock market index and the daily
volume of trade of the shares of the DJIA, before and after the crash. HRS 2008.
Specication (1) Specication (2)
 ln lnSt (u)  ln lnSt (u)
Constant  0:09  0:57  8:96  0:08  0:79  8:45
(0:01) (0:04) (2:21) (0:01) (0:09) (2:23)
Monthly log returns 0:05 0.33
(0:08) (0:10)
VDX volatility index 0.01 0.98
(avg. prev. 5 days) (0:15) (0:41)
Log volume of trade 0.35 0.33
(avg. prev. 5 days) (0:10) (0:10)
Post-crash dummy  0:01 0.21 19.29
(Oct 08 to Feb 09) (0:03) (0:25) (6:10)
Post-crash interacted  0:72
with log returns (0:26)
Post-crash interacted  0:62
with volatility (0:60)
Post-crash interacted  0:84
with log volume (0:27)
Other covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instruments YES YES YES YES
Log likelihood  42301:2
N 9347
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
The results for  and  are rather clear. They indicate that their relation to the stock
market indicator (monthly returns and volatility, respectively) changed dramatically after
the crash. Coe¢ cients in specication [2] suggest that before the crash, an increase in the
DJIA of 1 percent was followed by the population average of  higher by 0.3 percentage points
(i.e. 0.003). This magnitude is broadly in line with previous ndings by, for example, Kézdi
and Willis (2008). The post-crash relationship is just the opposite; there, the coe¢ cient
implies that the same one percent increase would be followed by a drop of 0.4 percentage
points (=0.335-0.721). This negative relationship is most likely identied from the fact that
within a one month window from the crash, the monthly log returns indicator was large
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and negative, while average expectations were higher than before. Specication [1] shows no
relationship between returns and average expectations, because it shows the mixed results
of a positive relationship between changes in the DJIA and the average level of expectations
in the pre-crash period and the temporary increase in expectations after the crash. The
population average of uncertainty shows a similar pattern; it tracks the volatility index
before the crash in specication [2] closely, but its increase after the crash is smaller than
what the large increase of the VDX would have implied. Again, specication [1] mixes the
two and produces an insignicant estimate.
The results in Table 5 are less clear on the association between disagreement and the
volume of trade. Our interpretation of the results is that it was largely similar before and
after the stock market crash. An increase in the volume by one percent was associated with
a subsequent increase in unobserved heterogeneity by somewhat over 0.3 percent before the
crash in both specications. The post-crash coe¢ cients suggest a reverse association but
also a huge increase in the intercept. Taken literally, they would imply that disagreement
increased by astronomical magnitudes right after the crash, and from there it tracked trading
volume with a negative coe¢ cient. Recall though that trading volume jumped substantially
right after the crash (see Figure 1 above), and it decreased considerably and steadily for
most of the following time in our sampling frame. At the same time, disagreement stayed
substantially higher after the crash than before, and it may have even increased in the
immediate aftermath of the crash when volume dropped the most (although we would not
have enough power to detect that). We argue that the post-crash association between volume
and disagreement was dominated by the large increase in both right after the crash (a strong
positive connection), and subsequent movements are of second order importance.
All the results presented in this section are based on the assumption of normally distrib-
uted subjective yearly returns. We checked the sensitivity of our results to this functional
form assumption by considering two alternatives, the Student-t distribution with various de-
grees of freedom and the shifted log-normal distribution. The Student-t has fatter tails than
the normal. It is motivated by the model of Weitzman (2007) who showed that, if agents
have imperfect knowledge about the true parametersgoverning the stochastic process of
stock market returns, and the parameters are evolving over time, then the posterior distri-
bution of subjective returns can be Student-t. The shifted log-normal form is motivated by
nance theory. While the log-normal is practically identical to the normal for small values
of the return, it is quite di¤erent for larger values. All of our important results are robust to
these alternative assumptions. The detailed results are available in section C.2 in Appendix
C.
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4.6 Conclusions
Using survey data on households subjective probability beliefs about the one-year-ahead
return on the Dow Jones stock market index, we estimated the e¤ect of the stock market crash
on the population average of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty
about returns (subjective standard deviation) and heterogeneity in expected returns. We
presented estimates both from reduced-form OLS regressions and a structural model that
can estimate relevant heterogeneity in subjective expectations and incorporates survey noise
at the same time.
We used data from the Health and Retirement Study that was elded in February 2008
through February 2009. We identied the e¤ect of the crash from the date of the interview,
which we showed to be exogenous to previous stock market expectations. The estimated ef-
fects are qualitatively similar in the reduced form regressions and from the structural model,
and they are robust to the functional form assumption for the distribution of stock market
returns. The results show a temporary increase in the population average of expectations
and uncertainty right after the crash. The e¤ect on cross-sectional heterogeneity is more
signicant and longer lasting, which implies substantial long-term increase in disagreement.
Stockholders were found to have more positive, less uncertain and less heterogeneous ex-
pectations than non-stockholders, but the stock market crash led to a larger increase in
disagreement among them than among non-stockholders. We found similar but smaller dif-
ferences between those who follow the stock market and those who dont, as well as between
those whose cognitive capacity is above the average and those whose cognition is below the
average.
The large positive e¤ect of the crash on disagreement suggests that there is heterogeneity
in the cognitive processes (or mental models) people use to convert public news into personal
probability beliefs, in line with the models of Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and
Pearson (1995). The di¤erential e¤ects on stockholders versus non-stockholders, and similar
di¤erences between informed and less informed or by cognitive capacity, may be due to the
fact that those di¤erent groups receive di¤erent signals or process the signals in very di¤erent
ways. These results provide empirical evidence for future research on heterogeneous beliefs
in nance theory.
Another natural question for further research is whether the changes in expectations we
document lead to changes in asset allocation. Data from HRS 2009 and 2010 will allow for
a thorough analysis of the e¤ect of the crisis on the reallocation of household portfolios and
the role of expectations.
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5 Concluding remarks
The three chapters of this dissertation examined ordinary peoples expectations of returns
attainable on the stock market. All chapters used the same methodology to uncover relevant
aspects of peoples expectations from their answers to survey questions. The questions were
elded in di¤erent years of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a survey representative
of the 51-year-old and older American population. The focus of this dissertation was on
the sources and consequences of heterogeneity of expectations. Each chapter examined a
di¤erent aspect that heterogeneity.
Chapters 2 and 3 provided detailed evidence on survey noise, and the measurement model
accommodates all the noise features we document. The results are consistent with our pro-
posed explanation for heterogeneity in stock market beliefs: nancial knowledge in general,
and knowledge about the history of stock returns in particular, are important determinants
of expectations about future stock returns. They also reinforce previous results about the
predictive power of beliefs on stockholding. The results of Chapter 3 suggest that there is
substantial heterogeneity in stock market expectations conditional on nancial knowledge.
Thus, two people with the same nancial knowledge can have di¤erent expectations about
future stock market returns. However, that extra heterogeneity in expectations is di¢ cult
to relate to standard psychological measures of personality. The only exception is general
optimism, which appears to be signicantly related to expectations of stock market returns,
but the origins and consequences of the relationship between general optimism and stock
market expectations are di¢ cult to assess without further research.
In line with ndings in the previous literature, the results of Chapter 4 suggest that
macro events a¤ect peoples stock market expectations. Our results highlight the di¤erential
e¤ect of the same macro event on di¤erent peoples expectations. The large positive e¤ect
of the stock market crash on disagreement, documented in Chapter 4, suggests that there
is heterogeneity in the cognitive processes (or mental models) people use to convert public
news into personal probability beliefs. These results provide empirical evidence for future
research on heterogeneous beliefs in nance theory.
The results in Chapter 2 establish the importance of belief heterogeneity in household
nances. They show that survey answers to probability questions can be helpful in char-
acterizing individual beliefs, but their analysis should recognize the importance of survey
noise. Although our results emphasize the importance of beliefs, on a cautionary note, they
also suggest that the strong correlation between beliefs and stock market participation in
the HRS and other surveys cannot be interpreted as a causal relationship.
A causal interpretation of the results would suggest that heterogeneity in expectations
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leads to heterogeneity in stockholding, and low average expectations, high uncertainty, and
large heterogeneity in expectations explain much of the stockholder puzzle. In principle, the
identication of causal e¤ects would require exogenous variation in expectations. However,
as we emphasized in Chapter 2, the lifelong learning aspects of nancial knowledge, together
with the role of cognitive capacities and the complex incentives for savings, makes it di¢ cult
to nd appropriate exogenous variation. Nevertheless, I believe that the results discussed
in this dissertation, combined with better measurement of preferences and constraints, can
shed more light on their respective role in householdsinvestment decisions in general, and
the stockholding puzzle in particular. That sets an agenda for future empirical research.
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Appendices
A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Details of the theoretical model
In this Appendix we present and solve a simple three-period life-cycle model of consumption
and saving with risky assets, heterogeneous beliefs about the parameters of the distribution
of returns, and potential learning about those parameters. The model is built on the "small
scale" model of Haliassos and Michaels (2002), and we add to it elements that are connected
to ideas in the human capital literature (e.g., Becker, 1964), its application to the acqui-
sition of nancial knowledge (Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008), and the theory of
information choice (Veldkamp, 2011).
Consider individual i who lives for three periods. Period 1 contains her young active years
(e.g., age 20 through 40), period 2 her active years in mature age (e.g., age 40 through 60),
and in period 3 she is retired. In periods t = 1; 2 she receives labor income Yit. In period 3 she
receives pension benets that are a function of her previous earnings Yi3 =  (Yi1; Yi2). We
abstract away from taxes and non-labor income other than pensions. Importantly, pensions
are from a dened-benets-type system such as Social Security, and pension benets are a
concave function of lifetime earnings.38 As a result, people who earn above certain threshold
have an incentive to save for retirement, and the saving rate may depend on lifetime earnings.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty in earnings, the retirement age, pension
benets or the length of life.
In each period, individual i can save. Savings can be invested in bank accounts (Bit)
that yield a xed gross interest Rf or in equity (Sit) that yield stochastic potential return
Rt  iid logN (; ). The individual cannot borrow or short the risky asset so Bit  0 and
Sit  0: Risky returns Rt are dened as potential returns in the sense that the actual returns
individual i can earn come at a discount of  so that e¤ective returns are Ret = Rte
  
logN (   ; ). The idea here is that Rt denotes the yearly gain on an ideal portfolio of risky
assets. In this paper we assume that the ideal portfolio is the stock market index fund, and
therefore realizations of Rt are the realized returns on the stock market index. We assume
that individuals earn less than the return on such an ideal portfolio because of proportional
transaction costs (therefore the notation ) and sub-optimal choice of underlying assets.
38The Social Security benet formula is very concave indeed. It starts with dening average monthly
earnings from the lifetime earnings history, in which months without earnings count as zero. Benets are 90
per cent of that average up to a relatively low level of earnnings; earnings in the middle range are transformed
into benets by a 32 per cent factor; and a factor of 15 per cent is used for high levels of earnings.
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Importantly, we assume that the survey questions in HRS (p0 and p10) ask about potential
returns Rt, but individual investment decisions are based on e¤ective returns Ret . Rt is a
random variable but the factor  is not. Realizations of potential returns Rt are common
across all individuals. However, individuals may di¤er in their beliefs about the parameters
of the distribution of Rt (but they all think it is i.i.d. lognormal). Individual beliefs about
the parameters are denoted by tilde over the greek letters denoting true parameters, e.g., ~.
In the beginning of period 1, individual i is endowed with a set of beliefs about the para-
meters of the distribution of potential returns Rt. Beliefs about parameter 2 are assumed to
be the same for everybody (this setup is the same as the one used by Brennan, 1998). At the
same time, there is uncertainty about  with heterogeneous beliefs. Individuals have some
belief ~ but they know that they dont know the true . We refer to incomplete knowledge
about  as uncertainty and model it by a prior distribution of , which is normal, centered
around ~i1, and its variance ~
2
i1 is potentially heterogenous, too.
In this setup, the distribution of log gross potential returns is perceived as normal with
mean ~i1 = ~Eit [] (the individual-specic mean of the random variable ) and variance
~2i1 = ~
2
i1 + 
2 (the reduced-form variance is the sum of variance due to individual-specic
parameter uncertainty and xed variance due to risk). When individual i makes the portfolio
choice decision in period 1, she thinks that risky returns follow a lognormal distribution with
parameters
 
~i1; ~
2
i1

. Heterogeneity in period 1 beliefs is predetermined by di¤erences in
what people may learn at home or in school, or di¤erences in personality (degree of general
optimism and general uncertainty). If they do not learn more about the returns, individuals
enter period 2 with the same beliefs: ~i2 = ~i1 and ~
2
i2 = ~
2
i1. However, their beliefs can
change as results of two kinds of learning.
The rst kind is mechanical learning, or passive learning following the terminology of
Veldkamp (2011). If an individual invests in Si1, the realized returns will make her change
her beliefs by Bayesian updating. Since the length of period 1 is unity, and the realized
returns are R1 for everyone, the results of passive learning are the Bayesian posteriors
~i2 =
2~1i + ~
2
i1R1
2 + ~2i1
(39)
~2i2 =
 
1
~2i1
+
1
2
! 1
=
2~2i1
2 + ~2i1
(40)
~2i2 = ~
2
i2 + 
2 (41)
As a result of passive learning, individuals update their ~ in the direction of the realized
stock market returns in period 1, and their uncertainty decreases.
The second kind of learning is active learning (again, following the terminology of Veld-
kamp, 2011). Individuals can invest in learning even if they do not invest in period 1. Also,
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those who are investors in period 1 may learn more than simply observing the returns they
realize. Active learning is an investment in ones nancial knowledge, which is a form of
human capital. Many insights of the large literature on investment into human capital may
apply to active learning (see, e.g., Becker, 1964).
Active learning a¤ects attainable returns in two ways. The rst is Bayesian updating of
ones beliefs about  and . The investor can update her beliefs by observing a history of
past returns, where the length of the history is hi. While hi should be a decision variable in
general, we abstract away from that in this simple model and x it to h. We set h > 1 in
order to reect a longer horizon than available in mechanical learning. With history length
h and observed average stock market returns Rh the result of active learning is the Bayesian
posterior distribution
~i2 =
2~1i + h~
2
i1
Rh
2 + h~2i1
(42)
~2i2 =
 
1
~2i1
+
h
2
! 1
=
2~2i1
2 + h~2i1
(43)
~2i2 = ~
2
i2 + 
2 (44)
Similarly to passive learning, individuals update their ~ in the direction of the realized
returns in the observed time horizon, and their uncertainty decreases. Those are ex post
results of learning. Active learning is a choice based on results that are expected ex ante.
Ex ante, individuals do not know in which direction their ~ will be updated. In particular,
they do not expect their mean to change after learning. But they know that learning will
decrease their uncertainty.39
The second aspect of learning a¤ects individual transaction costs  that discount potential
returns. Recall that although potential returns areRt, individuals can attain returns ofRte 
on their investment Sit. By active learning, we assume that individuals can decrease their
transaction cost  . For simplicity, we assume that active learning leads to  = 0 so that
active learners can expect to realize (and do realize) Rt on their investment Sit.
Active learning is an investment. We assume that its two aspects are bundled so that
those who choose to learn will see their beliefs updated as in (42) through (44) and their
transaction costs  reduced (to zero in this simple setup). Active learning entails individual-
specic costs of Di that are to be paid in period 1. Note a key aspect of this investment
setup: while the benets to active learning are related to the amount to invest into the risky
assets, the costs are not. This aspect will drive many of our most important implications.
39In this setup, the decrease in uncertainty is a deterministic function of h because of the simplistic
assumption of known 2. But uncertainty decreases in h in richer setups as well as long as the observed
returns are from a stationary distribution.
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Combining all the ingredients outlined above, the decision problem of the individual can
be formulated the following way.
EUi =
3X
t=1
t 1Eu (Cit) (45)
u (Cit) =
1
1  C
1 
it (46)
Xit  Cit +Bit + Sit + fit +Dit (47)
fit = f  1 (Sit > 0) (48)
Di1 = D if active learning in period 1 (49)
Dit = 0 otherwise (50)
Xit = Si(t 1)
 
Rte
  it  Rf

+
 
Bi(t 1) + Si(t 1)

Rf + Yit (51)
Bit  0; Sit  0 (52)
The utility function in (45) is standard expected utility, Cit is consumption,  is the
discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is CRRA, and  is the parameter for
risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution at the same time.
The budget line in (47) states that the sum of investments Bit and Sit (bonds and stocks,
respectively), the xed costs of investment (fit), and the cost of active learning (Dit) cannot
exceed cash on hand (Xit). Fixed costs need to be paid if one invests in the risky assets, and
their role is to prevent very small investments. D needs to be paid if one invests in active
learning. In our setup the only time people may invest into active learning is period 1 (no
one wants to save in period 3, and thus it is never optimal to learn later than period 1).
Equation (51) describes the equation of motion for cash on hand. In the beginning of every
period t earnings (Yit) are received, and the returns on previous period (t  1) investments
are collected. In case of stocks, these are net returns that include proportional transaction
costs  . Equation (52) states the nonnegativity constraints that make borrowing and short
selling impossible.
This model is relatively simple, but it does not yield to analytical solutions. In order to
get the implications for our empirical investigation, we simulated out the policy function.
The model can be solved with backward induction. In the third period the optimal behavior
is trivial. There is only one state variable, Xi3 (cash-on-hand in period 3) and one control
variable Ci3 (consumption). The optimal policy is to consume everything, Ci3 = Xi3. The
second period is more complex. There are four state variables: Xi2, Di1 (whether the
individual had active learning in period 1) and the belief parameters ~i2 and ~
2
i2. The two
control variables are Bi2 and Si2 which then imply Ci2. The optimal second period policy
function and the implied value function can be computed by simulation. We computed the
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optimal decision for a large number of grid points on the state variables and then we used
cubic splines to approximate the functions for their entire domains. In the rst period there
is no state variable, but there are three control variables: Bi1, Si2 and Di1.
We solved the model for a large number of di¤erent parameter values. Some parameters
values were borrowed from the literature such as:
 = 3 (53)
 = 0:97 (54)
Rf = e
0:02 (55)
 = 0:07 (56)
 = 0:15 (57)
The second set of variables are the wage variables. The heterogeneity of lifetime income
and its link to learning and investment is our primary focus so we computed the optimal
policy function for a large set of wage values. We generated a distribution of earnings that
resembles the observed distribution. As a benchmark, we set the ratio of Yi2 to Yi1 to 2 (so
that Yi2 = 2Yi1). The distribution of earnings is set to lognormal in both the rst and the
second period (or generation). We have set the 5th percentile of the Yi1 to be 0:4 and the
95th percentile of the Yi1 to be 2:2. This way the population average of Yi1 is normalized to
roughly 1.
For the third period income we used a simplied social security formula. First we com-
puted the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) as the average of the prior wages,
PIAi = 0:5 (Yi2 + Yi1). Then we have chosen two bendpoints, Q1 and Q2. The third period
social security income was dened as
Yi3 =
8>><>>:
0:9PIAi if PIAi  Q1
0:9Q1 + 0:32 (PIAi  Q1) if Q1 < PIAi  Q2
0:9Q1 + 0:32 (Q2  Q1) + 0:15 (PIAi  Q3) if Q2 < PIAi
(58)
The bendpoints were chosen to be Q1 = 1:25 (approximately the 40th percentile) and Q2 =
2:65 (approximately the 90th percentile).
The rest of the parameters, due to lack of consensus about their values, had to be cal-
ibrated di¤erently. We have chosen basic values that made the results interesting, and we
have run sensitivity analyses to see how the results change as we move away from these
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values. The default values of these parameters were:
 = 0:025 (59)
f = 0:06 (60)
D = 0:02 (61)
~21 = 0:15 (62)
h = 3 (63)
Perhaps the most important but also a rather straightforward result of the model is that
an increase in lifetime earnings leads to an increased propensity to learn and to invest. In the
setup here, the only source of heterogeneity is in earnings. Figure A1 illustrates the results
using our default parameter values. There is a rst threshold value of second period earnings
( 1:75) below which nobody learns and nobody participates on the stock market. Between
this and a second threshold value ( 2:13) people participate on the stock market but they do
not acquire nancial knowledge. People whose second period earnings are above the second
threshold, and consequently who had the most incentive to save, both learn actively and
participate on the stock market. The pattern that, other things equal, the lowest earners do
not learn and do not invest, the middle income people do not learn but invest and the rich
both invest and learn is universal in this model, but the two threshold values can coincide
in which case all investors are knowledgeable.
This relationship between lifetime earnings and learning is due to saving motives in this
model. Expected benets of learning are increasing in the level of period-2 savings. Ceteris
paribus, those who intend to save less will see lower benets to learning than those who
intend to save more. Since intended period-2 savings are increasing in lifetime earnings,
expected benets to learning are increasing in lifetime earnings as well. At the same time,
117
               dc_564_12
the costs of investment, D; arent directly related to the amount to invest. As a result, the
likelihood of learning and investing is increasing in lifetime earnings.
In a richer and more realistic setting learning costs would also be heterogeneous. In
reality, learning costs are likely to be negatively correlated with earnings. Heterogeneity
in lifetime earnings reects heterogeneity in general human capital (Becker, 1964). Hetero-
geneity in human capital is the result of di¤erences in the costs as well as the benets to
investment into human capital (Willis, 1986, and Card, 1998). Those costs include general
skills and family background, which likely play important roles in determining costs of learn-
ing about stock returns, too. Therefore, those who have higher lifetime earnings because of
higher levels of human capital are also likely to face lower learning costs of stock returns.
This amplies the positive relationship between learning and earnings.
The 8 panels in Figures A2 show additional comparative static results. Each gure shows
the fraction of individuals who choose to learn in period 1 and the fraction of individuals
holding stocks in period 2. These fractions are calculated using the simulated distribution
of earnings as described above.
The results are very intuitive. Panel a) of Figure A2 shows that as the cost of learning
increases, the fraction of people who choose to learn decreases. The increasing learnings costs
make active learning less benecial but that does not necessarily discourage stock market
participation. As long as learning costs are su¢ ciently high to begin with, a further increase
in it would only make people participate on the stock market without learning. This is
the case on Figure A1, where an increase in learning cost leads to a monotonic decrease in
active learning, but that does not fully translate into lower stockholding above some level of
learning costs.
Panel b) shows a reverse picture. As the period-1 expectation of the mean of log potential
returns increases, stockholding in period 2 increases dramatically, and the probability of
learning increases as well up to a point. Above some expected potential returns, some people
can acquire su¢ ciently high e¤ective returns in the second period even without nancial
knowledge, but they choose not to invest in knowledge in the rst period when they are
relatively poor.
Panel c) shows that parameter uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about ) is negatively related
to stock market participation and weakly negatively related to learning. The expected value
of a lognormally distributed variable positively depends on the variance of its logarithm40.
This panel nets out this e¤ect. In order to show the pure e¤ect of increasing uncertainty, we
have imposed a mean-preserving spread such that expected returns are the same in all ve
cases. This result shows that, in this setup, the prospect of decreased uncertainty is not an
40E (Rit) = exp
 
~it + 0:5~
2
it

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important motive for learning. The expectation of gains is the important motive.41 Panel d)
shows that increasing the xed costs of participation leads to decreasing stockholding, and
albeit in a much less pronounced way, it also leads to less learning.
Panel e) shows the e¤ect of increasing transaction costs  , the discount from potential
returns. Increasing this discount decreases e¤ective attainable returns conditional on Rt,
but it increases the expected gains from active learning. The results imply that the e¤ects
on both learning and on stockholding in period 2 are substantial, but the two e¤ects go in
the opposite direction. Higher discount makes participation without nancial knowledge less
benecial. Some of these people would leave the market, but some would decide to learn
and stay on the market.
Panel f) shows a strong and monotonic negative relationship between risk aversion on the
one hand, and learning and subsequent stockholding on the other hand. Higher risk aversion
leads to a smaller fraction of savings put into stocks, ceteris paribus, which decreases the
value of learning about stock returns (especially since the primary e¤ect of such learning is
increased expected returns and not decreased risk). Panel g) shows that increased patience
increases stockholding and learning as well. It is partly because more patient individuals
plan to save more, and partly because they are more willing to pay the costs of learning in
period 1 for its expected benets in period 2.
Finally, panel h) shows that as the age-earnings prole gets atter (period 1 earnings
increase at the cost of period 2 earnings), the probability of learning increases and the e¤ect
on stock market participation is rather ambiguous. In order to net out wealth e¤ects lifetime
earnings are kept constant in all ve specications and only the ratio of rst and second
period wage is changing. A atter wage prole makes any investment in the rst period
more likely as the marginal value of consumption loss in period 1 decreases. There are two
opposing e¤ects on stock market participation. First, a atter wage prole decreases second
period earnings, which makes people less likely to participate on the stock market. Second,
if the earnings prole is su¢ ciently at, the increasing number of nancially knowledgeable
people would push stock market participation up. In this particular setup, the rst e¤ect
dominates at very steep proles, and the second e¤ect dominates at very at proles. In
general, it is not evident which of the two e¤ects is stronger.
41In case we do not make the adjustment of the mean log return the dependence between uncertainty
and learning vanishes completely, and the dependence between uncertainty and participation becomes very
weakly positive.
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A.2 Data, descriptive statistics and detailed evidence on noise and
information in the probability answers
A.2.1 Sample and stockholding
Table A2.1. Sample size
Age 55-64a Other respondentsb
HRS 2002 4; 056 12; 074
HRS 2004 3; 676 14; 651
HRS 2006 3; 182 14; 027
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 2; 512 11; 161
aIndividuals of age 55 to 64 and whose spouse is of age 55 to 64 as well (or have no spouse)
Table A2.2. Fraction of stockholders in the sample
Stockholders
outside retirement acc.a in retirement acc.b All
HRS 2002 0:37 0:33 0:51
HRS 2004 0:34 0:32 0:49
HRS 2006 0:29 0:29 0:45
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 0:26 0:29 0:42
a Have investments in stocks or mutual funds outside retirement accounts
b Have stocks or mutual funds within retirement accounts
Table A2.3. Share of stocks in the portfolio among stockholders in the sample
Stockholders
outside retirement acc.a in retirement acc.b All
HRS 2002 0:59 0:79 0:56
HRS 2004 0:58 0:75 0:56
HRS 2006 0:53 0:81 0:56
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 0:51 0:78 0:53
a Have investments in stocks or mutual funds outside retirement accounts
b Have stocks or mutual funds within retirement accounts
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Figure A2.1. Fraction of stockholders and total net wealth. HRS 2002.
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Figure A2.2. Fraction of stockholders and nancial wealth. HRS 2002.
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Figure A2.3. Share of stocks in the portfolio of stockholders, and total net wealth. HRS
2002.
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A.2.2 The proxy variable for lifetime earnings
The source of the lifetime earnings data is the Detailed and the Summary Earnings Records
(DER and SER) derived from the Master Earnings File (MEF) of the Social Security Ad-
ministration that is linked to HRS. For details about the MEF and the linking procedure
see Olsen and Hudson (2009) and the documents on the HRS website.42
The DER data is derived from the W-2 forms led by employers to the Internal Revenue
Service each year, and it is available from 1978 onward. The SER data is available since
1951, but it contains information only on jobs covered by social security and income up to
the taxable maximum. In principle the DER data is superior to the SER as it covers more
jobs and it provides more precise information on high income people whose earnings records
are capped in SER but uncapped in DER. Therefore we gave priority to the DER data and
we only used the SER in exceptional cases described below.
The main issue of the linking procedure is that HRS needed to acquire written consent
from sample members in order to get the administrative information on them. HRS made a
lot of e¤ort to increase the participation rate, but it remained below 100 percent. Generally
HRS has a relatively good coverage rate for earnings before 1992 (slightly above 80 percent)
and moderately good coverage rate for earnings afterwards (around 60 percent). Below we
provide precise numbers about the attrition rate for our target sample, which will be higher
than these numbers. HRS asked for consent in each wave, but in some waves only people
with prior consent were asked. Before 2006 the consent covered years up to the interview
year, but since 2006 the consent covers future years as well. The consequence is that, as of
now, the coverage rates are typically higher for earlier waves (people had more chance to
provide consent), but in the future this di¤erence will diminish. Another problem beyond
coverage rate is selection. There is evidence that giving consent is not random. Men, the
educated, the rich and minorities are underrepresented in the merged sample. See the text
for details about how we handle this problem.
Our primary sample is a ten year cohort, people 55-64 years old in 2002 and whose spouse
is in the same age range, too.43 In some specications we look at people in the same age
range in 2004, 2006 and 2008 as well. As Table A24 shows our target sample size is 4056
in 2002, 3672 in 2004, 3174 in 2006 and 2506 in 2008. Hudomiet, Kézdi and Willis (2011)
show that shortly after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 stock market beliefs
42There are two relatively detailed documents under the data section at hrsonline.isr.umich.edu that can
be accessed after free registration. Note that the social security data is not public, and thus only these
documents are available but not the data. The website also provides detailed information about how to get
permission to use the restricted data.
43People who are at least 55 years old, but they havent turned 65 yet.
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of households changed substantially and in an unusual way. For this reason we decided to
drop interviews that were made after September 2008 in this paper.
The earnings data we created is the average CPI-adjusted earnings in a 15 year period,
between age 40 and 55.44 The earliest year we used is 1978, which is for earnings at age
40 for people who were 64 in 2002 (2002   64 + 40 = 1978). The DER data in principle
is available from 1978, but the version of the data stored at HRS only covers years 1980
onward. The HRS sta¤ claims that there were some technical problems with the 1978 and
the 1979 DER data, and therefore they decided against merging it to HRS. Therefore all
the 1978 and 1979 earnings information is coming from the SER. Another issue happened in
1998-2000. HRS rst acquired only the DER data until 1997, and then it acquired the SER
data until 1999. Therefore for people who stopped giving consent after 2000, we only have
SER information for their earnings from 1998 and 1999.
Table A2.4 shows the quality of the social security earnings information in HRS. As we
can see we had no information about the earnings of 612 people in 2002 (15 percent). This
number is similar in later waves as well, but due to the falling sample size the ratio of missing
values is increasing. Among those who provided some information the majority did so for
all the 15 years we needed for our lifetime earnings proxy. The nature of the data is such
that missing years can only happen at the end of the period and only for those who stopped
giving consent to HRS to collect the earnings data on them. In 2002 we have all the necessary
years for 2733 people, we have 10-14 years of information for 590 people and less than 10
years for 121 people. The corresponding numbers for later waves are smaller in level but
very similar as a percentage. Here the decision we made was to disregard the earnings data
for everyone for whom we have less than 10 years of information, and use the available years
for imputation for those who only have 5 or less missing years.
Table A2.4. Social Security earnings availability in our target samples
2002 2004 2006 2008
Target sample size 4056 3672 3174 2506
All 15 years available 2733 2521 1974 1337
10-14 years available 590 376 405 469
1-9 years available 121 91 64 44
no SSA information 612 684 731 656
 Interviews made prior to October 2008
For condentiality reasons HRS top-coded all the earnings variables. For people whose
earnings were above $250,000 in a given year, we only have interval information, where
44People who are at least 40 years old but havent turned 55 yet.
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the intervals are $250,000-$299,999; $300,000-$499,999 and $500,000 and above. Topcoded
responses were imputed with a procedure described below. HRS also rounded earnings
below $250,000 to the closest multiple of $100, with the exception of $0-$49, where we can
di¤erentiate between a true $0 and a $1-$49 value.
The DER data contains ve earnings variables:
1. Total compensation: This variable amounts to the sum of the Box 1 values on each
W-2 forms submitted on behalf of a person by all his employers. Total compensation
includes wages, bonuses, non-cash payments and tips45. Total compensation typically
does not include deferred payments such as contributions to a 401k plans, but certain
plans are included. This variables is uncapped, meaning that high income vales are
not censored, only topcoded.
2. Social security earnings: This variables is derived from the Box 3 values of the corre-
sponding W-2 forms. There are two major di¤erences between this variable and total
compensation. The rst di¤erence is that social security earnings contain information
on deferred compensation as well. The second di¤erence is that this variable is capped
at the taxable maximum. The taxable maximum was changing year by year. In 2002 it
was $80,400, for example, meaning that any earnings beyond this amount are missing.
3. Medicare earnings: This variable is based on the Box 5 values of the W-2 forms.
Medicare earnings are almost identical to social security earnings. The main di¤er-
ence is between the taxable maximums used for the two measures. Before 1991 the
medicare and the social security caps were identical. Since 1994 there is no limit on
the taxable earnings for medicare, and between 1991 and 1993 the di¤erence between
the medicare and the social security taxable maximums were diverging.
4. FICA taxable self employment earnings: This variable is based on Form 1040 Schedule
SE reported by the self employed to IRS. The variable is capped at the same amounts
as the social security earnings.
5. Medicare taxable self employment earnings: This variable is almost identical to the
previous, but here the less restrictive medicare caps are used.
The SER data contains only one variable which is the sum of all his wage, salary and self
employment income. Similarly to social security DER earnings the variable has information
only on jobs covered by social security and contains capped values at the social security
taxable maximum.
45Only tips that the employee reported to the employer. Allocated tips are not part of Box 1.
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The correlation between these variables are generally very high, but they are not identical.
In principle the best quality data is the post 1994 values of the medicare earnings which is
uncapped and it also contains information on deferred compensation. The decision we made
was the following. First we took the maximum of the total compensation, the social security,
and the medicare earnings. In case the maximum was capped or topcoded, we imputed a
value with a procedure described below. Second, we took the maximum of the FICA and
the medicare taxable self employment earnings. Again, if the maximum was capped or
topcoded, we used imputation. Third, we added the employment and the self-employment
values. Fourth, we compared this sum to the SER data and took the maximum. After this
procedure we had an almost complete person-year-earnings dataset.46 The nal step was the
imputation of the remaining missing values.
We needed to impute earnings in three cases. The rst is topcoded and rounded responses;
the second is for people who stopped giving consent to HRS and therefore their earnings are
missing for their last years; and the third is for capped earnings values. Out of these three
only the second one a¤ected many respondents (590 in 2002), topcoding and capping were
less severe issues.
Topcoded and rounded responses were imputed in a very simple way. For the $250,000-
$299,999 interval we imputed $270,000; for the $300,000-$499,999 interval we imputed $370,000;
for the $500,000 and above interval we imputed $710,000, and for the $1-$49 interval we im-
puted $40. Other rounded responses were not imputed, we used the rounded values. The
values we used were motivated by interval regressions for the logarithm of earnings. If one
assumes log-normally distributed earnings, estimates an interval regression, and computes
the conditional expected value of a given interval, then he gets numbers that are very close to
the values we used. We estimated models with and without exible time trends in earnings
and with and without basic demographic variables such as gender, age and education, and
the resulting conditional expectations were always very close to these numbers.
For people whose last earnings values were missing we used their earlier earnings for
imputation. As described above, we only have people in our sample with at least ten years
of information and thus maximum 5 years of missing earnings. We saw two possibilities for
imputation. We could either impute the mean of earlier wages, or we could put more weight
on recent years. We have found that many people in our sample had notable uctuations in
their earnings so we decided to use the second approach. First we identied the last four valid
earning values for each missing value. Second, we adjusted all the four values with the cpi
to get an initial guess for the missing earnings. Then we averaged these values with relative
46One technical issue was that missing values and zero earnings were hard to distinguish in the DER data,
but it was precisely stored in the version of the SER data HRS provided.
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weights 1=t if the initial guess was based on earnings t years before the missing response. For
example let us say that for a given person we only had earnings up to 1991, and we wanted
to impute values for 1992-1994. Let us take the 1994 value. We took the persons earnings
from 1988,1989,1990 and 1991, adjusted these values with the cpi, and averaged them with
relative weights 1=6; 1=5; 1=4 and 1=3.
Capped earning values were imputed in a very similar fashion to the previous. Recall
that capping applied to people whose earnings were higher than the taxable maximum. As
the taxable maximum increased over time we decided to use the next four earnings values
instead of the last four. Moreover, when an initial guess turned out to be lower than the
taxable maximum, we replaced the guess with the taxable maximum. When the nal guess
was equal to the taxable maximum (when all the four initial guesses were lower than that)
we imputed 110 percent of the taxable maximum. Another problem was that sometime we
had less than four initial guesses, in which case we used as many as we had. When there
was no initial guess at all, we again imputed 110 percent of the taxable maximum.
Finally, we simply imputed the sample mean for all the missing observations. The last
two rows of Table A2.4 shows that the number of imputed observations were 733 in 2002
and similar in magnitude in the later waves as well. In the regression analyses, we entered
a dummy variable for missing (and therefore imputed) earnings data.
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A.2.3 Noise in the probability answers
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Figure A2.5. The distribution of reported subjective probabilities of a gain of the stock
market (p0) and the 10 per cent or larger gain (p10). HRS 2002, estimation sample
(n = 2969)
Table A2.5. Patterns of survey noise in the core questionnaire
Fraction of responses where HRS 2002 HRS 2004 HRS 2006 HRS 2008
p0 = 0:5 0:238 0:262 0:239 0:254
p0 = 0:0 or p 0 = 1:0 0:119 0:077 0:073 0:062
p0 rounded other ten per cent 0:509 0:512 0:559 0:539
p0 rounded 25% or 75% 0:088 0:096 0:082 0:096
p0 not round number 0:047 0:054 0:047 0:048
Total 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
p0 > p10 0:425
p0 = p10 0:439
p0 < p10 0:136
Total 1:000
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Table A2.6. Direct evidence on survey noise: Test-retest comparisons
using core questionnaire and experimental module answers
to the same probability questions from HRS 2002
p0 p10
Mean answer in core questionnaire 0:486 0:396
Mean answer in module 0:479 0:334
Di¤erence (core minus module) 0:007 0:063
Standard dev. in core 0:290 0:272
Standard dev. in module 0:272 0:303
Di¤erence (core minus module) 0:018  0:031
Fraction who gave the same answer in core and module 0:273 0:179
Absolute value of di¤erence between core and module 0:231 0:240
Correlation core and module answers 0:467 0:356
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Table A2.7. The propensity to give round answer to the to p0 question
(multiple of 10% or 25% or 75%)
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002-2008
Stockholder dummy -0.004
[0.005]
Log lifetime earnings -0.001
[0.003]
Education -0.002
[0.001]**
Cognition 0.002
[0.004]
Single female 0.013
[0.007]
Single male 0.011
[0.009]
Female in couple 0.008
[0.007]
Age -0.001
[0.001]
Black -0.020
[0.009]*
Hispanic 0.014
[0.009]
Father manager/professional -0.013
[0.008]
Log risk tolerance 0.001
[0.011]
Wealth non-positive -0.004
[0.011]
Wealth in middle -0.007
[0.007]
Wealth high -0.011
[0.009]
Fin. wealth zero 0.000
[0.010]
Fin. wealth in middle -0.004
[0.008]
Fin. wealth high -0.005
[0.009]
Dummies for p0 categories YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,112 11,113
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.06
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.27 1.01
p-value 0.257 0.418
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni ficant at 5%; ** s igni ficant at 1%
Mean fi l l  for miss ing cognition, father's  occ, ri sk tolearnce variables ; dummies  for miss ing va lues  included but not shown.
LHS variable:   p0 answer rounded (dummy).     HRS 2002-2008
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Table A2.8. The propensity to give the same answer to p0 and p10
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy -0.016
[0.020]
Log lifetime earnings -0.020
[0.009]*
Education -0.008
[0.004]*
Cognition -0.007
[0.011]
Single female 0.015
[0.026]
Single male 0.047
[0.034]
Female in couple 0.046
[0.023]*
Age 0.011
[0.004]*
Black 0.018
[0.028]
Hispanic 0.007
[0.043]
Father manager/professional -0.032
[0.027]
Log risk tolerance 0.001
[0.029]
Wealth non-positive 0.088
[0.044]*
Wealth in middle 0.003
[0.029]
Wealth high -0.034
[0.034]
Fin. wealth zero -0.045
[0.037]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.021
[0.030]
Fin. wealth high -0.017
[0.035]
Dummies for p0 categories YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,519 3,520
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 2.31 0.73
p-value 0.019 0.623
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni ficant at 5%; ** s igni ficant at 1%
Mean fi l l  for miss ing cognition, father'socc, ri sk tolearnce variables ; dummies  for miss ing va lues  included but not shown.
LHS variable:   p0=p10 (dummy).    HRS 2002
132
               dc_564_12
Table A2.9. The propensity to give smaller answer to p0 than p10
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
µ log(s ) log[Std(u)]
coef
interaction with
stockholding coef
interaction with
stockholding coef
interaction with
stockholding
Constant -0.091 0.087 -0.597 -0.134 -1.176 -0.229
[0.007]** [0.013]** [0.026]** [0.052]** [0.082]** [0.063]**
July 08 to Sep08 0.008 -0.013 0.135 -0.052 0.158 -0.066
[0.018] [0.022] [0.067]* [0.082] [0.076]* [0.098]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.091 -0.031 0.29 -0.066 0.465 0.135
[0.041]* [0.052] [0.155] [0.188] [0.161]** [0.203]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 -0.012 -0.006 -0.113 0.194 0.231 0.251
[0.052] [0.068] [0.173] [0.246] [0.181] [0.268]
Female -0.103 0.05 0.234 0.076 0.157 0.024
[0.016]** [0.019]** [0.059]** [0.073] [0.066]* [0.087]
Single 0.012 -0.017 0.135 -0.169 0.244 -0.232
[0.018] [0.022] [0.062]* [0.081]* [0.070]** [0.096]*
Black 0.015 -0.126 0.539 0.101 0.483 0.276
[0.028] [0.062]* [0.104]** [0.228] [0.107]** [0.241]
Hispanic 0.013 -0.04 0.408 -0.107 0.357 -0.004
[0.035] [0.055] [0.134]** [0.223] [0.139]* [0.242]
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 0.011 -0.012 0.018
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
Years of education 0.004 -0.001 -0.04 -0.006 -0.033 -0.028
[0.003] [0.004] [0.011]** [0.015] [0.012]** [0.017]
P(economic recession) -0.004 0.001
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.025 0.007
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.673 -0.42
2004-2006 average [0.249]** [0.261]
Ll -42278.6
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.083
Mean(s ) 0.622
Mean(Std(u) 0.355
Var[R*]/Var[R] 0.652
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.535
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.225
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Stockholders are those who own any stock-market based assets (stocks, mutual funds etc.) either directly or through retirement
accounts. Members of the same households are assigned the same stockholding status.
For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4.4
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Table A2.10. Absolute value of the di¤erence between p0 in the core and p0 in the module
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy 0.044
[0.037]
Log lifetime earnings -0.006
[0.017]
Education 0.003
[0.007]
Cognition 0.034
[0.020]
Single female 0.006
[0.061]
Single male -0.056
[0.073]
Female in couple -0.041
[0.052]
Age -0.006
[0.007]
Black -0.087
[0.046]
Hispanic -0.025
[0.127]
Father manager/professional 0.003
[0.056]
Log risk tolerance -0.028
[0.069]
Wealth non-positive -0.009
[0.055]
Wealth in middle 0.047
[0.060]
Wealth high -0.007
[0.065]
Fin. wealth zero 0.027
[0.081]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.044
[0.057]
Fin. wealth high 0.024
[0.063]
Dummies for p0 categories NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.26 1.19
p-value 0.272 0.314
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni ficant at 5%; ** s igni ficant at 1%
Mean fi l l  for miss ing cognition, father'socc, ri sk tolearnce variables ; dummies  for miss ing va lues  included but not shown.
LHS variable:   | p0 - p0_module |.    HRS 2002
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Table A2.11. Absolute value of the di¤erence between p10 in the core and p10 in the module
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy 0.025
[0.036]
Log lifetime earnings 0.003
[0.016]
Education -0.005
[0.008]
Cognition 0.027
[0.020]
Single female -0.022
[0.059]
Single male -0.026
[0.062]
Female in couple -0.043
[0.048]
Age -0.009
[0.008]
Black 0.012
[0.048]
Hispanic 0.200
[0.124]
Father manager/professional 0.093
[0.060]
Log risk tolerance 0.075
[0.061]
Wealth non-positive 0.051
[0.063]
Wealth in middle 0.052
[0.056]
Wealth high 0.039
[0.064]
Fin. wealth zero 0.146
[0.094]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.031
[0.051]
Fin. wealth high 0.017
[0.059]
Dummies for p0 categories NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.26 1.19
p-value 0.272 0.314
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni ficant at 5%; ** s igni ficant at 1%
Mean fi l l  for miss ing cognition, father'socc, ri sk tolearnce variables ; dummies  for miss ing va lues  included but not shown.
LHS variable:   | p10 - p10_module |.    HRS 2002
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A.2.4 Relevant heterogeneity in the probability answers
Table A2.12. Descriptive statistics of the subjective probability answers to the
stock market returns questions by survey wave. HRS 2002 through 2008.
p0 V (p0i) p0   p10 Fraction missing p0
All respondents
2002 0:48 0:081 0:088 0:18
2004 0:52 0:068 0:12
2006 0:51 0:068 0:19
2008 (before September) 0:50 0:067 0:104 0:15
Stockholders
2002 0:56 0:081 0:113 0:06
2004 0:58 0:056 0:03
2006 0:57 0:056 0:05
2008 (before September) 0:56 0:055 0:129 0:04
Not stockholders
2002 0:40 0:081 0:064 0:27
2004 0:46 0:072 0:20
2006 0:46 0:072 0:28
2008 (before September) 0:46 0:071 0:086 0:21
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2002, 4, 6 and 8 (p0   p10 is from HRS 2002 only).
Respondents of age 55 through 64 with a spouse of the same age range (and singles)
p0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns on stock markets by following year
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Table A2.13. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 1: Without wealth on the right-hand side
p0 resid square p0 - p10 missing p0
Log lifetime earnings 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.032
[0.004]* [0.001] [0.004] [0.003]**
DB pension -0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.012
[0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008]
DC pension 0.016 -0.004 0.010 -0.023
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.010] [0.008]**
Education 0.008 -0.001 0.005 -0.015
[0.002]** [0.000]** [0.002]* [0.002]**
Cognition 0.024 -0.007 0.007 -0.037
[0.004]** [0.001]** [0.006] [0.005]**
Financial respondent 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.164
[0.009]** [0.003]* 0.000 [0.011]**
Log risk tolerance 0.044 0.002 0.022 -0.033
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.014] [0.012]**
Single female -0.082 -0.004 -0.045 0.092
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.012]** [0.010]**
Single male -0.032 0.000 -0.018 0.038
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.015] [0.012]**
Female in couple -0.065 -0.007 -0.023 0.071
[0.008]** [0.002]** [0.011]* [0.009]**
Age -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]**
Black -0.048 0.006 -0.019 0.022
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.011]*
Hispanic 0.001 0.005 -0.029 0.112
[0.013] [0.004] [0.017] [0.016]**
Father manager/professional 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.004
[0.009]* [0.003] [0.012] [0.009]
Sunny day optimism 0.016 0.000 -0.006 0.004
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.008] [0.007]
Economic pessimism -0.092 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
[0.014]** [0.004] [0.017] [0.014]
Depressive symptomes -0.010 0.003 0.004 0.014
[0.004]** [0.001]* [0.004] [0.004]**
Fraction fifty answers -0.041 -0.124 -0.193 -0.069
[0.036] [0.011]** [0.045]** [0.040]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 9131 9131 3323 10887
R-squared 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.23
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni ficant at 5%; ** s igni ficant at 1%
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Table A2.13. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 2: Wealth included on the right-hand side
p0 resid square p0 - p10 missing p0
Log lifetime earnings 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.035
[0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.003]**
DB pension -0.010 -0.001 0.010 -0.008
[0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008]
DC pension 0.017 -0.003 0.011 -0.022
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.010] [0.008]**
Education 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.012
[0.002]** [0.000]* [0.002] [0.002]**
Cognition 0.019 -0.007 0.006 -0.031
[0.004]** [0.001]** [0.006] [0.005]**
Financial respondent 0.033 0.006 0.000 0.156
[0.009]** [0.003]* 0.000 [0.011]**
Log risk tolerance 0.042 0.002 0.021 -0.031
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.014] [0.012]*
Single female -0.068 -0.005 -0.038 0.078
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.012]** [0.010]**
Single male -0.019 -0.001 -0.011 0.024
[0.012] [0.004] [0.015] [0.012]*
Female in couple -0.068 -0.007 -0.026 0.074
[0.008]** [0.002]** [0.011]* [0.009]**
Age -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]**
Black -0.031 0.005 -0.010 0.001
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.011]
Hispanic 0.013 0.005 -0.022 0.095
[0.013] [0.004] [0.018] [0.016]**
Father manager/professional 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.007
[0.009] [0.003] [0.013] [0.009]
Sunny day optimism 0.015 0.000 -0.006 0.004
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.008] [0.007]
Economic pessimism -0.081 -0.003 0.008 -0.011
[0.014]** [0.004] [0.017] [0.014]
Depressive symptomes -0.007 0.002 0.006 0.010
[0.004] [0.001]* [0.004] [0.004]*
Fraction fifty answers -0.045 -0.116 -0.191 -0.044
[0.036] [0.011]** [0.045]** [0.040]
Wealth non-positive 0.017 0.002 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.005] [0.016] [0.016]
Wealth in middle 0.026 -0.002 0.002 -0.029
[0.008]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.010]**
Wealth high 0.049 0.000 0.025 -0.038
[0.010]** [0.003] [0.014] [0.012]**
Fin. wealth zero -0.021 0.003 0.002 0.056
[0.012] [0.004] [0.014] [0.015]**
Fin. wealth in middle 0.025 -0.003 0.014 -0.041
[0.008]** [0.003] [0.012] [0.010]**
Fin. wealth high 0.046 -0.001 0.028 -0.043
[0.010]** [0.003] [0.014]* [0.011]**
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 9131 9131 3323 10887
R-squared 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.24
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni fi cant at 5%; ** s igni fi cant at 1%
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Table A2.14. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 1: Without wealth or belief-specic variables on the right-hand side
HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002 HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002
p0 0.222 0.077
[0.019]** [0.020]**
p0 missing -0.140 0.005
[0.012]** [0.021]
p0 - p10 0.094 0.000 0.043
[0.033]** 0.000 [0.030]
Log lifetime earnings 0.042 0.046 0.005 0.008
[0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008] [0.009]
DB pension 0.040 0.021 -0.023 -0.005
[0.014]** [0.021] [0.012] [0.018]
DC pension 0.019 0.040 0.000 0.003
[0.013] [0.020]* [0.011] [0.017]
Education 0.027 0.025 0.006 0.005
[0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.004]
Cognition 0.055 0.063 0.001 0.001
[0.006]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.011]
Financial respondent -0.078 -0.159 0.001 0.001
[0.010]** [0.019]** [0.011] [0.037]
Log risk tolerance 0.038 0.037 0.024 0.031
[0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.023]
Single female -0.096 -0.129 -0.001 -0.006
[0.014]** [0.019]** [0.015] [0.021]
Single male -0.115 -0.130 0.022 -0.016
[0.018]** [0.025]** [0.020] [0.027]
Female in couple 0.029 0.011 0.007 0.018
[0.008]** [0.012] [0.007] [0.011]
Age 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.009
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]**
Black -0.196 -0.209 0.005 0.022
[0.016]** [0.022]** [0.023] [0.035]
Hispanic -0.136 -0.172 0.012 0.018
[0.019]** [0.027]** [0.031] [0.047]
Father manager/professional 0.095 0.069 0.001 0.006
[0.017]** [0.022]** [0.014] [0.018]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 10901 4055 4850 1876
R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.01
Robust s tandard errors  in brackets . * s igni fi cant at 5%; ** s igni fi cant at 1%
Stockholding Share of stocks if stockholder
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Table A2.14. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 2: Wealth and belief-specic variables are included on the right-hand side
HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002 HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002
p0 0.109 0.070
[0.017]** [0.020]**
p0 missing -0.079 0.005
[0.011]** [0.020]
p0 - p10 0.026 0.000 0.044
[0.030] 0.000 [0.030]
Log lifetime earnings 0.017 0.016 0.003 0.006
[0.005]** [0.006]* [0.008] [0.008]
DB pension 0.022 0.005 -0.019 -0.001
[0.012] [0.019] [0.012] [0.018]
DC pension 0.020 0.041 0.002 0.006
[0.011] [0.018]* [0.011] [0.017]
Education 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.004
[0.002]** [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Cognition 0.020 0.029 0.002 -0.001
[0.005]** [0.008]** [0.008] [0.011]
Financial respondent -0.039 -0.068 -0.001 0.001
[0.008]** [0.016]** [0.011] [0.037]
Log risk tolerance 0.031 0.030 0.021 0.027
[0.018] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023]
Single female 0.005 -0.025 0.003 0.001
[0.012] [0.018] [0.015] [0.022]
Single male -0.024 -0.035 0.027 -0.017
[0.016] [0.023] [0.020] [0.027]
Female in couple 0.009 -0.009 0.009 0.017
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011]
Age -0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.008
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]*
Black -0.100 -0.095 0.005 0.010
[0.014]** [0.021]** [0.022] [0.036]
Hispanic -0.074 -0.092 -0.006 -0.007
[0.017]** [0.025]** [0.032] [0.047]
Father manager/professional 0.053 0.027 -0.006 -0.004
[0.015]** [0.019] [0.014] [0.018]
Sunny day optimism 0.005 0.029 0.008 -0.016
[0.010] [0.013]* [0.012] [0.015]
Economic pessimism -0.106 -0.082 -0.061 -0.089
[0.018]** [0.026]** [0.023]** [0.033]**
Depressive symptomes -0.008 -0.012 0.011 0.009
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010]
Fraction fifty answers -0.092 -0.076 -0.149 -0.072
[0.053] [0.073] [0.066]* [0.089]
Wealth non-positive -0.005 -0.011 0.083 0.180
[0.012] [0.020] [0.050] [0.077]*
Wealth in middle 0.138 0.134 0.023 0.011
[0.016]** [0.024]** [0.021] [0.031]
Wealth high 0.279 0.278 0.069 0.045
[0.020]** [0.031]** [0.023]** [0.035]
Fin. wealth zero -0.006 -0.016 0.134 0.168
[0.012] [0.020] [0.045]** [0.067]*
Fin. wealth in middle 0.203 0.232 -0.113 -0.073
[0.016]** [0.025]** [0.021]** [0.032]*
Fin. wealth high 0.352 0.379 -0.099 -0.043
[0.020]** [0.031]** [0.022]** [0.035]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 10887 4054 4848 1876
R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.04 0.04
Stockholding Share of stocks if stockholder
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A.3 Details of the structural econometric model
A.3.1 The likelihood function
The hypothetical "before rounding" survey answers are the following:
pbr0i = 

~i
~i
+ v0i

(64)
pbr10i = 

~i   0:1
~i
+ v10i

(65)
Observed probability answers are modeled as interval responses:
 
p0i
p10i
!
2 Qkl ,
0@  ~i~i + v0i


~i 0:1
~i
+ v10i
 1A 2 Qkl (66)
Qkl =
 
[qk; qk+1)
[ql; ql+1)
!
(67)
Expressing the event in scalar terms makes it clear how we can invert the standard normal
c.d.f. and get algebraic expressions in terms of the latent variables ~i, ~i and v0i and v10i.
p0i 2 [qk; qk+1), qk  

~i
~i
+ v0i

< qk+1 (68)
, ~i
~i
+ v0i 2

 1 (qk) ; 1 (qk+1)

p10i 2 [ql; ql+1) (69)
, ~i
~i
+ v10i 2

 1 (ql) +
0:1
~i
; 1 (ql+1) +
0:1
~i

(70)
We need distributional assumptions on the random variables to close the econometric
model and make it suitable for Maximum Likelihood estimation. First of all, we assume
that conditional on observables the individual mean, ~i is distributed normally:
~i = 
0
xi + 
0
zi + ui (71)
ui  N (0; V (u)) (72)
Second, we assume that individual uncertainty, ~i can take two values ~i 2 f~low; ~highg
where ~low is the low value corresponding to certain people and ~high is the high value for
uncertain ones. These two cut points can be estimated, but sometimes we set ~low = 0:15
which is the historical standard deviation of yearly log-returns. Whether someone has high
or low uncertainty is a probit:
~i =
(
~low if 
0
xi + 
0
zi + ui  0
~high if otherwise
(73)
ui  N (0; 1) (74)
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Third, we assume that the noise components, v0i and v10i follow a bivariate normal
distribution: "
v0i
v10i
#
 N
 
0; 2v
"
1 v
v 1
#!
(75)
Lastly, we assume that ui; ui and vi  (v0i; v10i)0 are mutually independent.
Let ~i denote the vector of beliefs, v the vector of noise terms, pi the vector of probability
answers and let the parameter vector  denote all parameters of the conditional density and
Xi denote the vector of all right hand-side variables. The quadrant Qkl that contains the
observed probability answers is dened above.
~i  (~i; ~i)0 (76)
vi  (v0i; v10i)0 (77)
pi  (p0i; p10i)0 (78)
 =
 
0; 
0
; ~low; ~high; 
0
; 
0
; V (u) ; 
2
v; v
0
(79)
Xi 
 
x0i; z
0
i; z
0
i

(80)
Then the event described by (68) and (69) can be summarized as
pi 2 Qklj~i;vi (81)
The individual (conditional) likelihood is the probability of observing that event condi-
tional on observables.
`i  ` (pijXi; ) = Pr (pi 2 Qkl j Xi; ) (82)
It is worth expanding the likelihood by conditioning on ~i
`i = ` (pijXi; ;~i = ~low) Pr (~i = ~lowjXi; ) (83)
+` (pijXi; ;~i = ~high) Pr (~i = ~highjXi; ) (84)
= ` (pijXi; ;~i = ~low)  (0xi + 0zi) (85)
+` (pijXi; ;~i = ~high) (1   (0xi + 0zi)) (86)
Thus it is enough to nd an expression for ` (pijXi; ;~i). Let us denote w0i  ui~i + v0i and
w10i  ui~i + v10i. The conditional likelihood is
` (pijXi; ;~i) = Pr
 "
p0i
p10i
#
2
"
[qk; qk+1)
[ql; ql+1)
#Xi; ;~i
!
(87)
= Pr
 "
w0i
w10i
#
2
" 
wk0i; w
k+1
0i

wl10i; w
l+1
10i
 #Xi; ;~i
!
(88)
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with the notation wk+10i   1 (qk+1)   0xi + 0zi, wk0i   1 (qk)   0xi + 0zi,
wl+110i   1 (ql+1)  0xi + 0zi + 0:1~i and wl10i   1 (ql)  
0
xi + 
0
zi +
0:1
~i
wi  (w0i; w10i)0 has a centered bivariate normal distribution and thus the likelihood
can be expressed from the bivariate normal c.d.f.
` (pijXi; ;~i) = Binorm
 
wk+10i ; w
l+1
10i ;Ci

+Binorm
 
wk0i; w
l
10i;Ci

(89)
 Binorm  wk0i; wl+110i ;Ci Binorm  wk+10i ; wl10i;Ci (90)
with Ci representing the variance-covariance matrix of wijXi; ;~i
Ci=
24 V (u)~2i + 2v V (u)~2i + v2v
V (u)
~2i
+ v
2
v
V (u)
~2i
+ 2v
35 (91)
As the bivariate normal distribution is available in standard econometric packages such as
Stata 11 the likelihood can be evaluated using (90).
A.3.2 Expected ~ and  conditional on the probability answers
With the parameter estimates, we can "estimate" (predict) the latent variables for each
individual. The goal is to get
^i = bE [~ijpi 2 Qkl] (92)
Start from the individual likelihood (68) and (69). These describe the probability of the
probability answers falling in a certain interval, conditional on ~i and ~i. In the parsimonious
notation, (68) and (69) describe the event pi 2 Qklj~i. Our question is the reverse: it is the
density (and then the expectation) of ~i and ~i conditional on the probability answer:
E [~ijpi 2 Qkl] =
Z
~i  f (~ijpi 2 Qkl) d (~i) (93)
By Bayestheorem,
f (~ijpi 2 Qkl) =
Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i) f (~i)
Pr (pi 2 Qkl) =
Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i)
li
 f (~i) (94)
so that
^i = E [~ijpi 2 Qkl] =
Z
~i 
Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i)
li
 f (~i) d (~i) (95)
143
               dc_564_12
The only unknown part is Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i). It can be computed similarly to the likelihood
function.
Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i) = Pr
 "
p0i
p10i
#
2
"
[qk; qk+1)
[ql; ql+1)
#Xi; ;~i; ~i
!
(96)
= Pr
 "
v0i
v10i
#
2
" 
vk0i; v
k+1
0i

vl10i; v
l+1
10i
 #Xi; ;~i; ~i
!
(97)
where vk+10i   1 (qk+1)   ~i~i , vk0i   1 (qk)  
~i
~i
, vl+110i   1 (ql+1)   ~i~i + 0:1~i and vl10i 
 1 (ql)   ~i~i + 0:1~i . Note that this is di¤erent from the analogous formula in the likelihood
function because, at this stage we "know" (~i; ~i). (In practice, we simulate it out using the
estimated parameters which completely specify its distribution.)
The probability in question is again the probability mass over a rectangle:
Pr (pi 2 Qij~i) = Binorm
 
vk+10i ; v
l+1
10i ;D

+Binorm
 
vk0i; v
l
10i;D

(98)
 Binorm  vk0i; vl+110i ;D Binorm  vk+10i ; vl10i;D (99)
with covariance matrix D from (75) so that D =2v
"
1 v
v 1
#
:
Having all elements in (95) the integration can be approximated by simulation. With
drawingM simulation draws ~i;s from the distribution of ~i the approximation can be written
as
^i =
Z
~i 
Pr (pi 2 Qklj~i)
li
 f (~i) d (~i) (100)
 1
Ki
MX
s=1
~i;s 
Pr
 
pi 2 Qklj~i;s

li
(101)
where Ki is a normalization factor:
Ki =
MX
s=1
Pr
 
pi 2 Qij~i;s

li
(102)
A.3.3 Estimating the variance and correlation of survey noise
The goal of this exercise is to estimate moments of the noise distribution so that we can
calibrate those in the estimation. We are interested in 2v and v. In this simple exercise, we
make use of the probability answers in the core questionnaire (p0i; p10i) and the probability
answers in the experimental module (pM0i; pM10i), and we ignore rounding.
The hypothetical "before rounding" survey answers are, conditional on the noise vari-
ables, the following
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pbr0i = 

~i
~i
+ v0i

(103)
pbr10i = 

~i   0:1
~i
+ v10i

(104)
pbrM0i = 

~i
~i
+ vM0i

(105)
pbrM10i = 

~i   0:1
~i
+ vM10i

(106)
As a result, we have that  1
 
pbr0i

= ~i
~i
+ v0i,  1
 
pbr10i

= ~i 0:1
~i
+ v10i,  1
 
pbrM0i

=
~i
~i
+ vM0i, and  1
 
pbrM10i

= ~i 0:1
~i
+ vM10i.
By assumption, the noise components are jointly normally distributed, and they are
uncorrelated across core questionnaire and the experimental module.266664
v0i
v10i
vM0i
vM10
377775  N
0BBBB@0; 2v
266664
1
v 1
0 0 1
0 0 v 1
377775
1CCCCA (107)
Moment conditions 1 and 2. Compare the inverse normal of the core and module answers
to the same probability question (p0 and pM0 or p10 and pM10), and and take expectation of
the squares:
E
h
 1
 
pbr0i
   1  pbrM0i	2i =
"
~i
~i
+ v0i   ~i
~i
  vM0i
2#
(108)
= E

(v0i   vM0i)2

= 22v
E
h
 1
 
pbr10i
   1  pbrM10i	2i =
"
~i   0:1
~i
+ v10i   ~i   0:1
~i
  vM10i
2#
(109)
= E

(v10i   vM10i)2

= 22v
Moment conditions 3 and 4. Similar comparisons across questions (p0 and pM10 or p10 and
pM0) yield moments that are similar to (108) and (109), but they also include the subjective
beliefs about the standard deviation of stock market returns.
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E
h
 1
 
pbr0i
   1  pbrM10i	2i =
"
~i
~i
+ v10i   ~i   0:1
~i
  vM10i
2#
(110)
= E
"
v0i   vM10i + 0:1
~i
2#
= 22v + 0:01E

1
~2i

E
h
 1
 
pbr10i
   1  pbrM0i	2i =
"
~i   0:1
~i
+ v10i   ~i
~i
  vM10i
2#
(111)
= E
"
v0i   vM10i   0:1
~i
2#
= 22v + 0:01E

1
~2i

Moment condition 5. Compare the adjacent probability answers in the core questionnaire
(p0i; p10i) and take expectation of the squares:
E
h
 1
 
pbr0i
   1  pbr10i	2i = E
"
~i
~i
+ v0i   ~i   0:1
~i
  v10i
2#
(112)
= E
"
v0i   v10i + 0:1
~i
2#
= 2 (1  v)2v + 0:01E

1
~2i

In principle, one can do this for the answers from the experimental module, (pM0i; pM10i).
Because of low number of observations in the experimental module, we do not make use of
that comparison.
Estimation. In principle, this is a simple Minimum Distance problem with ve moment
conditions ((108) through (112)) in three parameters
 
2v, v and E

1=~2i

. Of these three
parameters, we are interested in two, (2v, and v).
The rst two moment conditions allow for a Minimum Distance estimation of 2v, while
the fth moment, together with the third and the fourth moments, allows for a Minimum
Distance estimation of v. To see the latter, consider the di¤erence (110)   (112), and the
di¤erence (111)  (112) is, of course, analogous.
E
h
 1
 
pbr0i
   1  pbrM10i	2i
 E
h
 1
 
pbr0i
   1  pbr10i	2i = 22v + 0:01E

1
~2i

  2 (1  v)2v   0:01E

1
~2i

= 2v
2
v (113)
Unfortunately, we do not observe pbr0i and p
br
10i only their survey response versions that
are rounded versions for almost all respondents. We address rounding in the likelihood
estimation is by interval regressions, which is consistent under any rounding model (as long
as rounding is within the pre-dened intervals). In this simple exercise, we assume away
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rounding error and treat observed answers as if they were the hypothetical pre-rounding
variables pbr0i and p
br
10i .
However, an important practical consequence of rounding is the prevalence of answers at
0 and 1, and  1 (p) is not dened for p = 0 or p = 1. In this simple exercise we opted for
an ad-hoc solution replacing p = 0 to p = 0+ " and p = 1 to p = 1  ", respectively. Various
values for " were considered (0.05, 0.025, 0.01, and 0.005), and we present the results as a
function of those values.
We have four equations in two unknowns, with the rst two and second two equations
being symmetric in p0 and p10 (or their counterparts in the experimental module). This
symmetry implies that the optimumMinimum Distance estimator has identity weights under
the structure of our model.
The estimation results are the following.
Table A3.1. Estimated variance and correlation of survey noise.
Results of the Minimum Distance exercise by values of the auxiliary parameter "
" = 0:050 " = 0:025 " = 0:010 " = 0:005
v 0:96 1:05 1:17 1:26
v 0:61 0:61 0:61 0:60
These results should be viewed as very crude approximations because they ignore round-
ing (we substituted in the actual answers p for the hypothetical, before-rounding answers
pbr) and because they handle boundary values in a very ad-hoc way. The estimates of v
seem robust to our handling the boundary problem, but the estimates of v are not.
Estimation of  and 2v by Minimum Distance with covariates. The likelihood function
and the estimator for (^i; ^i) conditions on observed covariates (Xi) as well as the observed
answers to the stock market probability questions (pi). The variance and correlation coe¢ -
cient of the noise variables (v0i; v10i) may be di¤erent if conditioned on those covariates.47
In this subsection we present estimates of the noise parameters that use moment condi-
tions conditional on covariates. In practice, we repeated the Minimum Distance exercise de-
scribed above, but instead of the inverse of the observed (and "-adjusted) variables  1 (p0i)
etc. we used their residuals after having regressed on all covariates (Xi). The results are in
Table A3.2.
47Tables B6 through B10 in the Online Appendix B show that the observed noise features are not strongly
associated with covariates. That was the basis for our assumption of unbiased and homoskedastic noise.
However, even those weak associations may result in a conditional noise variance that is somewhat smaller
than the unconditional one, which may make a di¤erence in the likelihood estimation procedure.
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Table A3.2. Estimated variance and correlation of survey noise, conditional on covariates.
Results of the Minimum Distance exercise by values of the auxiliary parameter "
" = 0:050 " = 0:025 " = 0:010 " = 0:005
v 0:95 1:04 1:15 1:24
v 0:42 0:42 0:43 0:44
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A.4 Detailed estimation results from the structural econometric
model
A.4.1 Detailed estimates from the benchmark model
Table A4.1. Detailed structural estimates 2-point distribution for ~, low xed at 0.15.
E[mu] P[s ig=low] E[mu] P[s ig=low] E[mu] P[s ig=low]
probi t coeff probi t coeff probi t coeff
Log l i fetime earnings 0.005 -0.055 0.003 -0.053
[0.009] [0.048] [0.010] [0.058]
Education (years ) -0.046 -0.309 -0.042 -0.294
[0.021]* [0.262] [0.021]* [0.291]
Cognitive score 0.003 -0.019 0.005 -0.009
[0.018] [0.179] [0.018] [0.197]
DB pens ion plan 0.01 -0.01 0.005 -0.009
[0.004]* [0.032] [0.004] [0.035]
DC pens ion plan 0.02 -0.121 0.017 -0.112
[0.014] [0.101] [0.014] [0.118]
Financia l  respondent 0.036 0.073 0.035 0.057
[0.020] [0.193] [0.020] [0.207]
Log ri sk tolerance 0.088 0.137 0.087 0.11
[0.027]** [0.239] [0.026]** [0.276]
Single female -0.158 -0.763 -0.145 -0.833
[0.033]** [0.234]** [0.034]** [0.257]**
Single male -0.076 -0.28 -0.061 -0.361
[0.030]* [0.238] [0.029]* [0.268]
Female in couple -0.108 -0.715 -0.112 -0.798
[0.028]** [0.235]** [0.031]** [0.305]**
Age 0.003 0.079 0.002 0.072
[0.004] [0.039]* [0.004] [0.045]
Black -0.072 -0.184 -0.041 -0.174
[0.034]* [0.269] [0.032] [0.267]
Hispanic 0 0.029 0.021 0.036
[0.039] [0.297] [0.039] [0.331]
Father profess iona l 0.028 0.202 0.018 0.166
[0.021] [0.189] [0.020] [0.217]
Miss ing l i fetime earnings 0.015 0.519 0.005 0.558
[0.020] [0.170]** [0.021] [0.189]**
Miss ing ri sk tolerance 0.023 0.32 0.018 0.314
[0.022] [0.212] [0.021] [0.235]
Miss ing father occupation 0.005 0.291 0.006 0.312
[0.025] [0.205] [0.024] [0.222]
Non-pos i tive wealth -0.008 -0.623
[0.120] [1.107]
Medium wealth 0.015 -0.396
[0.025] [0.209]
Hugh wealth 0.068 -0.061
[0.030]* [0.296]
Zero financia l  weal th 0.02 0.272
[0.040] [0.353]
Medium financia l  wealth 0.024 -0.215
[0.027] [0.237]
High finacia l  wealth 0.049 -0.138
[0.031] [0.278]
Sunshine optimism 0.04 0.038
[0.016]* [0.015]*
Pess imism in economic outlook -0.206 -0.182
[0.041]** [0.038]**
Depress ive symptomes -0.018 -0.011
[0.010] [0.009]
Miss ing sunshine -0.034 -0.033
[0.031] [0.030]
Miss ing economic pess imism -0.038 -0.036
[0.038] [0.038]
Fraction fi fty answers -3.724
[1.025]**
Constant -0.009 -0.716 -0.148 -3.871 -0.052 -0.76
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Table A4.2. Detailed probit estimates 2-point distribution for ~, low xed at 0.15
mu_hat 2.361*** 0.302***
[0.257] [0.099]
sigma_hat -0.160 0.144
[0.285] [0.111]
Log lifetime earnings 0.128*** 0.109*** 0.000 -0.003
[0.027] [0.026] [0.008] [0.008]
Education (years) 0.102*** 0.075*** 0.011** 0.008
[0.013] [0.013] [0.005] [0.005]
Cognitive score 0.214*** 0.143*** 0.002 -0.009
[0.035] [0.035] [0.014] [0.014]
DB pension plan 0.017 0.108 -0.020 -0.012
[0.066] [0.069] [0.024] [0.024]
DC pension plan 0.097 0.079 0.006 0.004
[0.064] [0.065] [0.021] [0.021]
Financial respondent -0.071** -0.152*** -0.029*** -0.040***
[0.035] [0.038] [0.010] [0.011]
Log risk tolerance 0.072 -0.127 0.048* 0.030
[0.082] [0.086] [0.028] [0.029]
Single female -0.344*** 0.067 -0.023 0.009
[0.072] [0.093] [0.029] [0.035]
Single male -0.292*** -0.098 -0.022 -0.005
[0.087] [0.092] [0.034] [0.035]
Female in couple -0.011 0.280*** 0.010 0.029
[0.039] [0.060] [0.013] [0.020]
Age -0.013 -0.016 0.006 0.006*
[0.010] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004]
Black -0.728*** -0.582*** 0.034 0.057
[0.087] [0.090] [0.045] [0.046]
Hispanic -0.715*** -0.723*** -0.008 -0.004
[0.125] [0.124] [0.065] [0.063]
Father professional 0.162** 0.094 0.002 -0.003
[0.074] [0.075] [0.023] [0.023]
Constant -1.452** -1.066 0.110 0.060
[0.690] [0.724] [0.276] [0.282]
Observations 3323 3323 974 974
Log likelihood -1078 -1049 -129 -128
Standard errors  are clustered at the household level
* s igni fi cant at 5%; ** s igni fi cant at 1%
Probit coefficients Truncated regression coefficients
Pr(S=1) E(s|s>0)
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A.4.2 Results for nancial respondents
Table A4.3. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~, low xed at 0.15.
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE Point estimate SE
Population average of ~  0:048 0:011  0:038 0:056
Population standard deviation of ~ 0:147 0:010 0:202 0:094
Population average of ~ 0:170 0:002 0:449 0:086
Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Table is analogous to Table 2.2 in the main text
Table A4.4. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~, low xed at 0.15.
Average ^i Average ^i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:134 0:434
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings  0:078 0:481
Education college or more 0:061 0:461
Education high school or less  0:074 0:469
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:140 0:437
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:092 0:471
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:042 0:474
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity  0:128 0:455
Father was manager or professional 0:047 0:442
Father had other occupation  0:021 0:477
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:033 0:437
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance  0:141 0:504
Entire sample of nancial respondents  0:020 0:468
Total number of observations 2; 313 2; 313
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
^i and ^i are the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return,
predicted value. Table is analogous to Table 2.3 in the main text
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Table A4.5. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~, low xed at 0.15.
Pr (si > 0), partial e¤ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^i 0:862 0:355
(0.097) (0.129)
^i  0:158 0:170
(0.115) (0.146)
Log lifetime earnings 0:031 0:019  0:003  0:008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Education 0:037 0:029 0:010 0:008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.06) (0.007)
Cognitive capacity 0:060 0:039  0:002  0:013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Log risk tolerance 0:015  0:064 0:049 0:028
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)
Single female  0:132 0:025  0:032 0:001
(0.025) (0.034) (0.031) (0.042)
Single male  0:108  0:034  0:028  0:014
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038)
Female in couple  0:026 0:101  0:003 0:018
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.039)
African American  0:218  0:155 0:036 0:058
(0.027) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045)
Hispanic  0:210  0:162  0:004 0:002
(0.043) (0.042) (0.067) (0.064)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to Table 2.4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4);  signicant at 1%;  at 5%
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A.4.3 Results with freely estimated 2-point distributions for ~
Table A4.6. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
2-point distribution for ~, low point estimated as well.
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE Point estimate SE
Population average of ~  0:054 0:015  0:036 0:010
Population standard deviation of ~ 0:210 0:027 0:178 0:013
Population average of ~ 0:516 0:055 0:165 0:011
Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Table is analogous to Table 2.2 in the main text
Table A4.7. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
2-point distribution for ~, low point estimated as well.
Average ^i Average ^i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:703 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings  0:004 0:164
Education college or more 0:054 0:164
Education high school or less  0:041 0:164
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:071 0:164
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:068 0:165
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:041 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity  0:071 0:163
Father was manager or professional 0:042 0:164
Father had other occupation  0:008 0:164
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:021 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance  0:055 0:164
Entire sample respondents  0:036 0:164
Total number of observations 3; 314 3; 314
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
^i and ^i are the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return,
predicted value. Table is analogous to Table 2.3 in the main text
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Table A4.8. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
2-point distribution for ~, low point estimated as well.
Pr (si > 0), partial e¤ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^i 0:712 2:283
(0.080) (0.265)
^i  11:62  37:2
(13.95) (44.7)
Log lifetime earnings 0:041 0:037 0:000 0:121
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.027)
Education 0:033 0:026 0:011 0:080
(0.004) (0.004) (0.05) (0.013)
Cognitive capacity 0:069 0:054 0:002 0:176
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.037)
Log risk tolerance 0:023  0:008 0:049  0:027
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.084)
Single female  0:111  0:033  0:023  0:107
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.083)
Single male  0:093  0:051  0:022  0:164
(0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.090)
Female in couple  0:003 0:050 0:006 0:161
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.056)
African American  0:233  0:204 0:034  0:655
(0.027) (0.028) (0.045) (0.089)
Hispanic  0:229  0:227  0:008  0:729
(0.024) (0.038) (0.065) (0.125)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to table 4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4);  signicant at 1%;  signicant at 5%
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A.4.4 Results with including all the belief-specic right hand-side variables (z)
in all models with the other covariates (x)
Table A4.9. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
2-point distribution for ~, low point xed to 0.15. z and z are always included with x
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE Point estimate SE
Population average of ~  0:066 0:018  0:046 0:021
Population standard deviation of ~ 0:197 0:019 0:213 0:036
Population average of ~ 0:576 0:077 0:524 0:089
Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
Table is analogous to Table 2.2 in the main text
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Table A4.10. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
2-point distribution for ~, low point xed to 0.15. z and z are always included with x
Average ^i Average ^i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:065 0:546
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings  0:092 0:535
Education college or more 0:042 0:539
Education high school or less  0:090 0:532
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:073 0:540
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:049 0:576
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:024 0:551
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity  0:132 0:509
Father was manager or professional 0:030 0:520
Father had other occupation  0:046 0:548
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:011 0:512
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance  0:142 0:562
Financial respondent in couple 0:032 0:511
Non-nancial respondent in couple  0:049 0:556
Entire sample  0:038 0:537
Total number of observations 3; 314 3; 314
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Respondents of age 55 through 64 (partner also 55-64)
^i and ^i: subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return,
predicted value. Table is analogous to Table 2.3 in the main text
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Table A4.11. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
2-point distribution for ~, low point xed to 0.15. z and z are always included with x
Pr (si > 0), partial e¤ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^i 0:608 0:240
(0.095) (0.117)
^i  0:071 0:240
(0.096) (0.131)
Log lifetime earnings 0:037 0:033  0:000  0:003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Education 0:030 0:023 0:009 0:007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.05) (0.005)
Cognitive capacity 0:054 0:042  0:002  0:011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Log risk tolerance 0:026  0:025 0:045 0:034
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Single female  0:088 0:015  0:017 0:010
(0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
Single male  0:079  0:030  0:024  0:021
(0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
Female in couple 0:005 0:078 0:017 0:018
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.024)
African American  0:233  0:190 0:028 0:047
(0.026) (0.030) (0.045) (0.046)
Hispanic  0:220  0:216  0:005  0:006
(0.039) (0.040) (0.063) (0.061)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to table 4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4);  signicant at 1%;  at 5%
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B1.1. Summary statistics of the control variables in the entire HRS sample
as well as the subsamples for the analysis
Entire sample 50-70 years old subsample
All Financial knowedge Personality
subsample subsample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Number series score -0.05 1.01 0.16 0.96 0.08 1.00 0.24 0.95
Education (years) 12.55 3.18 12.99 3.02 13.11 2.92 13.13 2.88
Female 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49
Age in 2010 70.52 10.42 62.57 5.08 62.37 5.11 62.70 5.05
African American 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.34
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30
Wealth non-positive 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30
Log wealth 10.87 3.90 10.76 4.05 10.53 4.27 10.86 4.03
Observations 15372 7446 685 3547
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2002, 50 to 70 years old respondents and HRS 2010, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B1.2. The propensity to give various answer combinations to p0 and p10 in 2002 and
p0, p20 and pltn20 in 2010 that imply zero probability mass or violate the laws of probability.
Linear probability estimates (OLS regressions) age is 50 to 70 at the time of the survey
Implied zero probability mass Apparent violation of the laws ofprobability
2002 2010 2002 2010
p0=p10 p0=p20 p0+pltn0=1 p0<p10 p0<p20 p0+pltn0>1
Number series score -0.010 -0.013 0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.018
[0.007] [0.006]* [0.005]** [0.005]* [0.005]** [0.005]**
Education (years) -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.004
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]** [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]*
Female 0.040 0.043 -0.003 -0.004 0.015 0.026
[0.011]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]* [0.008]**
Age 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]**
African American -0.013 0.030 -0.015 0.008 0.070 0.004
[0.017] [0.015] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012]** [0.012]
Hispanic -0.080 0.017 0.015 0.043 0.074 -0.010
[0.024]** [0.019] [0.015] [0.020]* [0.015]** [0.014]
Wealth nonpositive -0.071 -0.021 -0.006 -0.038 0.012 -0.032
[0.049] [0.038] [0.030] [0.035] [0.029] [0.030]
Log wealth -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
p0 category dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7560 6416 6416 7560 6416 6416
R-squared 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.25
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2002, 50 to 70 years old respondents and HRS 2010, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B1.3. The Big Five personality measures and their predictors.
Linear regression estimates (OLS regressions), 50 to 70 years old respondents in HRS 2010.
Agreableness Conscientiousness Extroversion Neuroticism Openness
Agreableness 0.342 0.404 0.074 0.262
[0.024]** [0.020]** [0.028]** [0.021]**
Conscientiousness 0.244 -0.085 -0.151 0.128
[0.017]** [0.017]** [0.024]** [0.017]**
Extroversion 0.384 -0.114 -0.059 0.439
[0.019]** [0.023]** [0.028]* [0.019]**
Neuroticism 0.041 -0.117 -0.034 -0.011
[0.015]** [0.019]** [0.016]* [0.016]
Openness 0.254 0.174 0.447 -0.018
[0.021]** [0.023]** [0.019]** [0.028]
Number series score -0.022 0.011 0.009 -0.039 -0.002
[0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.020]* [0.015]
Education (years) -0.02 -0.002 0.02 -0.013 0.041
[0.005]** [0.007] [0.006]** [0.007] [0.006]**
Female 0.185 0.087 0.087 0.051 -0.153
[0.023]** [0.028]** [0.024]** [0.031] [0.023]**
Age 0.001 -0.005 0.007 -0.017 -0.005
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]*
African American 0.051 -0.137 0.046 -0.31 -0.004
[0.037] [0.045]** [0.037] [0.052]** [0.040]
Hispanic -0.073 0.168 0.07 0.075 -0.005
[0.044] [0.051]** [0.043] [0.069] [0.049]
Wealth nonpositive -0.111 0.238 0.081 -0.058 0.077
[0.095] [0.106]* [0.097] [0.125] [0.103]
Log wealth -0.011 0.022 0.017 -0.017 0.003
[0.007] [0.008]** [0.008]* [0.009] [0.008]
Constant 0.212 0.133 -0.946 1.563 -0.087
[0.183] [0.218] [0.180]** [0.247]** [0.188]
Observations 3247 3247 3247 3247 3247
R-squared 0.51 0.21 0.53 0.06 0.51
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2002, 50 to 70 years old respondents and HRS 2010, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B1.4. The measure of general optimism and its predictors.
Linear regression estimates (OLS), 50 to 70 years old respondents in HRS 2010.
(1) (2)
Sunshine optimism 0.103
[0.047]*
Number series score 0.038 0.024
[0.030] [0.020]
Education (years) 0.025 0.020
[0.010]* [0.007]**
Female 0.065 0.067
[0.048] [0.031]*
Age 0.008 0.008
[0.007] [0.003]*
African American 0.402 0.421
[0.077]** [0.052]**
Hispanic 0.412 0.530
[0.094]** [0.062]**
Wealth nonpositive 0.477 0.499
[0.195]* [0.133]**
Log wealth 0.048 0.057
[0.015]** [0.010]**
Constant -1.571 -1.566
[0.552]** [0.257]**
Observations 1540 3513
R-squared 0.04 0.05
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010, 50 to 70 years old respondents. Subset with sunshine optimism is smaller because
that measure is derived from earlier observations in the HRS (1994 and 2000).
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Table B1.5.
Pairwise correlation of nancial knowledge, Big Five personality and optimism
Hist. Financial Agreeable- Conscien- Extro- Neuro- Open-
returns knowledge ness tiousness version ticism ness
Financial knowlege 0.19
(685)
Agreeableness 0.04 0.07
(349) (310)
Conscientiousness  0:02 0.04 0.42
(349) (310) (3543)
Extroversion 0.09 0.13 0.62 0.25
(349) (310) (3543) (3542)
Neuroticism 0.00 0.07  0:03  0:14  0:08
(350) (311) (3545) (3542) (3543)
Openness 0.04 0.07 0.57 0.33 0.65  0:08
(348) (309) (3535) (3534) (3535) (3535)
Optimism 0.10 0.15 0.26 0.02 0.33  0:20 0.28
(349) (311) (3529) (3526) (3527) (3527) (3520)
Number of observations in parentheses. * signicant at 5%.
HRS 2010, Financial literacy experimental module and "Participant Lifestyle Questionnaire" 50-70 years of age.
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B.2 Detailed estimates of the structural models with 2 probability
answers
Table B2.1
Stock market expectations and nancial knowledge. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model with other right hand-side variables
(n = 619; log likelihood =  2617:0)
Perceived Log unobserved Probit coe¢ cient for
mean
 


heterogeneity in (u) high perceived risk ()
Historical returns 0.06  0:55  0:28
(S.E.) (0:03) (0:36) (0:56)
Other nancial knowledge 0.05  0:37  0:54
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:13) (0:30)
Female  0:08 0.32 3.4
(S.E.) (0:04) (0:28) (35:9)
Age  0:00  0:01  0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02) (0:04)
Education 0.01  0:08 0.01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04) (0:08)
Number series score  0:03  0:33  0:11
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:12) (0:29)
Constant  0:06  1:65 0.91
(S.E.) (0:04) (0:34) (0:60)
Historical returns: dummy for response stocks have had higher returns than bonds and savings accounts.
Other nancial knowledge: standardized score. See the methods section for details of the model.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. Financial literacy module, 50 to 70 years old respondents. No other RHS variables
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Table B2.2
Stock market expectations and agreeableness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Agreeableness above average 0.00  0:00 0:16 0:16
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:11)
Female  0:08 0.55
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:13)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.02  0:05
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04)
Number series score 0.05  0:33
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11)
Constant  0:07  0:04 0.92 0.62
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:02) (0:10) (0:20)
Log likelihood  13099  13016
Observations 3062 3062
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.3
Stock market expectations and conscientiousness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Conscientiousness above average 0.00 0:01 0:00 0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:11) (0:11)
Female  0:08 0.59
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:10)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.02  0:05
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04)
Number series score 0.04  0:35
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:17)
Constant  0:06  0:04 1.02 0.79
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:02) (0:10) (0:25)
Log likelihood  13093  13010
Observations 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.4
Stock market expectations and extroversion. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Extroversion above average 0.02 0:00  0:04  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:11)
Female  0:08 0.60
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:15)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.02  0:04
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04)
Number series score 0.04  0:34
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:14)
Constant  0:08  0:05 1.03 0.71
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:02) (0:11) (0:22)
Log likelihood  13103  13021
Observations 3062 3062
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.5
Stock market expectations and Openness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Openness above average 0:05 0:02  0:03 0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:10)
Female  0:08 0.58
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:10)
Age  0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.02  0:04
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04)
Number series score 0.04  0:33
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:17)
Constant  0:10 1.02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11)
Log likelihood  13074
Observations 3057 3057
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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B.3 Detailed estimates of the structural models using all three
probability answers
Table B2.6
Stock market expectations and nancial knowledge. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
(n = 433; log likelihood =  2791:3)
Perceived Log unobserved Probit coe¢ cient for
mean
 


heterogeneity in (u) high perceived risk ()
Historical returns 0.02  0:08  0:05
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:21) (0:29)
Other nancial knowledge 0.02  0:15 0:10
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:10) (0:13)
Constant  0:07  1:95 1.21
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:16) (0:23)
Historical returns: dummy for response stocks have had higher returns than bonds and savings accounts.
Other nancial knowledge: standardized score. See the methods section for details of the model.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. Financial literacy module, 50 to 70 years old respondents. No other RHS variables
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Table B2.7
Stock market expectations and nancial knowledge. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
(n = 433; log likelihood =  2781:1)
Perceived Log unobserved Probit coe¢ cient for
mean
 


heterogeneity in (u) high perceived risk ()
Historical returns 0.01  0:06 0:15
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:23) (0:38)
Other nancial knowledge 0.02  0:17 0:09
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:11) (0:17)
Female 0:01 0.28 0.52
(S.E.) (0:02) (0:25) (0:33)
Age 0:00 0:03  0:02
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02) (0:04)
Education 0.01  0:04 0.12
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:04) (0:09)
Number series score 0:00 0:19  0:29
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:17) (0:27)
Constant  0:07  2:71 1.08
(S.E.) (0:03) (0:38) (0:56)
Historical returns: dummy for response stocks have had higher returns than bonds and savings accounts.
Other nancial knowledge: standardized score. See the methods section for details of the model.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. Financial literacy module, 50 to 70 years old respondents. No other RHS variables
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Table B2.8
Stock market expectations and Agreeableness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Agreeableness above average  0.01  0:01 0:04 0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:11)
Female  0:02 0.21
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:05  0:06 1.06 1.15
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:10) (0:19)
Log likelihood  14749  14707
Observations 2291 2291
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.9
Stock market expectations and Consicientiousness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Conscientiousness above average  0.01  0:01  0:06  0:08
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:12) (0:12)
Female  0:02 0.22
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01 0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:05  0:06 1.12 1.20
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:10) (0:18)
Log likelihood  14736  14694
Observations 2289 2289
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.10
Stock market expectations and Extroversion. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Extroversion above average  0.00  0:01  0:07  0:08
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:13) (0:13)
Female  0:03 0.21
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01 0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:06  0:06 1.13 1.21
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:11) (0:20)
Log likelihood  14745  14703
Observations 2291 2291
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.11
Stock market expectations and Neuroticism. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Neuroticism above average  0.02 0:00  0:04  0:05
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:12) (0:12)
Female  0:03 0.21
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01  0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:05  0:06 1.11 1.19
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:10) (0:20)
Log likelihood  14748  14707
Observations 2291 2291
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.12
Stock market expectations and Openness. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Openness above average 0.01 0:00 0:06 0:07
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:12) (0:11)
Female  0:03 0.21
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:01
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:01
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:06  0:07 1.05 1.11
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:10) (0:19)
Log likelihood  14718  14677
Observations 2286 2286
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
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Table B2.13
Stock market expectations and Optimism. Parameter estimates of the
structural econometric model using all three probability answers (p0; p20; pltn20)
Perceived mean Probit coe¢ cient for
returns
 


high perceived risk ()
Optimism above average 0.04 0:03 0:07 0:10
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:12) (0:12)
Female  0:03 0.22
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:12)
Age 0:00  0:02
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01)
Education 0.01 0:00
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:02)
Number series score 0.02 0:02
(S.E.) (0:00) (0:07)
Constant  0:07  0:08 1.06 1.11
(S.E.) (0:01) (0:01) (0:09) (0:18)
Log likelihood  14716  14676
Observations 2286 2286
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. * signicant at 5%; ** 1%.
HRS 2010. "Participant lifestyle" questionnaire subsample, 50 to 70 years old respondents.
175
               dc_564_12
C Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Detailed estimates from the models with interactions
Table C1.1.
Stockholders versus non-stockholders. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective
expected value of yearly stock returns (), average subjective standard deviation () and
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural
regressions including full interactions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log[Std(u)]
coef
interaction with
stockholding coef
interaction with
stockholding coef
interaction with
stockholding
Constant -0.091 0.087 -0.597 -0.134 -1.176 -0.229
[0.007]** [0.013]** [0.026]** [0.052]** [0.082]** [0.063]**
July 08 to Sep08 0.008 -0.013 0.135 -0.052 0.158 -0.066
[0.018] [0.022] [0.067]* [0.082] [0.076]* [0.098]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.091 -0.031 0.29 -0.066 0.465 0.135
[0.041]* [0.052] [0.155] [0.188] [0.161]** [0.203]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 -0.012 -0.006 -0.113 0.194 0.231 0.251
[0.052] [0.068] [0.173] [0.246] [0.181] [0.268]
Female -0.103 0.05 0.234 0.076 0.157 0.024
[0.016]** [0.019]** [0.059]** [0.073] [0.066]* [0.087]
Single 0.012 -0.017 0.135 -0.169 0.244 -0.232
[0.018] [0.022] [0.062]* [0.081]* [0.070]** [0.096]*
Black 0.015 -0.126 0.539 0.101 0.483 0.276
[0.028] [0.062]* [0.104]** [0.228] [0.107]** [0.241]
Hispanic 0.013 -0.04 0.408 -0.107 0.357 -0.004
[0.035] [0.055] [0.134]** [0.223] [0.139]* [0.242]
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 0.011 -0.012 0.018
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
Years of education 0.004 -0.001 -0.04 -0.006 -0.033 -0.028
[0.003] [0.004] [0.011]** [0.015] [0.012]** [0.017]
P(economic recession) -0.004 0.001
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.025 0.007
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.673 -0.42
2004-2006 average [0.249]** [0.261]
Ll -42278.6
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.083
Mean(s ) 0.622
Mean(Std(u) 0.355
Var[R*]/Var[R] 0.652
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.535
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.225
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Stockholders are those who own any stock-market based assets (stocks, mutual funds etc.) either directly or through retirement
accounts. Members of the same households are assigned the same stockholding status.
For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4.4
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Table C1.2.
Informed versus uninformed respondents. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective
expected value of yearly stock returns (), average subjective standard deviation () and
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural
regressions including full interactions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log[Std(u)]
coef
interaction with
informed coef
interaction with
informed coef
interaction with
informed
Constant -0.085 0.06 -0.588 -0.123 -1.084 -0.087
[0.006]** [0.012]** [0.025]** [0.050]* [0.084]** [0.054]
July 08 to Sep08 0.001 -0.004 0.106 0.005 0.165 -0.079
[0.020] [0.023] [0.072] [0.085] [0.080]* [0.097]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.136 -0.108 0.311 -0.08 0.528 -0.047
[0.049]** [0.056] [0.186] [0.210] [0.192]** [0.218]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 0.014 -0.064 -0.114 0.138 -0.101 0.582
[0.054] [0.068] [0.211] [0.256] [0.225] [0.276]*
Female -0.096 0.058 0.166 0.128 0.107 0.081
[0.016]** [0.019]** [0.063]** [0.076] [0.070] [0.086]
Single 0.01 -0.029 0.111 -0.096 0.183 -0.058
[0.018] [0.022] [0.069] [0.084] [0.075]* [0.093]
Black 0.01 -0.077 0.458 0.221 0.461 0.244
[0.032] [0.048] [0.122]** [0.180] [0.124]** [0.184]
Hispanic 0.066 -0.158 0.179 0.347 0.173 0.311
[0.032]* [0.054]** [0.135] [0.211] [0.140] [0.219]
Age -0.003 0.001 -0.011 0.01 -0.01 0.011
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
Years of education 0.006 0 -0.034 -0.018 -0.026 -0.046
[0.003] [0.004] [0.011]** [0.014] [0.012]* [0.016]**
P(economic recession) -0.003 0
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.022 0
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.634 -0.537
2004-2006 average [0.252]** [0.230]*
Ll -42300.4
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.08
Mean(s ) 0.608
Mean(Std(u) 0.376
Var[R*]/Var[R] 0.676
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.699
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.138
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Informed are those who claim to follow the stock market at least occasionally.
For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4.4
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Table C1.3.
Stockholders versus non-stockholders. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective
expected value of yearly stock returns (), average subjective standard deviation () and
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural
regressions including full interactions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log[Std(u)]
coef
interaction with
cognition coef
interaction with
cognition coef
interaction with
cognition
Constant -0.085 0.029 -0.6 -0.116 -1.175 -0.194
[0.007]** [0.013]* [0.025]** [0.051]* [0.075]** [0.060]**
July 08 to Sep08 -0.03 0.043 0.152 -0.056 0.169 -0.081
[0.019] [0.022] [0.070]* [0.084] [0.079]* [0.099]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.078 -0.023 0.286 0.003 0.531 0.037
[0.049] [0.056] [0.185] [0.211] [0.186]** [0.218]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 -0.027 0.005 -0.249 0.405 0.31 0.017
[0.058] [0.070] [0.188] [0.245] [0.191] [0.262]
Female -0.097 0.04 0.2 0.129 0.1 0.155
[0.017]** [0.019]* [0.063]** [0.075] [0.071] [0.088]
Single -0.016 0.013 0.128 -0.105 0.259 -0.189
[0.019] [0.022] [0.069] [0.084] [0.077]** [0.097]
Black 0.011 -0.113 0.485 0.285 0.457 0.336
[0.030] [0.053]* [0.113]** [0.199] [0.115]** [0.208]
Hispanic 0.024 -0.074 0.325 0.134 0.284 0.159
[0.036] [0.054] [0.146]* [0.214] [0.151] [0.228]
Age -0.003 0.001 -0.008 0.005 -0.011 0.01
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004] [0.003]** [0.004]*
Years of education 0.009 -0.003 -0.046 0.011 -0.037 -0.014
[0.003]** [0.004] [0.011]** [0.014] [0.012]** [0.017]
P(economic recession) -0.003 0
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.025 0.005
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.408 0.239
2004-2006 average [0.215]** [0.268]
Ll -42319.7
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.083
Mean(s ) 0.617
Mean(Std(u) 0.351
Var[R*]/Var[R] 0.649
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.518
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.235
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Cognitive capacity is measured by a score from memory and numeracy tasks.
For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4.4
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C.2 Estimates based on alternative functional form assumptions
In this appendix we re-estimate our structural models with two alternative specications for
the return distribution, Student-t with various degrees of freedom and shifted log-normal.
Within the Student-t framework, the relation between the probability answers and the
estimated parameters is the following:
P0i = T

i
i
; df

(114)
Px+i = T

i   x=100
i
; df

(115)
Px i = T

x=100  i
i
; df

(116)
where df is the degrees of freedom of the distribution. Note that since the t distribution
is symmetric,  can still be interpreted as the mean of the subjective distribution. However,
 will not be the subjective standard deviation anymore. According to the properties of the
Student-t distribution, the true standard deviation will be
Std (Ri) = i
s
df
df   2 (117)
Within the shifted log-normal framework, returns follow Ri  [lnN (i; 2i )  1]. In this
case the probability answers are:
P0i = 

i
i

(118)
Px+i = 

i   x=100
i

(119)
Px i = 

x=100  i
i

(120)
For small return realizations the normal and the shifted log-normal distributions are very
similar. We, however, have quite high subjective variance, and thus a very large fraction of
the return distribution is in a range where the true distributions are di¤erent. An important
di¤erence between the normal and the shifted lognormal model is that they have di¤erent
moments. It can be shown that the rst two moments of the shifted lognormal distribution
are:
E [Ri] = exp

i +
2i
2

  1 (121)
V [Ri] =
 
exp
 
2i
  1  exp  i + 2i  (122)
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Because it is skewed, the mean of the distribution will be larger than the estimated .
The potential asymmetry of the subjective distribution, thus, can be a reason for having
small, usually negative values for .
As we can see, the parameter estimates are very much the same in all specications,
and the qualitative results do not change. All specications agree that the crash brought a
moderate increase in uncertainty and a huge increase in disagreement. The normal and the
Student-t models agree that the mean of the subjective distribution was weakly positively
a¤ected by the crash. The log-normal model is also equivalent to the other models if we talk
about log-returns instead of actual returns. As we saw earlier, actual returns are non-linear
functions of  and , and the moderate increase in  must have a positive e¤ect on R.
According to these estimates, the average R increased after the crash from 16.5 percent to
72.2 percent, and the overall mean is 21.2 percent. This is clearly implausible.
We can also see that the likelihood is the highest in the original normal case and thus
this model ts the data the best. While asymmetric models could explain how the mean of
the subjective distribution can be positive even if the average P0 value is less than 50, we
can see that the log-normal model does not t the data well. Further investigation is needed
to test for the potential non-normality of the subjective return distribution
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Table C2.1.
Stock returns assumed to be distributed Student-t with 3 degrees of freedom
Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns () ;
average subjective standard deviation () and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural regressions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log(Std(u))
Constant -0.090 -0.871 -1.165
[0.006]** [0.024]** [0.074]**
July 08 to September 08 0.000 0.114 0.122
[0.010] [0.038]** [0.046]**
October 08 to November 08 0.059 0.277 0.552
[0.025]* [0.090]** [0.099]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.027 0.003 0.364
[0.034] [0.122] [0.135]**
Female -0.063 0.248 0.157
[0.009]** [0.035]** [0.043]**
Single 0.004 0.040 0.118
[0.010] [0.040] [0.048]*
Black -0.017 0.592 0.562
[0.026] [0.095]** [0.098]**
Hispanic 0.000 0.383 0.327
[0.027] [0.109]** [0.114]**
Age -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Years of education 0.001 -0.033 -0.032
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.094 -0.195
[0.010]** [0.038]* [0.047]**
Follow the stock market 0.048 -0.125 -0.075
[0.010]** [0.039]** [0.046]
Stockholder 0.071 -0.047 -0.177
[0.010]** [0.039] [0.049]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.018
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.545
2004-2006 average [0.196]**
Log-likelihood -43091.9
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.087
Mean(s ) 0.818
Mean(Std(u) 0.364
s 2/(s 2+V(v)) 0.763
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.574
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.193
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male, non-Black and non-Hispanic, married.
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Table C2.2.
Stock returns assumed to be distributed Student-t with 10 degrees of freedom
Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns () ;
average subjective standard deviation () and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural regressions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log(Std(u))
Constant -0.088 -0.678 -1.213
[0.006]** [0.023]** [0.077]**
July 08 to September 08 0.001 0.113 0.128
[0.010] [0.038]** [0.047]**
October 08 to November 08 0.061 0.288 0.565
[0.025]* [0.088]** [0.099]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.028 0.015 0.376
[0.033] [0.120] [0.135]**
Female -0.062 0.239 0.149
[0.009]** [0.034]** [0.043]**
Single 0.004 0.040 0.120
[0.010] [0.039] [0.048]*
Black -0.017 0.590 0.560
[0.025] [0.093]** [0.097]**
Hispanic 0.001 0.386 0.330
[0.027] [0.107]** [0.114]**
Age -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Years of education 0.002 -0.034 -0.031
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.099 -0.197
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.048]**
Follow the stock market 0.049 -0.128 -0.073
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.046]
Stockholder 0.071 -0.055 -0.180
[0.010]** [0.038] [0.049]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.017
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.522
2004-2006 average [0.192]**
Log-likelihood -42425.5
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.085
Mean(s ) 0.641
Mean(Std(u) 0.348
s 2/(s 2+V(v)) 0.663
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.512
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.238
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male, non-Black and non-Hispanic, married.
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Table C2.3.
Stock returns assumed to be distributed log-normal with parameters  and 
(which, in this case, are di¤erent from the mean and the standard deviation, respectively)
Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns () ;
average subjective standard deviation () and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations (Std (u)). Results from structural regressions. HRS 2008.
µ log(s ) log(Std(u))
Constant -0.108 -0.565 -1.185
[0.006]** [0.023]** [0.078]**
July 08 to September 08 0.000 0.098 0.116
[0.010] [0.038]* [0.047]*
October 08 to November 08 0.065 0.296 0.572
[0.026]* [0.093]** [0.103]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.027 0.018 0.379
[0.035] [0.124] [0.139]**
Female -0.067 0.234 0.145
[0.009]** [0.035]** [0.044]**
Single 0.005 0.044 0.127
[0.011] [0.040] [0.049]**
Black -0.013 0.554 0.527
[0.025] [0.092]** [0.094]**
Hispanic 0.005 0.382 0.328
[0.028] [0.109]** [0.115]**
Age -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]*
Years of education 0.002 -0.031 -0.029
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.032 -0.081 -0.179
[0.010]** [0.038]* [0.048]**
Follow the stock market 0.050 -0.101 -0.046
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.047]
Stockholder 0.074 -0.054 -0.177
[0.010]** [0.039] [0.050]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.018
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.521
2004-2006 average [0.196]**
Log-likelihood -42360.2
N 9348
Mean(µ) 0.210
Mean(s ) 9.017
Mean(Std(u) 0.355
s 2/(s 2+V(v)) 0.644
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.484
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.231
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male, non-Black and non-Hispanic, married.
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